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ABSTRACT
THE MORAL STATUS OF HUMAN FETUSES
FEBRUARY, 1988
LUCILLE R. CORMIER, B.A., ANNA MARIA COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Dir6ct0d by! Profossor Gar©th B. Matthows
The study attempts to determine whether or not human fetuses
have moral status. It seeks to establish whether or not they are the
subjects of rights or if there are persuasive reasons for taking their
interests into account in our moral decisions.
Three broad categories of answers to the question are analyzed.
The arguments developed by Michael Tooley in Abortion and
infanticide are assessed as representative of a liberal view. Those
of L.W. Sumner in Abortion and Moral Theory stand as moderate
claims and the position defended by William May in "Abortion and
Man's Moral Being" represents a conservative position. The work of
other authors is drawn upon to help analyze the central arguments
and to provide alternate interpretations. Among these are Jane
English, Judith Thomson, Christina Hoff Sommers, Ronald Green,
Joseph Donceel, Lawrence Becker, and Gareth Matthews.
Though each of the three principal authors is found to present
V
potentially forceful arguments, none of them is thought to provide a
fully convincing account of the moral status of fetuses. Important
difficulties stem from the use of particular theories of rights and
from inadequate treatment of the concept of potentiality.
The study arrives at two_conclusions. The first is that arguments
for or against the moral status of fetuses are grounded in more
basic, conflicting moral theories about rights or moral behavior.
Thus the question of the moral status of fetuses is not likely to
receive a universally acceptable answer before moral philosophers
come to agreement on basic moral principles.
The second is that the discussions above have nonetheless yielded
two important considerations which together form the basis of a
tenable position on the moral status of fetuses. I suggest that an
argument can be developed from two claims. One is a conservative
claim that an embryo or fetus is the same entity as a later human
being. The other is a moral principle discussed by Michael Tooley,
viz. that where an entity will at some' time in its life have rights, it
is wrong to affect it so that the entity will be incapable of
exercising those rights when the time_^comes. The argument supports
the conclusion that, from the period of the embryo on, there is an
entity that merits our moral consideration.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
1.1 The Moral Status of Fetuses
The vexing question of the moral status of human fetuses is at
the heart of several contemporary issues in bioethics. It has been
the centerpiece of the polemics of abortion where fetal rights are
asserted on one side and denied on the other. It colors views on the
moral limits to fetal experimentation and the use of fetuses as
organ farms. It compounds itself into a number of dilemmas for
childbearing women, counterposing duties to insure fetal health
against rights to privacy and autonomy. The question forces all who
think about it to assess their commitment to women's autonomy, to
women s power to control their own lives, to their competence in
making life and death decisions. And it pushes us to confront beliefs
about parents obligations to support and protect offspring, about
everyone's duties to cause no harm, to protect and defend those who
are weak and helpless. The answer one gives, then, to the question of
fetal moral status has explosive practical implications.
The issue is no less interesting in its theoretical dimension. It
requires that the notion of moral standing itself be clarified, that
theories of rights be articulated and defended. Concepts of
personhood and theories of personal identity are woven into some of
1
2the arguments and so must be justified in their own right. Further,
arguments from ail periods in the history of philosophy need to be
considered, from Aristotelian hylomorphic theory and doctrine of
potency, to Scholastic formulations of natural law theory, to
classical utilitarian thought. Our century has contributed the more
sophisticated vocabulary of embryology and the feminist focus on
the primacy of elected or freely undertaken duties for genuine moral
agents.
Yet another interesting facet of the discussion is the illumination
of moral intuitions. It becomes evident that a strong underlying
reason for supporting one moral view or another is that what it
permits "feels” moral and that what it forbids truly "feels" wrong.
One is expected oftentimes just to "see" that, for example,
infanticide is evil or that being a Good Samaritain is right. Thus, the
role and relevance of moral intuitions must be weighed into the
evaluation of theories about moral status.
All this makes for an enormously interesting and complex project
but one whose goal is easy to articulate: we are trying to determine
whether human fetuses have moral standing or not. I warn in advance
that I have not discovered the definitive answer. What I hope this
study does do, however, is to eliminate fruitless avenues of defense
and to illuminate the roots of disagreements as well as important
dimensions to the question that one faction or the other has not
considered._ In so doing,! hope to advance the discussion of fetal
moral status and substantiate a view of what I believe to be
necessary elements in a well-formed solution.
31.2 Methodology
I did not begin the research with the intention of defending any
one particular point of view. Rather, knowing that a range of
opinions on the status of fetuses had already been formulated,
I
proposed to look through as many of them as was feasible, choose
the best among them and look at these representative few in good
detail.
My criteria for "best" have been: (1) comprehensiveness, where I
have preferred work that encompassed a number of arguments rather
than that which addressed only one point, (2) importance, where the
work is often cited in other articles or books, (3) depth, where the
author not only defended a view on the status of fetuses but
attempted to ground his argument in a general moral theory and (4)
currency, since other things being equal, I have preferred more
recent works to older ones.
With these criteria in mind then, I have chosen Michael Tooley’s
t®xt, Abortion and Infanticide, as representative of the liberal view
of fetal moral status, L.W. Sumner's book. Abortion and Moral Theory
as representative of a moderate view, and William May's paper,
"Abortion and Man's Moral Being", as a conservative defense of the
claim that all fetuses have moral status. I have freely drawn on
other authors' work to help analyze the main arguments, to provide
alternate interpretations, objections or lines of reasoning.
4Chapter 1 is an analysis of Tooley's three arguments against fetal
moral standing, the first generated from his theory of rights as
entitlements generated from desire, the second and third levelled,
respectively, against claims that fetuses have moral standing in
virtue of being innocent human beings and in virtue of their status
as potential persons.
In Chapter 2, I look at L.W. Sumner's four-part defense of a
moderate view. The first two parts are negative arguments, the first
directed against liberal claims, the second against conservative. The
third is an intuitive argument for his "differential" view that
fetuses acquire moral standing gradually during gestation. He rounds
out his position in the fourth part by offering a defense of classical
utilitarian theory and arguing that his differential view is implied
by that theory.
Chapter 3 is a reconstruction and analysis of a conservative
argument for fetal standing based on William May's discussion. He
offers two principles to support his conclusion that all fetuses have
moral status: (1) a humanitarian principle that all humans have equal
moral standing, and (2) a "membership" claim that all fetuses are
human beings, i.e. members of the species homo sapiens.
My goal in all three chapters is to clarify each position and show
both its strengths and weaknesses. In the concluding chapter, I
summarize what has thus far been found, draw conclusions about
work that needs to be done and suggest a direction for future
research.
Although my intent has been primarily to clarify and assess
5claims about the moral standing of human fetuses, it was inevitable
that this process should lead to the formulation of an opinion on the
subject. Indeed, I would have thought it a failure had such study not
yielded the basis for a defensible view. In the closing pages of the
conclusion, then, I give reasons for deciding that fetuses from the
point of individuation must be reckoned to have moral standing.
1.3 Terms
The question is whether or not human fetuses have moral status.
The two most important terms to clarify then are "human fetus" and
"moral status."
A human fetus, strictly speaking, is an unborn human offspring
from the end of the third month of pregnancy until birth. It is
preceded by the embryo and zygote. As a rule, however, I will use the
term fetus" to speak of an unborn human offspring at any stage of
its development prior to birth. At times, it will be useful to refer to
the fetus as being at a particular stage of development. In those
cases, I will use either the medically correct term or a more
generally descriptive one such as "the very early fetus" or "older
fetuses." In general, context will determine the extent to which
more or less precise terminology is desirable.
The notion of moral status is more difficult to fix. That an entity
has moral status commonly means that it is an object of moral
concern, or, in other words, that it is the kind of thing whose
6treatment has some direct moral consequence. L.W. Sumner offers a
very cogent analysis of it as a normative property which indicates
that an entity "counts” for something in the moral community;
Moral status is a determinable whose values can be
ordered along a continuum. The established views
[on the morality of abortion] have fastened upon the
limits of that continuum. Thus, counting for nothing
IS one limiting form of moral status, as is counting
for for just as much as the paradigm of a normal
adult human being. Every physical object has some
moral status or other; it makes no more sense to
say that a thing lacks moral status altogether than
to say that it lacks shape or color. We therefore need
some term to designate what it is that liberals withhold
from and conservatives award to fetuses. This we
shall call moral standing. To count for nothing is to
have no moral standing. Thus to count for something is
to have (some) moral standing, and to count for as much
as possible is to have full moral standing.
(Sumner, 1 981 :26)
Sumner also says that entities which count for "as much as
possible have a right to life. This right, he claims, is as strong as
any person's right to life. (Sumner, 1981
: passim, 30 )
Sumners analysis of the concept of moral standing implies that
the criteria for having a right to life are also criteria for for having
full moral standing. But I do not believe that discussion of moral
status is necessarily bound up with showing that an entity has a
right to life. For instance, where it was shown that moral principles
about fairness, compassion or decency ought to extend to our
behavior towards an entity S as much as they do to our behavior
towards innocent adult human beings, it would also be shown that S
7counted for as much as possible, i.e. that S had full moral status.
Therefore, I would expand Sumner's analysis to capture this point.
The notion of moral status will mean:
S has moral status if and only if whichever moral rules
govern the actions of moral agents towards innocent
adult human beings also govern their actions towards S.
Thus, the project at hand is to be characterized as one of
determining whether or not the moral rules by which we justify our
behavior towards innocent adult human beings ought also to govern
our behavior towards fetuses. We want to know whether moral
agents have duties towards fetuses such that they must extend as
much effort towards their protection as they must towards the
protection of any innocent adult human being.
Sometimes questions about fetal moral standing are phrased as
questions about the personhood of fetuses, e.g. is the fetus a person?
But as there is considerable difference of opinion about the meaning
of the term "person", I believe that phrasing the question of a fetus'
moral status in terms of its possible personhood would only serve to
confuse and complicate. Therefore, I disassociate the question of
fetal moral status from that of fetal personhood and refrain from
using the term "person" as much as possible in the course of this
study. I assume no particular view on the relation of criteria for
moral standing to those for personhood.''
The question of moral status is also, at times, phrased as a
^See for example Ruth Macklin's, "Personhood in the Bioethics Literature" for an
excellent survey of the variety of analyses of the concept of "person." (Macklin;1983)
8question about the humanity of the fetus, that is, whether the fetus
is "a human being" or "human" or "a human." In such cases, it is
necessary to determine what sort of an answer is expected. For
instance, it may be that the inquirer wants to know whether a fetus
is a human fetus as opposed to a feline or canine fetus. Or, perhaps
the question is about whether or not a fetus is a human thing, like a
human organ or tissue. Or again, it could be the case that someone
want to know whether the fetus is a human being in the sense that it
is a member of the species homo sapiens. Therefore, it will usually
be necessary to clarify questions about a fetus' "humanity."
It is worthwhile noting, however, that when the question is
whether or not a fetus is a human being, a member of homo sapiens,
an affirmative answer need not imply that a fetus has full moral
standing. Further reasoning will be required to show that
membership in the species is sufficient for having full moral status.
During the course of this study, I will also frequently refer to
views about the moral standing of fetuses as "liberal", "moderate" or
"conservative." When a view is said to be liberal, it will mean that
the view asserts that no fetus has any moral standing; when a view
is said to be moderate, it will mean that it is a claim that some
fetuses have full moral standing but that some have less than full
standing. And, when a view is said to be conservative, it will mean
that it asserts that all fetuses have full moral standing.
Last, for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to fetuses having full
moral status merely as their "having moral status."
9To summarize, the central question of the inquiry is whether
human fetuses have moral status. "Fetus” will, unless otherwise
indicated, refer to an unborn human offspring at any time during
gestation. Having "moral status" will mean, in general, counting for
as much as possible in the moral community and this will mean that
whichever moral rules govern our behavior towards innocent adult
human beings ought also govern our behavior towards human fetuses,
I do not assumed that "having moral status" is equivalent to
being a person” nor that "being a human being" implies that
something has moral status or that it is a person. Whenever the term
human being' is used, it is used in a non-normative sense to denote
a member of the species, homo sapiens.
1.4 Importance of the Question
I have said above that the question of the moral status of human
fetuses is the centerpiece of the current debate over abortion rights
and so it seems for in a well-populated world where abortions are
safe medical procedures, nothing less than an appeal to the moral
status of the fetus could warrant forbidding the elective
termination of a burdensome pregnancy. Why prevent a woman from
procuring an abortion unless her action becomes also the destruction
of a being that has great moral worth? If fetuses don't count morally
then why not be permitted to destroy them, especially where their
continued existence creates difficulty and hardship? It appears that
the question of the morality of abortion then turns on the
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determination of whether or not human fetuses have moral worth.
However, should it turn out that abortion can be justified even if
fetuses have moral status, the importance of showing that they have
or lack moral standing diminishes considerably. We will still need an
answer to the question in order to adjudicate claims about the
morality of non-therapeutic fetal experimentation, the use of
fetuses as organ donors, and policies about the treatment of fetuses
conceived in vitro. But a major impetus for justifying an opinion
about fetal moral status will have been removed were it to be shown
that a fetus moral status is not decisive in determining whether
abortion is, or may be, permissible.
In view of this, I think it important to assess the claim that
abortion is morally permissible even if fetuses have moral status.
The view is defended by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her classic paper,
"A Defense of Abortion" (Thomson, 1 971 ) and with a different
argument by Jane English in "Abortion and the Concept of a Person."
(English, 1977) What follows is a discussion of both their arguments.
1.4.1 Justifiable Defense
Many anti-abortion arguments are based on the moral principle
that the innocent ought not be made to suffer and, a fortiori, ought
not be killed. Where fetuses are thought to be paradigmatic examples
of moral innocence, their abortions are called unjustifiable
homicides.
Jane English's argument for the permissibislity of abortion draws
11
on an exception to the principle, that is, that in certain cases of
self-defense, killing the innocent is morally defensible. The
following is an example she offers to draw out our intuitions about
self-defense against innocent attackers:
Suppose a mad scientist, for instance, hypnotized
innocent people to jump out of bushes and attack
innocent passers-by with knives. If you were
so attacked, we agree you have a right to kill
the attacker in self-defense, if killing him is the
only way to protect your life or to save yourself
from serious injury. It does not matter here that
the attacker is not malicious but himself an innocent
(English, 1977:421)
The example is effective in confirming a judgment that the moral
rules governing our behavior towards innocent human beings are
overridden or suspended in cases of self-defense.
English does not, however, endorse the view that one may kill
every innocent (or even malicious) attacker. As the passage reveals,
she believes that killing is justified only if it is the sole way to
protect or save one's life. And still, even where inflicting an injury
suffices to repel the attack, she will not allow that the victim
should harm the aggressor much more seriously than he himself
would have been harmed. For instance, she writes:
... our laws and customs seem to say that you may create
an injury somewhat, but not enormously, greater than the
injury to be avoided. To fend off an attack whose outcome
would be as serious as rape, a severe beating or the loss
of a finger, you may shoot; to avoid having your clothes
torn, you may blacken an eye.
Aside from this, the injury you may inflict should only
be the minimum necessary to deter or incapacitate the
12
attacker. Even if you know he intends to kill you vou
are not justified in shooting him if you could equally well
simple expedient of running away,
purpose of avoiding harms ratherthan equalizing harms. (English,1977 :421 )
Thus far, she has described guidelines for moral behavior towards
innocent human beings who pose an immediate threat to life or
well-being. Later in her paper, she offers another example to elicit
intuitions about the justifiability of defending oneself against
innocent human beings whose actions will cause you serious harm in
the foreseeable future. I believe it is not necessary to reproduce the
example to agree with her conclusion that acting in self-defense is
appropriate where the harm will be inflicted but only at a later date.
Surely, if the only difference between two threats is that one will
cause an immediate harm and the other will cause it in the future,
one is justified in protecting oneself as forcefully from the latter
as from the former.
English sees a parallel between situations like those of the
innocent attacker above and certain cases of pregnancy. Though the
fetus is itself innocent, if it poses a serious threat to a woman's
life or well-being, now or later, it ca_n be thought of as an innocent
attacker. And, if there is no way of stopping its threat short of
killing it, an abortion may be construed as an act of justifiable self-
defense.
I think' English has captured an intuition that frequently
motivates a "pro-choice" stance on the justifiability of abortion.
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Being or remaining pregnant in some instances directiy and
immediately threatens a woman's life or well-being and bearing the
responsibility of providing for the child that issues from a
pregnancy can constitute a serious threat to her emotional as well
as physical well-being. If one adds to this the feelings of fear and
desperation that accompany threatening pregnancies, it becomes
even easier to see them as assaults by an innocent attacker. One
might say that from a phenomenological perspective, the two
experiences are very similar.
Still, upon reflection, it seems that not very many abortions of
threatening pregnancies will be justified by appealing to principles
of self-defense. One category that would be excluded would be
abortions of pregnancies that pose a future threat to a woman
because the responsibility of the future child is very seriously
burdensome; in these cases, the threat issues not from a fetus but
from a baby or child. And, since, to use English's expression, a
woman can escape from this threat "by the simple expedient of
running away" it would seem that the moral thing to do would be to
run away", perhaps by letting the baby out for adoption rather than
killing a fetus that is presumed to be a person. It must be recalled
that according to the principles set out above, killing in self-
defense must be a last resort in order to be justifiable; thus, where
the threat is posed by a baby or child and a woman can escape from
it, it would seem that she cannot justify an abortion on the grounds
of self-defense.
The range of abortions justified in self-defense, then, is
14
appreciably narrowed. Only where a continued pregnancy threatens a
woman’s life or well-being would she be able to abort it in self-
defense.
Beyond these initial doubts there is reason to question whether
the self-defense model is really applicable to cases of threatening
pregnancy. I want to suggest that the two states of affairs are
sufficiently disanalogous that it is not appropriate to appeal to
moral rules about self-defense in justifying the abortion of
threatening pregnancies.
One difference is that in the self-defense model, the innocent
aggressor is an individual who typically causes harm by inflicting
blows or punches or by shooting or stabbing. Certainly a fetus does
not fit this description. If a fetus is an attacker, then it is one in
some other sense of the word.
Marjorie Reilly Maguire has likened the fetus to a parasite that
invades a woman's body, in some cases debilitating it, draining it of
vigor or even threatening life itself. (Maguire et al,1986) We must
think of the fetus as an invader or a subversive and interprete its
attack as like that of a virus' or parasitical tapeworm's.
But likening fetuses to viruses or parasites is unfelicitous, for
fetuses are assumed to have moral standing which makes them
morally very different from flu viruses or tapeworms. The situation
of Siamese twins where one needs to use a vital organ in the other's
body in order to survive is, I think, a better analogy. In such a case,
the parasitical twin has moral standing but may be detached even
though it will die as a result of it. This could be justified as an act
15
of self-defense m behalf of the normal twin who would die if the
dependent twin were not detached.
Strictly speaking, this analogy shows that abortions are
justifiable only when they threaten a woman’s very life. However, I
think it is plausible to say that if the dependent twin’s continued
existence meant a life of intolerable restriction for the normal
twin, it could be killed to defend the healthy twin’s well-being.
Still, the analogy is not good enough to justify aborting all
pregnancies that are not life threatening but pose great hardship for
the pregnant woman. This is because of the fetus’ special relation to
the woman. It is her offspring, and it is commonly thought that
offspring enjoy a fiduciary relation with their parents, one that
allows them the use of their parents’ resources even when that use
places much hardship on the parents. No one would say that parents
have, literally, to die in order that their offspring could live - that
would be heroic - but a goodly amount of discomfort and difficulty
is not thought to be an unreasonable part of caring for offspring.
Given this dimension of the situation, it appears that even though it
is permissible to ward off an attack that would deprive one of goods
that are equivalent in value to life^ and to kill the attacker if
need be, the fiduciary obligations of 'parent to child take precedence
and one may not justify harming offspring because the
responsibilities of caring for them entail a sharp curtailment of
^Some goods that_are thought to be equal in value to life and against whose loss a
person may defend himself are (1) limbs and faculties (2) sanity (3) liberty (4)
chastity (5) material goods of great value. See, for example, Austin Fagothey, Right and
Reason
.
(Saint Louis, 1967:237-238).
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liberty or a threat to one's sanity.
Thus, it would seem that the number of permissible abortions
becomes even smaller; only pregnancies that directly threaten a
woman's life or those that create intolerable hardship may be
terminated in self-defense.
Aside from the reasons offered so far, there is further cause to
question the adequacy of a self-defense model tor most distressful
pregnancies. It seems to me that fetuses who are part of a
burdensome pregnancy can be thought of not so much as innocent
aggressors but as unwitting and essential elements in critically bad
states of affairs. They seem to be more like innocent third-parties
whose very presence creates danger or trouble. Consider the
following "very bad situations":
Very Bad Situation I: S and Y climb aboard a lifeboat at the
same time. There is only enough food to last one
person until the soonest possible rescue time.
Also, there is only one hat, one raincoat and so
forth. The lack of resources is seriously distress-
ful and life-threatening to both S and Y yet it is
not clear that either is an attacker.
Very Bad Situation II: Prince Charming discovers Snow White's
glass coffin in the wicked' gueen's dungeon (with the
sleeping Snow White in it.) The queen, however, locks
him in and he cannot escape except by taking the key
from Snow White's hands. But if he does this, the coffin
will explode. (The queen has wired it!) Now the queen
promises to let them go when the effects of the
poisoned apple wear off, but staying in the dungeon
is seriously distressful for the prince. May he
retrieve the key and destroy Snow White as an
17
innocent aggressor?
Very Bad Situation III; (from a "M*A*S*H" episode)
® P®°P'® "'ll be revealed ifthe baby keeps crying. The people will surely be
captured and possibly killed if they are discovered. Isthe baby an innocent aggressor?
In all these cases, it is not plausible to say that the protagonist,
though essential to the badness of the_ situation, is an aggressor, li
may be that killing them could be justified, but not as acts of self-
defense. In the same way, it seems that fetuses as unwitting, though
key, elements in a very bad situation, viz. a distressful pregnancy,
might justifiably be destroyed but not because they are innocent
aggressors.
In view of this, I would claim that unless a fetus' continued
existence constitutes a serious threat to a woman's life or imposes
such burdens as could not reasonably be expected to be borne by a
parent in behalf of its child for a length of time equal to that of a
pregnancy, its abortion cannot be justified as an act of self-defense.
English has made a good case for downplaying the significance of
a fetus' innocence in judgments about the morality of abortion, but I
believe that she has not gained much in the way of defending certain
abortions as instances of self-defense. In light of this, it is still
fair to say that the fetus' moral standing is no small factor in
deciding the morality of the great majority of abortions that would
be performed, as well as for determining the permissibility of using
fetuses in non-therapeutic medical research.
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1.4.2 Having a Right to Life
Judith Jarvis Thomson also defends the claim that many abortions
are morally permissible even when the fetus is taken to have moral
standing. She argues that though we may assume for purposes of
argument that a fetus has moral standing and thus a right to life, we
do not from that assumption move inevitably to the conclusion that a
fetus (or any person) may never be killed.
Very often, just the contrary of her claim is assumed by writers
who believe that once it is shown that fetuses have a right to life,
everything is won. They infer that if a fetus has a right to life
everything possible must be done to support and preserve its life.
Thomson describes a category of circumstances in which the fetus'
right to life does not imply a corresponding duty in justice against
anyone to preserve its life.
Her now familiar example of the ill-fated violinist and his
reluctant savior is offered to elicit our intuitions about the limits
of duties that a right to life can generate.
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back
with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious
violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney
ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed
all the available medical records and found that you
alone have the right blood type to help. They have
therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's
circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that
your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from
his blood as well as your own.
(Thomson, in Feinberg,1 984:1 74)
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As the story continues, the hospital director is apologetic but
adamant in his belief that you may not unplug yourself from the
violinist because doing so would kill him and thus violate his right
to life.
Thomson considers a number of factors that might weight a
decision about the morality of disconnecting oneself from the
violinist, for instance, the length of time required or the effect on
one's own health. But she concludes correctly that one factor that
would not weight the decision is the violinist's right to life.
She reasons that a positive or welfare right to life implies that
the bearer should be provided with what he needs to sustain his life
but that one thing he may not command is the use of another person's
body. In justice, no one has a right against anyone that they should
give over their body or body parts even if they are needed for life
itself. In support of her reasoning, one could cite the widely held
belief that no one has a right to commandeer our organs or bone
marrow or even our blood - even though they need it for life itself.
Thus, that a fetus has a right to life does not imply that a woman
has a duty to give over her body for its life support.
Thomson allows that where a woman voluntarily engages in
unprotected intercourse, it may be said that she has at least tacitly
given a fetus the right to use her body and that she then has a duty
to bring the pregnancy to term. This will exclude pregnancies that
come about as a result of rape or contraceptive failure.
Thomson does not consider an observation that is sometimes
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made to the effect that any engagement in sexual activities that
could bring about a pregnancy, no matter how well protected,
constitutes an "invitation" by a woman to a fetus to use her body for
life support.
On the face of it, the point seems to have some merit. If one
understands what consequences may follow from a proposed action
and then freely consents to it, it would seem that one ought to
accept the responsibility for the consequences that flow from the
action. But, to use Thomson's expresion, "there are cases and cases,
and the details make a difference." The issue of ignorance is no
small factor in at least many teen-aged pregnancies, and it is
doubtful that many distressful pregnancies were consented to
freely. Where there is immaturity or where human emotional and
physical needs are great, it is hard to say that engaging in sexual
activity is a free act. In many cases, it will not be anywhere near a
sufficiently free act to constitute an "invitation" to a fetus which
grants it the right to use a woman's body.
However, where the consequences of engaging in sexual activity
are fully appreciated and the limitations of contraception are known
and there are no overwhelming "inner" constraints on her ability to
act freely, then a woman's action could be construed as a
willingness to grant a fetus a right against her that it should have
the use of her body.
Perhaps- then Thomson's case is somewhat weaker than she
supposes. It will not be that a fetus' right to life never obliges a
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woman to grant it the use of her body. There is something to be said
for the view outlined above that would allow fetuses conceived in
stone cold sobriety where the full import of the sexual act is
completely appreciated and the woman is not coerced into it. to
claim that their right to life includes the right to the use of the
woman's body.
Thus, the great majority of abortions could not be called immoral
just because they are a violation of aletus' right to life. Thomson's
point is, in the end, well taken.
But, if a fetus has moral standing, our behavior towards it will be
governed by moral rules other than those about rights and justice
and it may be that abortions are wrong for reasons other than their
being unjust acts. Thomson considers two other sources from which
one could derive the wrongness of abortion.
The first is from our moral obligations to be minimally decent to
each other where there is little cost to us, we ought to help someone
in need. For instance, she contends that ...
We surely must all grant that there may be cases
in which it would be morally indecent to detach a
person from your body at the cost of his life.
Suppose you learn that what the violinist needs
is not nine years of your life, but only one hour;
all you need to do to save his life is to spend one
hour in that bed with him. Suppose also that... [it]
would not affect your health in the slightest.
(Thomson, in Feinberg,1 984:1 82)
In such a case, even though you were kidnapped, Thomson believes
it would be indecent to refuse to help the violinist out.
However, there is a boundary between refusals that are indecent
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and those that are acceptable.Thomson phrases the distinction as
that between being a Good or Splendid Samaritain and being a
Minimally Decent Samaritain. She believes everyone has the
obligation to be a Minimally Decent Samaritain but that no one is
compelled to be heroic - or to be a Splendid Samaritain.
Except in such cases as the unborn person has a right
to demand it - and we are leaving open the possibility
that there may be such cases - nobody is morally
required to make large sacrifices, of health, of
all other interests and concerns, of all other duties
and commitments, for nine years, or even for nine
months, in order to keep another person alive.
(Thomson, in Feinberg,1 984:1 84)
Therefore, if our behavior towards fetuses is governed by the
ordinary rules of decency and connpassion, it follows only that it
would be indecent to terminate pregnancies that could be maintained
with little discomfort to the woman. She ought to be a Minimally
Decent Samaritain. One supposes that some pregnancies are
terminated for frivolous reasons, and these abortions would be
wrong. However, given the range of personal experiences and the
varying emotional and physical strengths of individuals, it is very
difficult to fix objective standards of "frivolity." But, in theory at
least, if a fetus has moral standing, it would be indecent not to help
it out where the cost is not too great.
The second reason it may be wrong to destroy fetuses is that they
have a special relation to a pregnant woman.
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It may be said that what is important is not merely
the fact that the fetus is a person, but that it is aperson for whom the woman has a special kind of
responsibility issuing from the fact that she is its
mother. And it might be argued that all my analogies
are therefore irrelevant - for you do not have that
special kind of responsibility for that violinist,
...And our attention might be drawn to the fact that
men and woman both are compelled by law to provide
support for their children.
(Thomson, in Feinberg,1 984:1 86)
Thomson is alluding to the fiduciary obligations of parents
towards their children that were mentioned above. ^ Perhaps the
application of moral rules about the obligations of parents to their
children shows that it is wrong for a woman to refuse to support her
fetus by allowing it the use of her body.
It seems to me that this is a telling argument, for if fetuses have
moral standing, they are morally equal to any of a person’s offspring.
And if fiduciary obligations require parents to care for their
offspring, it follows that they have the duty to care for their unborn
offspring as well.
Thomson offers the following response to this argument:
I have in effect dealt (briefly) with this argument in
section 4 above; but a (still briefer) recapitulation now
may be in order. Surely we do not have any such "special
responsibility" for a person unless we have assumed it,
explicity or implicitly. If a set of parents do not try to
prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, and then
at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for
adoption
,
but rather take it home with them, then they
O
~
On pp.14-15, we saw that parents' fiduciary obligations to their children took
precedence over moral rules that would allow persons to defend themselves against
threats that would take from them goods as valuable as life itself.
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responsibility for it, they have given it
rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it
fo I.".?"' "'f 'i"d it dSto go on providing for it. But if they have taken all
reasonable precautions against having a child they
biological relationship
to the child who comes into existence have a
^
special responsibility for it. They may wish to assume
responsibility for it, or they may not wish to. And I am
suggesting that if assuming responsibility for it would
require large sacrifices, then they may refuse. AGood Samaritain would not refuse - or anyway, a splendid
Samaritain, if the sacrifices that had to be made were enormous.
(Thomson, in Feinberg,1 984:1 86)
It seems from this passage and from "section 4" to which
Thomson refers that she sees the obligations that would issue from
this "special relationship" as duties due a child in virtue of some
right it has.
I believe she is correct about this but I question whether the
rights children have against their parents are, as she says, given to
them by their parents. Usually these rights are thought of as natural
rights that do stem from the parent's biological relationship to the
child.
If a child s right against its parents is a natural right, it will
mean that no pregnant woman ought to terminate a pregnancy for
any but life-threatening or exceedingly serious reasons because to
do so would cause the death of her unborn offspring. Thomson would
disagree with this in that she would reserve the obligation for
women who freely undertook responsibility for a fetus, who gave it
a right to use her resources. How one decides on the question will
depend one's view about whether a child's rights against its parents
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are natural or "conferred".
But even if offspring have a natural right to be supported by their
parents, it is not so sweeping as to include goods without which the
parent would die or goods that are as valuable as life. For instance,
no one doubts that a child has a right to shelter in its parents' home,
but If he threatens their lives or causes great torment, he may be
made to leave. Or If a child were taken hostage and would be
released only if its parent took its place, it is not clear that a
Parent would have a duty to do this.
Fiduciary obligations then can be thought to require Good
Samaritainism towards one's children where ordinary decency
requires only Minimally Decent Samaritainism towards human beings
who are not our offspring. But I think that not even fiduciary
obligations require one to be a Splendid Samaritain.
To sum up, on Thomson's view, if fetuses have moral standing,
they would count for as much as any other of a woman's offspring.
They would have a right to life and we ought to treat them according
to ordinary norms of decency. Fetuses upon whom their mothers had
conferred rights would be entitled to their support; those which
came to be as a result of contraceptive failure or rape would have no
such claim.
Thomson has shown correctly that any person's right to life
cannot include a right to use another's body or a part of their body
even if it is for life itself and hence that a fetus' right to life does
not include a claim to the use of its mother's body. There is some
room for debate over whether or not any voluntary participation in
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sexual acts that are procreative constitutes an "invitation" by a
woman to a fetus to use her body thus making it wrong for her to
withdraw her support once the "invitation" has been "accepted." I
thought there would be very few cases in which one could say that
merely engaging in intercourse constituted giving a fetus permission
to use one's body.
The number of justifiable abortions was limited by
considerations of decency. It was seen that abortions for frivolous
reasons are wrong. Giving women the benefit of the doubt, it is fair
to say that most abortions would not be requested for other than
frivolous reasons. Thus, so far, Thomson has shown that most
abortions are morally permissible.
However, if it is true that the fiduciary obligations of parents
towards their offspring correspond to a natural right to parental
support, every fetus could justifiably claim that its mother must
take care of it unless the situation is life-threatening or most
seriously burdensome. Should it be as Thomson claims, that
fiduciary obligations stem from a right "conferred" upon an offspring
by its parents, then only "planned" fetuses would be entitled to
support.
Without defending the position that children's rights are natural,
it would seem reasonably to give that view preference if only
because it is consistent with what conventional law requires or
because the notion that parents' obligations to their "planned"
offspring differ from those to their "unplanned" offspring is
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unintuitive.
In light of this, it turns out that many fewer abortions are
justifiable. The conditions for permissible abortion will be the same
as those for justifiably refusing to continue the support of one’s
children but with the added factor that turning out a fetus entails
Its death. Thus, it would be harder to justify an abortion than the
turning out of a child who could receive care from another source.
The conclusion to be drawn from fhomson's paper is similar to
that drawn from English’s above. Thomson has made a good case for
downplaying the significance of having a right to life in judgments
about the morality of abortion but she has not gained much by way of
justifying very many abortions. Where a fetus counts as much as any
of a woman’s offspring, it will be wrong for her to fail to support it
except in very extreme circumstances.
To ask whether a fetus counts as much as any other offspring is a
way of asking whether or not it has moral standing. Though I believe
English and Thomson have shown that an extreme conservative view
that condemns all abortions is untenable, what follows from their
reasoning is that the greater part of abortions that are allowed
within the law are, in fact, morally unjustifiable. If fetuses have
moral standing, it may well be that this is true. Much is at stake
then in resolving the issue and I believe that an attempt to do so
will be of service.
Chapter 2: Michael Tooley: A Liberal View
Michael Tooleys work stands out as, unquestionably, the most
comprehensive and original defense of the liberal position on the
morality of abortion. His claim is that since no fetus has an inherent
right to life, abortion at any point in pregnancy and for any reason is
permissible (Tooley, 1972,1983,1984).
The cornerstone of his argument is“the contention that no fetus
has moral standing. His defense of it is essentially negative; he will
refute arguments that purport to show that there is reason to think
that fetuses have moral status. The three that he addresses are
based first, on the fetus' alleged right to life; second, on its status
as an innocent member of the human species and third, on the
significance of its potential for becoming an adult human being.
My intention in this chapter is to reconstruct Tooley's refuting
arguments against the moral status of fetuses and to discuss their
strengths and weaknesses. I will draw almost exclusively from his
A bortion and Infanticide (Tooley, 1 983), since it is his most
comprehensive treatment of the issue and recapitulates his original
argument which was first published in a paper for the journal,
P.hilosophY a nd Public Affairs , in 1972. The 1984 article, "In
Defense of Abortion and Infanticide", was written especially for
Joel Feinberg's anthology. The Problem of Abortion and only
summarizes his theory of rights. The text, then, is the best source
for a definitive statement of Tooley's view as well as his forum for
responding to objections that were raised against it in the time
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since it first appeared in 1972
.
2.1 The Fetus' Right to Life
Perhaps the most often cited proof that the fetus has moral
standing is the claim that it has a right to life. That an entity has a
right to life is a sufficient reason for saying that it has moral
standing. Hence, if it can be shown that fetuses do have a defensible
right against us that we should not destroy them, they would
certainly "count" for something in the moral community.
Tooley argues against the view from principles about the very
nature of rights. He will elaborate a theory of rights from which it
will be seen that fetuses are not the kinds of things that can be the
subjects of rights. Hence, they are not the kinds of things that can
have a right to life.
The theory of rights that Tooley appeals to is Joel Feinberg's
theory of rights as claims derived from an entity's interests. The
part of it that is of special interest to Tooley and which he cites is
the conceptual relation Feinberg sees between rights and interests:
Now we can extract from our discussion of animal rights
a crucial principle for tentative use tn the resolution of
other riddles about the applicability of the concept of
a right, namely, that the sorts of beings who can have
rights are precisely those who have (or can have)
interests.! have come to this tentative conclusion for
two reasons: (1) because a right holder must be capable
of being represented and it is impossible to represent
a being that has no interests, and (2) because a right
holder must be capable of being a beneficiary in his own
person, and a being without interests is a being that is
incapable of being harmed or benefitted, having no good
or 'sake' of its own. Thus a being without interests has
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no 'behalf to act in, and no 'sake' to act for.
(Tooley,1983 :99 )
On Feinberg's view then, one of the conditions necessary for an
entity's having some right is that it have interests. Tooiey uses this
observation of Feinberg's as a springboard for deveioping his own
principles about rights and interests.
His first move is to "particuiarize", one might say, Feinberg's
principie. He contends that ... "It [Feinberg's] justification of the
interest principie is sound, it can aiso be empioyed to support
principies connecting particular rights with specific sorts of
interests." (Tooiey, 1 983:99) Thus, Tooiey's particular-interests
principle should hold true:
it is a conceptual truth that an entity cannot have a par-
ticular right R unless it is at least capable of having some
interest I which is furthered by its having right R.
(Tooiey,1983 :99 )
In the domain of specific rights, then, it will be true that an
entity, say, a fetus, would not have a right, for example, the specific
right to life, unless it had an interest in continuing its life. Thus
far, we might say that Tooiey has determined that fetuses cannot
have a right to life unless they are the kinds of things that can have
an interest in continuing their lives.
I expected that Tooiey would go on to show why it was that
fetuses were not the kinds of things that could have such an
Interest and, hence, could have no right to life. However, at this
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point Tooley changes tack to arrive at the conclosion. Thus far, he
had been working from a conceptual analysis of rights as derived
from interests, however, for reasons that are still unclear to me, he
elects to approach now from an analysis of rights. He explains
...
Feinberg s defense of the interest principle involves an
° e^^ect that 'a rightho der must be capable of being represented’, and 'a right^holder rriust be capable of being a beneficiary in his own
person. If his argument is to be sound, these must in turnbe conceptual truths. Perhaps they are.-However, it seems
that the argument should not rest with claims of this sortWhat one would like is an argument based on an analysis of
the fundamental notion of a right, and it is to such a line of
argument that I now wish to turn.
(Tooley.l 983:1 00)
Thus he will begin over to show that fetuses are not the kinds of
entities that can have rights, this time from a conceptual analysis
of rights themselves.
The account of rights that he chooses to analyze is one that views
rights as related to conditional obligations. He selects passages
from Stanley Benn and Richard Peters to illustrate the view and set
the basis for his further reasoning. The two relevant passages are:
and
To say that X has a right to £5 is to imply that there is
a rule which, when applied to the case of X and some
other person Y, imposes on Y a duty to pay X £5 if X
so chooses.
(Benn cited in Tooley.1 983:1 00)
We can say, roughly, that to have a moral right to something
is for someone else to be morally obligated (in the objective
sense) to act or refrain from acting in some way in respect to
the thing to which I am said to have the right, if I want him to.
(Peters cited in Tooley.1 983:1 01)
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The phrases, "... if x so chooses," and "if I want him to," suggest to
Tooley that the obligations correlative to rights are
"conditional
upon what the person with the right chooses or wants."
(Tooley,! 983:1 01) And, without further ado, he formulates from this
his initial account of rights;
to mPa h
^ analyzed as equivalent in meaning
to T ^ ^ Prima-facie obligationto refrain from actions that would deprive him of it.'
(Tooley.1 983:1 01)1
This account wili not do, he claims, because there could be a
sense in which it is true that a non-human animal, for example Puss,
the cat, wants to go on living. If so, we have a prima facie obligation
not to prevent her from doing so. Tooley believes that most people
would object to the idea of Puss having a right to life. So, a revision
is called for:
A has a right to X' means the same as 'A is capable of wanting X
and if A does want X, others are under a prima-facie
obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him
(Tooley.l 983:1 01 )
Tooley's moves here are most - interesting and crucial to his
further argument. For this reason, I would like to bring them into
sharper focus.
l|t is not obvious that Tooley's principle here is equivalent in meaning to the passages
from Benn and Peters. It seems that an equally plausible interpretation is: A has a right
to X Others have a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive
A of X unless A releases them from that obligation.
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First, he interpreted the passages from Benn and Peters as
connoting that the obligations that are correlative to rights are
"conditional upon what the person with the right chooses or wants."
He was talking here about obligations that may or may not be
binding, depending on whether a right bearer chose to require them
or not. This seems to me to mean: If A has a right to X then if A
doesn't release others from their obligations, others have a prima
facie obligation not to deprive A of X. -
Yet, Tooley's interpretation bears little resemblance to this. His
initial formulation of a principle of rights is a biconditional, a
definition:
A has a right to X is to bo analyzGd as GguivalGnt in
meaning to 'If A wants X, others are under a prima-facie
obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive
(Tooley.l 983:1 01; emphasis added)
Thus what began in Benn and Peters as the articulation of a
simple feature of bearing a right now becomes a statement about the
very nature of a right.
But Tooley thought that this "analysis of rights" was inadequate
in that it would allow that animals could have a right to life. Thus,
he quickly revised it. And, this second move is as interesting as the
first.
He went from the original formulation: "A has a right to X iff if A
wants X, others are under a prima facie obligation ... " to "A has a
right to X iff A is capable of wanting X and if A does want X, others
are under a prima facie obligation ... " (emphasis added)
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This is no doubt a good way of excluding Puss et al from the
domain of entities that could bear a right to life for, as we shall
see, unless Puss is quite intelligent, she is incapable of wanting X
where X is her continued existence.
The point that I want to make about Tooley's revision, however,
has to do with his formulation of the consequent as a conjunction’,
viz, "A is capable of wanting X and it A does want X ... ” In so doing
he has effectively posited a necessary'condition for bearing a right;
an entity. A, must be capable of wanting something in order for it to
begin to have a right to it. And, presumably, if A cannot want X, no
one has an obligation to let A have X.
The original formulation, with a conditional consequent, left open
the possibility that others would have obligations towards A even if
he did not want that to which he was entitled. And, it seems to me
that this is more in line with what we want to say about rights. For
instance, no one would say that we should not refrain from taking
property inherited by an infant because the infant did not want it or
that ones right to life is abridged if he is suicidal, someone
I would contend, then, that there are real difficulties in Tooley's
final analysis of rights where the capacity to desire the object of
the right is a necessary condition for having that right. In view of
this, the modified particular-interests principle" which he believes
is entailed by this analysis stands on shaky ground.
Nonetheless, Tooley directs his inquiry into an analysis of the
modified particular-interests principle, where he will determine
necessary conditions for having the capacity to desire.
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He singles out two features of desire that are relevant to the
question of whether or not an entity has the capacity to desire. The
first is that desires can be attributed only to creatures that are
conscious and can have experiences. (Tooley.1 983:1 03 -4 ) He wants
to rule out the possibility that an entity whose activities could be
interpreted as desires would be thought to have genuine desires. For
example, a simple machine designed to "search" for an electrical
outlet when its batteries ran down, would not be thought to "desire"
to be recharged. Hence, he concludes that
. however one analyzes such concepts as experience, consciousness
and desire any satisfactory analysis of the latter concept will imply
experiences, only things that are conscioushave desires. (Tooley.1 983:1 04 )
The second feature of desire Tooley calls attention to is that
desires involve what many philosophers refer to as propositional
attitudes." (Tooley.1 983:1 04) He assumes that, properly construed,
a desire must have as its object that a certain proposition be true.
And, if it is the case that the objects of desires are truth values of
propositions, it will follow that in order to have the capacity to
desire, an entity will have to have certain conceptual capacities.
Tooley puts it this way:
If desires involve propositional attitudes, an individual cannot
have a desire unless he understands the proposition that he
desires true. Understanding a proposition, in turn, presupposes
possession of the concepts involved in it. To have desires, then,
one must possess the related concepts.
(Tooley,1 983:1 04)
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The notion of being capable of having desires, in the end, turns
out to mean that any individual that is to have the capacity will have
to be a subject of experiences, be conscious and able to understand
the concepts involved in the relevant propositions.
In the case of having a right to life then, it would appear that an
entity had no right to life unless it were the subject of experiences,
were conscious and could grasp the concept of itself as a living
thing, or, to use Tooleys phrasing, noPunless it possessed the "
concept of a continuing subject of "experiences, and [the concept of]
[itjself as a subject of experiences." (Tooley, 1 983 : 1 05 )
It IS easy to foresee what conclusion will be drawn about the
fetuses and their right to life. No fetus has the capacity to
understand propositions about its continued existence; none possess
self-concepts and, thus, no fetus can desire its continued existence.
Zygotes, moreover are not thought to be subjects of experiences or
even to be conscious. Hence, there is no question that on Tooley's
understanding of rights, fetuses do not bear a right to life.
This is not the final version of Tooley's theory of rights, however.
He spends some time responding to two objections to it and will
modify his principle in light of them. It will be useful then to review
the objections briefly.
The first is that a theory of rights that predicates obligations on
what is in the bearer's interest is preferable to one that predicates
them on his desires because it can accomodate counterexamples like
the following. If rights were conditional solely upon desires,
sleeping and comatose persons would have no rights but if they were
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conditional on interests, these entities would have the rights we
know them to have. If rights were conditional solely upon desires,
infants' rights would not be violated if certain surgical procedures
were performed upon them, (Tooley's example is of castrating
newborn males to provide future soprano voices for the men's choir)
but if rights were conditional on the infants' interests, the surgical
procedure would be, correctly, a violation of their rights. If rights
were conditional solely upon desires, it_ would be no violation of the
rights of women to have conditioned them as children to be
dependent helpmates, having no interest in intellectually challenging
activities and so forth, but it rights were conditional upon
interests, this would, as it should, turn out to be a violation of their
rights. Thus, it seems that an account of rights as conditional upon
the bearer's interests is more adequate than Tooley's version of
rights as conditional upon desires.
In view of a rather ingenuous counterexample to theories of
rights as correlates of desires or interests, set out by B.C. Postow,
Tooley concedes that neither approach is adequate but some room
must be made for the consideration that the obligations entailed by
rights are conditional on whether or not the right- bearer has
forgiven the obligations.
^
Postow s counterexample casts doubt on the adequacy of a theory based simply on
interests or desires. The passage quoted in Tooley is: "One such sort of case is that where
the right-holder fails to inform the obligated party of the fact that he no longer desires
that to which he has a right. Suppose for example, that Hilda borrows £500 from Tom,
with the promise to deposit a like sum in his bank account on June 1. Tom has a moral
right to have this done, and Hilda a moral obligation to do it. On June 1, Tom is in a
monastery in Tibet, desiring to cease the accumulation of material possessions and
wealth. We may even assume that he has conceived this desire after careful consideration
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But an adequate account of rights imply that obligations are
conditional solely on whether they right-bearer has waived them or
not, because in this case, Tooley observes, non-human animals would
probably be incapable of having rights; as would fully conscious and
intelligent human beings who could not communicate their thoughts
or feelings to others. Further, the obligations due to minors do not
cease simply because a minor has given someone permission to
dGpriv© hirn of tho objoct of his right. ~
In view of all of this, Tooley arrives at a formulation of a set of
principles about rights that will accomodate all three factors: viz.
that the obligations generated by rights will be conditional on
desires, interests, and the decision to waive the obligation or not.
The last difficulty to "iron out" has to do with the rights of
entities who do not at a certain time have the relevant desires or
for whom the object of the right is not at the time in their interest.
Recall the plight of sleeping or comatose individuals or of the
would-be sopranos and Stepford wives. In all these cases, it seemed
that people had obligations to refrain from treating them in certain
ways because, at some time though not perhaps at present, they
would desire the restraint or see it as in their best interests. Tooley
thought some accomodation had to be made for this factor and
allowed that where an entity, at some time, satisfied the necessary
conditions for having a right, it would in the present time have the
right in question.
of his true interests. He is unable, however, to communicate his new wishes to Hilda. Yet
he still has a right to have the money deposited in the bank, and Hilda still has an
obligation to deposit it." (Postow cited in Tooley.t 983:1 13)
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He casts the final revision of his analysis of the right to life as
the following argument:
0) The concept of a right is such that an individual cannothave a right at time t to continued existence unless the
individual IS such that it can be in its interest at time t
that It continue to exist.
(2) The continued existence of a given subject of conscious-
Vh individual's interest at time t unlesseither that individual has a desire, at time t, to continue to
exist as a subject of consciousness, or that individual canhave desires at other times.
(3) An individual cannot have a desire to continue to exist
as a subject of consciousness unless it possesses the con-
cept of a continuing self or mental substance.
(4) An individual existing at one time cannot have desires
at other times unless there is at least one time at which it
possesses the concept of a continuing self or mental
substance.
Therefore,
(5) An individual cannot have a right to continued existence
unless there is at least one time at which it possesses the
concept of a continuing self or mental substance.
(Tooley,1 983:1 21 )
By way of evaluation, I have already indicated dissatisfaction
with Tooley's integration of the the capacity for desire into the
analysis of rights.
Further, I would count as a weakness in the argument his
dependence on a propositional account of desire. Certainly there is
more to be said about desires than that their objects are the truth
values of propositions. I am not prepared here to defend an
alternative view but it seems that the non-propositional content of
desire, the_"raw feel" of it, must enter into an adequate account of
desire and that if the logical behaviorist view has anything to it,
"desiring behavior" should not be ignored. At any rate, the
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assumption that desire requires a propositional attitude seems too
hasty for the weight that it must bear in the argument.
A final and, I think, important point of concern is Tooley's
introduction of the time factor, that an individual must at least at
one time possess the concept of a continuing self. There is no doubt
that he needs it to accomodate the counterexamples he lists. But, on
the face of it, the time factor appears to generate an inconsistency
in Tooley's overall view. The thrust of fiis entire argument has been
to exclude fetuses as bearers of a right to life, primarily on the
grounds that they lack the capacity to desire their continued
existence. Yet, if the time factor is applied across the board, as it
ought, fetuses would be perfectly good candidates for bearing a right
to life, for, at some time, they most assuredly would desire to
continue their existence.
The crucial question for Tooley here is whether or nor fetuses are
the same entities as the later human beings who most assuredly
would desire to continue their existence. Can we identify a fetus
with a later entity in whose continued existence will be in its
interest? Tooley provides an answer of sorts to the dilemma in a
discussion of a case raised by Derek Parfit.
Imagine a human baby that has developed to the point of
being sentient, and of having simple desires, but that is not
yet capable of having any desire for continued existence.
Suppose, further, that the baby will later enjoy a happy
life, and will be glad that it was not destroyed. Can we or can
we not say that it is in the baby's interest not to be destroyed.
(Parfit cited in Tooley, 1 983:1 1 8)
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Tooleys reply is illuminating. He takes seriously the contention
that it must have been in the baby's interest that it not have been
destroyed because the baby just is Mary when she was young. But
the identification needs to be justified by such things as Mary's
memories of the baby's experiences. If there were a sort of causal
and psychological connection between Mary and the baby, it would be
reasonable to say that they were the same subject of consciousness.
But, lacking these, he believes it would be clearly incorrect to say
that Mary and the baby were ’one and the same subject of
consciousness. (Tooley, 1983:1 19-20) It would seem very difficult
then to determine whether a baby will be the same subject of
consciousness as a later adult before it is possible to quiz the adult
about its memories and so forth. The situation will be all the more
difficult with a fetus, for (I assume) it is a rarity that anyone would
have intrauterine memories. Further, zygotes and embryos are not
sufficiently developed to have conscious states at all & hence could
not be the subjects of interests or be psychologically connected
with a later human being.
What he has said about the desirability of having memories and
establishing psychological connectedness to justify a statement of
identity is true. But, once there
. is evidence of psychological
capacity in a fetus, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there can
be (and usually is) psychological connectedness with a later human
being. Given this, it can be the case that at least later fetuses could
have a right to life. Further, Tooley has said nothing about the
significance of the physical continuity that holds between even
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embryos and adults. Where memories are lacking, it seems that
physical continuity could fill the gap to justify a claim of identity
between at least later fetuses and adults. Hence, it is not
unreasonable to say that a late term fetus is Mary when she was
young and that it will at some time desire to continue its existence.
The consequence of all this for Tooley's argument is that it does
not rule out the possibility that some fetuses have a right to life,
VIZ. those that are continuous with later human beings that have a
right to life.
Still, even this is being generous to Tooley, for his very analysis
of rights as entitlements that are conditional on the bearer's desires
is weak. It is fair to conclude that he has not shown that fetuses are
not the kinds of things that can be the subjects of rights.
2.2 The Fetus' Rights as an Innocent Human Being
Among arguments offered by opponents of abortion, one of the
most familiar is that based on the fetus' status as an innocent
human being. Tooley reconstructs fhe argument this way:
(1) An embryo or foetus developing inside a human mother
is itself a human being, and an innocent one, from conception
onwards.
(2) It is seriously wrong to kill an innocent human being.
(3) Abortion involves killing an embryo or foetus
developing inside a human mother.
Therefore,
(4) Abortion is seriously wrong.
(Tooley,1 983:61
-62)
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Conservatives would have it that abortion is wrong just because
It is an instance of killing an innocent human being, which is always
seriously wrong.
Tooley assumes that premisses (1), (3) and (4) are
uncontroversial.3 He will argue against the truth of (2), against
the claim that it is seriously wrong to kill an innocent human being.
In order to follow Tooley's reasoning, it is necessary first to
understand his distinction between basic and derived moral
principles. Some principles, he observes, are true because they are
implied by some more general principles and some empirical claims.
For example, the principle that it is wrong to pull cats’ tails is
acceptable because it is implied by the more general principle, it is
wrong to inflict pain upon some organisms, plus the empirical claim
that pulling cats' tails causes them to experience pain.
The more general, or basic, moral principles are those not
dependent on other principles and non-moral claims. (Tooley, 1983;
passim 62-63)
Premiss (2) then could be either a basic or a derived moral
principle. If it is a basic moral principle, Tooley writes, the way to
show that it is not a good principle is to show counterexamples to
it. If it is a derived moral principle, fhe way to refute it is either to
provide counterexamples to the principle(s) from which it is derived
or to show flaws in its derivation.
g For the sake of following Tooley's argument, we can assume for now that (1) is
-- uncontroversial. But, of course, it is not. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, it is
thought that a human being is not present in the womb until the fetus has developed a
human form or is "ensouled." This argument is discussed in Chapter 4 below.
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Tooley follows both strategies and concludes that (2) is neither a
good basic moral principle nor a derived moral principle from which
the wrongness of abortion can be inferred.
Using the first strategy, Tooley offers two counterexamples to
the claim that it is seriously wrong to kill innocent human beings.
The first is a case of human beings who have suffered brain damage
such that the frontal lobes are destroyed, thereby destroying the
neurological basis of consciousness, memory, personality, thinking
etc. but where the brain stem is intact. In such human beings, basic
bodily functions are still accomplished and they are considered to be
alive. Yet, Tooley contends, it is not even prima facie wrong to kill
such an individual. Thus, there is an instance in which it is not
seriously wrong to kill an innocent human being.
The second counterexample is one of human beings who have
suffered whole brain death and are maintained on respirators. Again,
Tooley claims, there is no wrong in removing them from the
respirators, thereby killing them.
It might be objected that this second counterexample will not do
since whole brain death is a “generally accepted criterion of
death. Thus, removing someone from a respirator is not an
instance of killing, for the organism is already dead. But, Tooley
responds, the processes of growth, repair and reproduction of parts
^The Uniform Determination of Death Act posits the irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, as the criterion of death. This act
has been adopted in sixteen states legislatively and in two others through explicit
judicial recognition; statutes similar to it have been enacted in twenty other states and
the highest courts in an additional four states have acepted neurological determinations
of death without explicitly recognizing the acts's formulation of the appropriate language
to achieve this end. (Capron,1987 :6 )
45
go on during respirator support and, for this reason, respirator
support IS analogous to the support given to other humans who are
otherwise normal but need some sort of sustaining assistance,
perhaps like that provided_ in kidney dialysis. Just as we say that the
dialysis patient is still alive though they would die without the
treatment, so we should say that the brain dead human is still alive
though their vegetative life processes would cease without
respirator support.
Tooleys attempt to sustain this counterexample is not clearly
successful. There is significant difference between an otherwise
normal patient who receives dialysis treatments and a brain dead
human organism which can, with assistance, perform vegetative life
functions. The difference and its moral significance will be part of
the discussion of premiss (2) as a derived moral principle. But, it is
not necessary to contest Tooley's reasoning on this point here. Let it
be granted that a brain dead organism is an innocent human being
that will be killed if it is removed from its respirator.
Tooleys first counterexample is_ much stronger and conservatives
should concede it, for if they want to maintain that an embryo
(which has less of a brain than a patient with only a functioning
brain stem) is alive, they must allow that the patient is alive. Thus,
removing a feeding tube and breathing tube from the patient would
constitute killing an innocent human being. And, if Tooley's
intuitions are true, such a killing is morally permissible.
However, given the current debate over cases just like this one, it
is fair to assume that Tooley's intuition does not amount to an
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obvious truth. All the votes are not in on the subject of the morality
of discontinuing life support for patients with only brain stem
function. 5 Yet, I believe that Tooley is correct here for reasons to
be given below.
Thus, premiss (2) is not a good basic moral principle. Is it a
defensible derived moral principle?
To assess its worth, it will first be necessary to uncover the
basic moral principle(s) from which it-is derived. Tooley suggests
that the way to do this is to find a class of actions which seem to be
wrong for the same reason the actions we are considering are wrong.
If there is such a class, he says, there must be some more basic
moral principle that explains why actions in both classes wrong.
(Tooley, 1983:67)
For instance, we are now considering the class of actions that
have the property of being actions of killing innocent human beings.
Tooley suggests that another class of actions that seems wrong in
the same way is one of ...
... killing non-human animals that speak languages, have
highly developed cultures, that have advanced further
scientifically, technologically, and aesthetically
than humans have, and that both enjoy sensations,
thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires, and attribute
such mental statues both to us and to themselves.
(Tooley,1 983:67)
If these two classes of actions are wrong in the same way there
^For example, three years of controversy preceded the court's decision to discontinue
life support for Paul Brophy who was maintained at New England Sinai Hospital in
Stoughton, Mass, until the fall of 1986.
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IS a basic moral principle that implies both of them. It would be
something to the effect of:
It is seriously wrong to kill entities that speak languages
developed cultures, have advanced scfentffic
’
technological and aesthetic achievements, that both
enjoy sensations and thought, feelings, beliefs, and
2t^'''t>ute such mental states both to us and
to themselves. (Tooley,1983:67)
Let us call this basic moral principle the Bright Entities
Pnncipie. As a basic moral principle, where it is joined by the true
empirical claim that an innocent human being speaks a language, is
cultured and so forth, it will imply that killing such an entity is
seriously wrong. In the same way, it will follow that killing one of
Tooley's very bright, innocent Martians is seriously wrong.6
The empirical claim that is needed to move from the Bright
Entities Pnncipie to the conservative's desired conclusion,
however, is missing. Human fetuses speak no language, are not
cultured, scientifically advanced
... thus, they do not come under the
category of innocent beings that may not be killed.
Nonetheless, it is possible that the class of actions of killing
innocent human beings is wrong because of another basic moral
principle, one that applies to human beings but not to very bright
Martians. It has to do with agent-relative reasons for not killing,
that it is, for instance, more seriously wrong to kill one's parents or
siblings than it is to kill others. We could call this principle the
6The Bright Entities Principle omits reference to innocent bright entities. I assume
that this is an unintended oversight on Tooley’s part.
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Kinship Principle: It is seriously wrong to kill one's own innocent
kin.
Add to this principle, the empirical claim
in virtue of their belonging to our species,
that innocent fetuses,
,
are kin of ours, it will
follow that it is seriously wrong to kill them.
Tooley is not convinced by this reasoning. He believes that
biological relations, such as membership in the same species, do not
constitute agent-relative considerations. (Tooley, 1 983:69) He
contends that the basis of our feelings about the wrongness of
killing members of our families is not so much our biological ties to
them but "shared experiences and social interaction over a period of
Here, though, Tooley is appealing to moral intuitions, intuitions
that may not be universally shared. Adopted persons, for instance,
often seek to establish ties with their biological parents, and I think
it is not unusual for people to feel a moral obligation to help
siblings or parents for whom they have little affection. One might
even construe the sense of obligation expressed by certain
Americans to support, for instance, the efforts of the Irish
Republican Army or the state of Israel as expressions of kinship
obligations. Someone might also cite the intuitions of judges and
social workers who claim that biological parents have financial
obligations to their minor children though they no longer live with
them or ev^n maintain any personal relations with them.
In view of this, it seems that Tooley's rejection of a Kinship
time.
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Principle is hasty and not warranted by appeal to current moral
intuitions.
But the Bright Entities Principle and the Kinship Principle are
perhaps not the only basic moral principles from which premiss (2)
could be derived. An argument is frequently met with in "pro-life"
literature, letters to the editor and such. And, although I have not
seen it spelled out in great detail, I believe the following would be a
good reconstruction of it. The argument would have premiss (2)
above be a moral principle derived from a more general principle of
justice. Let us call this principle the Innocence Principle: It is
seriously wrong to punish any innocent being.
The derivation of premiss (2) from the Innocence Principle would
run along these lines:
(i) It is seriously wrong to punish any innocent being.
(ii) Killing an innocent being is punishing it.
(iii) Killing an innocent human being is an instance of
punishing an innocent being.
Therefore,
(iv) It is seriously wrong to kill an innocent human being.
(v) A fetus is an innocent human being.
Therefore,
(vi) It is seriously wrong to kill a fetus.
Premiss (i) is the basic moral principle, (iii) and (iv) will be
acceptable if (ii) is true. But, (ii) is clearly not universally true.
Killing an innocent being is not, in every instance, a case of
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punishing it. For example, heroic suicides would not count as
punishments though they are the killing of innocent human beings
The sorts of cases that Tooley mentioned above, of killing patients
who suffer whole or frontal brain death and instances of elective
euthanasia do not count as punishments of innocent human beings,
yet they are examples of killing innocent beings. Therefore, one
should say that killing innocent beings is not necessarily punishing
them. Premiss (ii) is either false or true only in some cases.
There is a further reason, however, to say that the Innocence
Principle is actually of no help to the conservative. This is because
the conclusion that it is seriously wrong to kill innocent human
beings will not apply to fetuses because, contrary to premiss (v),
they are not innocent beings. Here is what 1 mean.
The notion of innocence means, minimally, "not guilty," that is to
say, an entity that is innocent has not performed an illicit action.
Now, It IS true that in a sense things like stones and trees do not
perform illicit actions because, first of all, they are probably
incapable of acting and secondly, they are certainly incapable of
moral sentiments. Thus, when we say that they are "not guilty" or
innocent
,
we use the terms metaphorically.
And, if we want to use "innocent" or "not guilty" literally, it
seems to me that they must be predicated of moral agents, those
who are capable of intentional behavior and whose actions can be
guided by moral considerations.^
^Francis Wade will disagree with my understanding of action. He claims that
something acts whenever it is "the causing of the cause" and that any agent that produces
any change in itself or another "acts." (Wade,1 975:241) On this theory it would be true
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In light of this then, it seems wrong to say that a fetus is an
innocent being because zygotes and embryos, at ieast, are incapable
of intentional behavior and the "actions” of later fetuses, if they are
genuine actions, are undoubtedly not guided by moral considerations.
The most appropriate thing to say about a fetus' morality, I would
think, would be that it is amoral. Therefore, rules that apply to
innocent (or guilty) beings would not apply to a fetus.
It is possible, though, that when
-conservatives appeal to the
innocence of fetuses, they are in fact appealing to its helplessness.
Perhaps the phrase, "it is after all just an innocent human being"
means that, after all, a fetus is just a small, helpless thing and
that, a woman, being much more powerful ought not destroy it.
Perhaps the moral principle that conservatives are appealing to is
a sort of Principle of Chivalry: It is seriously wrong to take arms
against weak and helpless human beings. This, in turn, would be
derived from a more basic moral principle, a rough version of which
could be the Principle of Fair Play: It is seriously wrong to take
take arms against a fgr weaker opponent, and the empirical claim
that fetuses are much weaker than an adult woman.
But the Principle of Fair Play admits to counterexamples. If the
far weaker opponent is in a position to kill you or enslave you or do
you some serious harm and the only way you can escape it is to kill
that a fetus "acts" in that it produces a change in a woman or that a tree "acted" when it
fell on my house and wrecked the roof. There is not room here to defend a theory of
action; thus, I must concede that my view depends on a deeper theory of action that is not
universally accepted. However, even if it were true that a fetus could act, its actions
would not have moral dimensions since it is incapable of moral judgment or intentional
behavior.
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It then you may do so in self-defense. Chivalry no doubt demands
that you try every other means of deflecting the harm before
resorting to killing but if there is no other recourse I do not think it
forbids you to save your life or well-being.
It would not be the case then that just because a fetus is weak
and helpless that its life is inviolable though, out of a sense of fair
play, one might say that it should not be destroyed except as a last
resort.
An appeal to innocence, however, will not affect our obligations
toward fetuses because, as we have seen, fetuses are not capable of
performing innocent or guilty actions. But conservatives could with
some justification claim that the agent-relative consideration of
kinship counts against the morality of destroying fetuses.
Tooley then has been successful in that he has shown that human
beings do not have moral standing just in virtue of their being human
beings. His counterexamples of irreversibly comatose and totally
brain dead humans are to the point. But he was too hasty in
discounting the significance of kinship. And, there is some room, I
believe, for appeals to rules of fair play for the protection of
fetuses.®
®There are two further points worth considering regarding the Principle of Chivalry
and the Principle of Fair Play that I have developed in behalf of conservatives. One is
that they can easily deteriorate into appeals to pity and so may be suspect on those
grounds and the second is that there are extremely few instances when they would come
into play. I think the claim that the great majority of abortions are performed because
the continued life of a fetus poses either an immediate or a later, predicatable, serious
threat to the woman's well-being is a verifiable empirical sstatement.
2.3 The Fetus' Rights as a Potential Person
53
It is possible that the ethics of abortion will be decided on the
basis of neither the fetus' kinship to us, its vulnerability nor its
possession of a right to life. Tooley believes there is a third
strategy which conservatives could use to show that abortion is
seriously wrong. This argument is build on the alleged moral
significanc© of a fGtus' boing a pot©ntiaI p©rson.
Tool©y's discussion of th© argum©nt has two parts. First, h©
provid©s a conc©ptual analysis of th© notion of "potential person"
and second, he offers four arguments to show that the destruction of
potential persons is not intrinsically wrong. ^ | will argue that his
analysis of "potential person" is inadequate, that the definition of
"potential person" he offers is but a straw man against which he
addresses his four arguments. In view of this, it will be fair to
conclude that Tooley's rejection of the potentiality criterion is
unconvincing.
2.3.1 The Meaning of "Potential Person"
Tooley sees his task as one of providing a definition of "potential
person" that will imply that human fetuses are potential persons. He
asks:
^Tooley actually develops six arguments against predicating moral status on
potentiality. However, he tells us that the first two, the "Identity cConditions and
Potential Persons" argument and the "Persons Versus Potential Persons" argument are
unsound. (Tooley,1 983:1 96) Thus, for the sake of economy, I will discuss only the four
he thinks are good.
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U
P^ interpreted
It appears to him, however, that at least two
interpretations of the phrase will not do because,
turns out that fetuses are not potential persons.
of the ordinary
under them, it
The two definitions are:
Definition (i): S is a potential person
=d, S will, in the
normal course of affairs, develop into a person.
Definition (ii): S is a potential person S will, if not
interfered with, develop into a person.
(Tooley,1983: passim 165-66)
The reason Tooley thinks that fetuses would not be potential
persons under Definition (i) is that there it is possible to imagine a
situation in which fetuses, in the normal course of affairs, do not
develop into persons. The scenario he describes is one in which there
IS a widespread disease that causes the majority of pregnancies to
miscarry. In such an environment, it would be true that "in the
normal course of affairs" fetuses would not develop into persons
because most of them die before they are even born.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the occurrence of such a
widespread disease is "in the normal course of affairs", we can see
why Tooley' thinks it would be normal for a fetus not to develop into
a person. In this rather abnormal environment, a fetus will probably
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die and not develop into a person. He assumes that "normal" should be
understood as "statistically average" so that where, on the average,
fetuses do not develop into persons, they cannot be said to be
potential persons.
But, this is not the only way to understand the term "normal" and
It IS not the way that someone who was trying to explain a
conservative argument would use it. They would, I believe, choose
the teleological sense of "normal" where for example, one says,
"John has a normal heart," or "Jane has a normal liver or pancreas."
In these cases "normal" means teleologically functional. Things that
are normal in this sense are things that function in the way they are
naturally supposed to function; they do the job they are designed to
do.
Using this understanding of "normal" in the analysis of "potential
person
,
we would say that S was a potential person if and only if S
had as a natural telos or goal developing into a person, or, more
generally, if and only if it was part of S's nature to develop into a
person. And, since it is part of a human fetus' nature to develop into
a person, it is reasonable to say that under Definition (i), it is a
potential person.
Under Definition (ii), something is a potential person only if it
will develop into a person if it is not interfered with. Tooley
contends that not interfering with fetuses is not enough for them to
develop into persons. He observes that fetuses "... must also be
supplied with nutrients and other things, if [they are] to survive and
develop into
... persons[sj." (Tooley, 1 983 : 1 66 )
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The intuition he is trying to capture is one that is often
expressed as the difference between having active or passive
potent, ahty. In the former case, an entity is said to have [active]
potential for P if it, itself, does something to bring it about that it
acquires P. ,n the latter-case, an entity is said to have [passive]
potential for P where something can happen to it such that it will
acquire Pjo Tooley expresses the distinction this way:
An entity may be said to have an active potentiality for acquiring
^ are within it all of the positive cLsal^
P InH acquire property
hinrk
no other factors present within it that will
fA
° passive poten-
in^., Ah
^ coaid acl upon
It suc a way as to bring it about that it acquires property P.
(Tooley.1 983:1 67)
Ordinarily, when it is said that an entity has potential for
acquiring a property P, one means that it has an active potential. For
example, if it were claimed that Louis had potential to become a
brilliant pianist, we would think that Louis could, by practicing and
attending to his teacher's advice (it he has a teacher), bring it about
that he becomes a virtuoso. We would not say that Louis had
potential to become a brilliant pianist if special pianos had to be
built for him to play well or if he would need to have Listz's brain
and hands transferred to him in order for him to succeed.
A fetus cannot, by itself, bring it about that it would develop into
a person. Some things must be done to it if it is to succeed, namely,
I am paraphrasing an explanation of the distinction between active and passive
potency given by the conservative writer, Francis C. Wade in his paper, "Potentiality
in the Abortion Discussion" (Wade, 1975:239).
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nutrients and shelter must be supplied to it. Thus, Tooiey feels that
it has a passive potential for becoming a person rather than an
active one.
He IS certainly right that a fetus cannot grow and develop without
support and protection and it is also true that where an entity has
but passive potential for acquiring a property P, one would say that
It was a potential P
. But I would take issue with the sharpness of
his distinction between active and passive potency. It seems to me
that there are gradations of potentiality and that "active" and
"passive" potential are more like the opposite ends of the scale than
two distinct kinds of potentiality. Consider again Louis. Were he a
child prodigy in need of no tutoring, he would clearly have active
potential for virtuosity: if he needs bizarre surgery and special
instruments, he clearly has only passive potential for it. But, there
are all the grades between these two extremes over which Louis
would be considered to have more and more potential for virtuosity.
Perhaps he would benefit from training with a more experienced
musician, perhaps he needs that training to develop his brilliance;
perhaps he needs much training for this. It seems to me that the line
between his developing into a brilliant pianist on his own at some
point blurs into his developing into one only if someone does
something to him and I do not think it would be false to say that he
had active potential if he needed some instruction or, to be absurd,
if he needed to have a some sheet music or a piano stool or even a
piano itself.’
There is another reason that Tooiey should not put much weight
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on this distinction. That is that if he holds to it as strictly as he has
done he will end up with the very odd conclusion that no living thing
has the active potential to acquire any property. It is never enough
not to interfere with natural or planned or chosen activities; each
living thing must receive “air and light, support and shelter in order
even to stay alive much less do great things.
Human beings of course must receive "assistance" from their
society and natural environment. We .cannot exist outside of our
"global womb." And, I do not think that the support that anyone
receives from society or the natural environment counts against
their having active potential for acquiring any number of
properties.^ '*
In the same way, it seems that the life support a fetus receives
is not of the kind or amount that would warrant our saying that it
had but passive potential for becoming a person. I am not sure
exactly where the line would be drawn when we would want to say
this - perhaps if a fetus needed radical surgery - but certainly not if
all it needed was the ordinary support provided by the pregnant
woman.
In view of all of this, Tooley's observation that strict non-
interference is not enough for a fetus to develop into a person is not
very interesting. He has put too much weight on the not-very-clear
distinction between active and passive potential and failed to take
^^This is not to say that there is a bright line between the "natural" support or
"ordinary" support Jhat would not preclude the presence of active potential and the
"extraordinary" support that indicates only the presence of passive potential. The
difficulty in deciding which medical procedures shall be "ordinary" means of
maintaining life and which ones "extraordinary" is a case in point.
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into account that some degree of life support is needed for any
endeavor and that receiving it does not take away from an entity’s
having active potentialities.
On Definition (ii) then, fetuses can be potential persons. They
would also count as potential persons under Definition (i). Therefore,
there was actually no need for Tooley to formulate a new definition
of "potential person." But he thought he did and so offered a new one
to remedy the deficiencies of Definitions (i) and (ii).
2.3.2 Why Potential Persons Lack Moral Standing
According to Tooley,
X is a potential person if and only if X has all, or almost
all, of the properties of a positive sort that together would
be causally sufficient to bring it about that X gives rise to
a person, and there are no factors present within X that
would block the causal process in question. (Tooley, 1 983 : 1 68 )
The new definition is interesting in a number of ways. There is an
allowance, as it were, for the fetus' need for life support in the
phrase, ... or almost all, of the properties ...." which would address
his difficulty with Definition (ii). Unfortunately, it provides an
uncomfortable vagueness to the definition. The last clause, "... and
there are no factors present within X that would block the causal
process in question." has the predictable effect of ruling out fetuses
with congenital defects that will prevent their developing the
properties necessary for having a right to life. This is reasonable
since it would make little sense to say that something that could
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never become a person was at some time a potential person. The
introduction of the phrase "
... causally sufficient to bring it about
that X gives rise to a person” however is puzzling. I cannot guess
why Tooley abandoned the traditional " X develops into a person" in
favor of "X gives rise to a person." But this is the best definition he
can generate in behalf of conservatives and it is the one he will use
in his subsequent reasoning.
Tooley supposes that there are three possible reasons why
conservatives might believe that it is wrong to destroy potential
persons:
a. because potential persons have a right to life,
b. because potential persons are intrinsically valuable objects
c. because the destruction of potential persons is intrinsically
wrong and seriously so.
(Tooley,1 983:1 73)
He rules the first one out because of reasons that he gave above
that would show that potential persons are not the kinds of entities
that could bear rights. He thinks conservatives would not argue from
the second claim because while it provides a reason for not
destroying potential persons, it also provides a reason for bringing
them into existence. And, it seems to Tooley, that conservatives
would prefer not to argue in behalf of a prima facie obligation to
propagate. Hence, the best strategy for them would be to defend the
third claim.
As a note in passing, it can be observed that Tooley's assumption
about conservatives' rejecting the second claim is probably
unwarranted. Arguing in behalf of a prima facie duty to propagate
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may not be as unthinkable as he supposes. After all, prima facie
duties become actual duties only when they are not over-ridden by
more serious prima facie duties. Hence, saying that one has a prima
facie duty to propagate only means that, if there are no more serious
reasons why one should not propagate, well, then, one ought to do so.
But, there are all kinds of serious reasons one might appeal to which
would leave the prima facie duty to propagate either nullified or
very low on the list of duties to be honored. And, one might add,
there may well be little disagreement between liberals and
conservatives about which reasons are strong enough to defeat the
prima facie duty to propagate.^ ^
Thus, Tooley need not have dismissed the claim so hastily. It
deserves more serious consideration. But, having assumed its
indefensibility and believing that he had shown the falsity of the
first claim, he elects the third for his reconstruction of a
conservative argument.
By Tooley's lights, the sustaining premiss of the conservative’s
argument from the fetus' status, as a potential person is: The
destruction of potential persons is intrinsically wrong and seriously
so. Let us call this the Potentiality Claim.
Also, the assumption that if X is intrinsically valuable, there is a duty to produce Xs
is not obviously true. It is a corollary of utilitarian theory where utility is taken to be
the only intrinsically good thing and there is an obligation to maximize utility. However,
outside of utilitarian theory, there seems to be no reason to suppose that because X is
intrinsically valuable, there is any obligation to produce more Xs. Consider the
possibility that something is intrinsically valuable if, among other reasons, it is a rare
or unique object. In such a case, we would want to preserve its uniqueness not negate it
by producing more Xs.
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Before looking at the four arguments Tooley offers against the
conservative view, it will be helpful to "unpack" the Potentiality
Claim. We already have an understanding of Tooley's concept of a
potential person. The destruction of a potential person, then will
mean, roughly, "affecting- a potential person in such a way that it
would never come to possess the properties of personhood." Thus, for
example, destroying the frontal lobes of a fetal brain while leaving
the stem intact would count as destroying a potential person as
much as aborting a fetus altogether (Tooley. 1983
: passim 162 ).
Next, the concept of an action being intrinsically wrong bears
clarification. Tooley does not say just what he means by something
being intrinsically wrong and seriously so. One would suppose that
he means something that generally corresponds to the notion of
intrinsic value, for example: X is intrinsically wrong X is wrong
in and of itself. That is to say. X would be judged wrong irrespective
of the circumstances in which it was performed or of any
consequences which would follow from its performance.
On the face of it. the notion of intrinsic wrong is reasonable
enough. Both deontologists and consequentialists could accomodate
the concept in their respective theoretical frameworks. But. while
deontologists may cite a number of intrinsically wrong acts. e.g.
failing to treat persons as ends-in-themselves, breaking promises
and so forth, consequentialists have only one action which they
would say is intrinsically wrong and that is an action that fails to
.produce the best state of affairs. For consequentialists, being an
intrinsically wrong act means being an act that produces a less-
than-best state of affairs.
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This being the case, it is difficult to see how most, if any,
consequentialist thinkers could accept the truth of the Potentiality
Claim. It would be tantamount to saying that in every instance,
destroying a potential person would fail to generate the best state
of affairs. Certainly hedonists, egoists and act utilitarians would
take no stock in such as assertion. And, it is doubtful that even a
rule utilitarian would be tempted by it.
Unfortunately then, for anyone who seriously wanted to defend
the Potentiality Claim, the consequentialist audience will, already,
have been lost, a priori, as it were. The claim will be unintelligible
to most, if not all, consequentialists.
However, should there be a contingent of non-consequentialist
thinkers who were willing (i) to accept Tooley's vague
characterization of "potential person", (ii) to agree that defending a
prima facie duty to propagate was a futile task and (iii) to defend
the claim that destroying potentiat persons was intrinsically wrong
(but not on the basis that potential persons have a right to life),
then, for these tenacious few, Tooley's four arguments against the
Potentiality Claim he attributes to conservatives may hold some
interest.
The four arguments are developed from: I. The Unrestricted
Potentiality Principle, II. The 'Almost Active Potentialities'
Principle, III. The Moral Symmetry Principle, and IV. The Moral
Comparability Principle.
I. The Unrestricted Potentiality Principle (UPP)
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Tooley develops the argument based on UPP in two stages. First,
he observes that conservatives' understanding of the notion of
potential personhood is quite restricted. That is to say, when
conservatives form principles about potential persons, they, in fact,
restrict them to biologically unified entities that satisfy the
conditions of potential personhood. They leave out, for example,
entities which are electronically or mechanically organized.
Now, Tooley reasons, if principles about biologically unified
potential persons are acceptable, they will be so only if unrestricted
principles about potential persons are acceptable. Thus, if
destroying a biologically unified potential person is intrinsically
wrong, it is so because destroying any potential person is wrong,
regardless of its mode of organization. In view of this, he suggests a
reading of the Potentiality Claim called the "Unrestricted
Potentiality Principle":
The destruction of a potential person is intrinsically wrong
and seriously so, where X is a potential person if and only
if X is an entity, or a system of entities, that has all, or
almost all of the properties of a positive sort that together
would be causally sufficient to bring it about that X gives
rise to a person, and where there are no factors present
within X that would block the causal process in question.
(Tooley,1 983:1 79)
The concept of potential person is now enlarged to include
mechanical and electronic systems that through some process or
' another will "give rise" to a person.
I confess a certain amount of uneasiness with this expanded view
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— not so much with the notion of mechanical or electronic persons,
as with that of a potential person being a system that "gives rise" to
a person. It is reasonably clear how a human embryo or fetus "gives
rise" to a person. It, itself, following a genetic program, as it were,
gradually matures until it becomes a person, i.e. according to Tooley,
until It becomes capable of understanding sentences about its
continued existence over time. But, what would it mean for an
electronic or mechanical system to "give rise" to a person? Must the
system become a person? Or, will it be sufficient that it provide
conditions under which one of its parts becomes a person? Tooley
provides no answers to such questions nor is it any clearer now than
it was earlier why he introduced the notion of "giving rise" to a
person rather than retain the more attractive notion of "becoming" a
person.
Nonetheless, he makes full use of the term in developing a
counterexample to UPP
. He asks us to consider a futuristic machine
that can bring together human sperm and ova and then sustain the
life of a resulting organism until it becomes capable of independent
existence. The machine, in view of its capacity to give rise to a
person is to be considered a potential person.
Next, Tooley asks us to contemplate the action of cutting the
conveyor belt that carries the sperm - which now languish and die.
He claims, rightly, that few people would consider this action to be
intrinsically wrong and seriously so. Thus, if it is morally
permissible' to cut the conveyor belt, it is morally permissible to
destroy a potential person, and, so UPP is false. Ergo, the
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conservatives' argument fails.
I think not. It makes little sense to say that a functioning
conception machine joined to an artificial womb is, itself, a
potential person. Tooley is here capitalizing on the vagueness of the
term "gives rise" to a person. I would suggest that the term is
inappropriate and misleading in a discussion of potentiality and
since Tooley has not justified its introduction,
I see no reason to
substitute it for the usual, "becomes" a "person.
Further, even with the notion of "giving rise" to a person, Tooley’s
counterexample will not work because the "baby-making-machine-
does not have active potential for giving rise to a person. Tooley
claims that the system does have active potential for giving rise to
a person, unlike a human fetus, because it "requires nothing beyond
the absence of interference" to yield a person. (Tooley, 1 983 : 1 82 )
But he is wrong on this score because mechanical and electronic
devices need to be "plugged in" or "cranked up", i.e. they need some
outside energy sources in order to run. Hence they need more than
non-interference to yield a person and so are no more a potential
person than a human fetus.
But of course, they are less of a potential person than any human
fetus. Systems that give rise to persons are not, themselves,
potential persons. No one, pace Tooley, would agree that just
anything that could occasion the existence of a person is, itself, a
potential person. If such were the case, primeval slime or the entire
universe, for the matter, would be potential persons, which is
absurd.
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II. Almost Active Potentialities (AAP)
In this argument, Tooley attempts to capture the intuition that
there is not much difference from a moral point of view between
entities that are very close to being potential persons and those that
are a bit farther away from it. He thinks most people would deny
that there is any sharp moral difference between things that almost
have active potentiality because one is slightly closer to achieving
it than the other.
For example, he suggests that a system consisting of a normal
woman and a collection of spermatozoa, let us call it "WS", though it
IS somewhat farther away from giving rise to a potential person
than a system consisting of a human zygote and its maternal support
system (let us call this system "ZM"), ought to have much the same
moral status as the second system, ZM.
Assuming that WS and ZM have much the same moral status, we
may further note that since it would not be seriously wrong to
destroy WS (contraception is not,' after all, usually thought to be
seriously wrong), it would not be very seriously wrong to destroy
ZM, at least not much more seriously wrong than destroying a
system like WS.
As in the case above, it still does not make sense to talk about
systems that give rise to persons as though they were entities that
..developed into persons. Thus, I would contend that neither WS nor ZM
is a potential person.
But even allowing for this, Tooley's example here does not
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illustrate his point. WS is not a system; it is a set that inciudes a
women and a coiiection of spermatozoa. Untii there is some
purposeful interaction among the elements of the set, it cannot
properly be called a system. Tooley would have done better to have
compared a zygote and its maternal support system with that of a
fetus with its support system.
It would have helped it he had done this but it would not have
erased the difficulties generated from “claiming that a system that
gives rise to a person is' itself a potential person.
III. The Moral Symmetry Principle (MSP)
For this third argument, Tooley develops a moral principle, MSP,
which he believes contradicts the Potentiality Claim. The "Moral
Symmetry Principle is:
Let C be any type of causal process where there is some
type of occurrence, E, such that processes of type C would
possess no intrinsic moral significance were it not for the
fact that they result in occurrences of type E
then:
The characteristic of being an act of intervening in a process
of type C that prevents the occurrence of an outcome of type
E makes an action intrinsically wrong to precisely the same
degree as does the characteristic of being an act of ensuring
that a causal process of type C, which it was in one's power to
initiate does not get initiated.
(Tooley, 1983:1 86)
Thus, if an action. A, has the characteristic of being an action
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Which disrupts a process C which results in E and is intrinsically
wrong to x» then an action, B, which has the characteristic of failing
to initiate a process c which results in E is intrinsically wrong to
x°.
The plausibility of MSP derives. I believe, from a consequentialist
understanding of the morality of actions. E is to be understood as a
best state of affairs, C as a process which leads to it. To act in such
a way as to prevent the occurrence of E would then be intrinsically
wrong.
Bearing this in mind, it becomes plausible to say that there Is a
"moral symmetry” between actions which have the characteristic of
preventing E by interrupting C and those that prevent E by failing to
initiate C. They are equally wrong because they equally result in the
prevention of E.
A number of objections have been raised against MSP on the
grounds that the morality of actions cannot be weighed solely on the
basis of one common characteristic. Actions, typically, have more
than one characteristic, some of them wrong-making, some of them
right-making, and some of them morally neutral. Determining the
comparative morality of two actions involves an assessment of all
of their morally relevant characteristics. Thus, for example, if A
were to be more difficult to perform than B, their morality might
differ, or if A were intentional and B was not. Or, again, if A had the
property of being a promise-breaking action and B did not, our
judgment alDout them would differ. Therefore, one could object to
MSP on the grounds that it is unintuitive. Actions typically have
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several morally salient characteristics, so a principle that
compares morality on the basis of just one characteristic Is not
helpful.
Tooley clearly acknowledges this type of objection. (Tooley,1983:
passim 187-90) But he maintains that his interest is in a principle
that is a claim about wrong-making characteristics alone and not in
one that is a claim about action that possess certain characteristics
that are generally wrong all things considered.
One wishes that Tooley had done more than acknowledge the
objections. It would have been helpful had he explained why they are
apparently irrelevant.
Tooley might defend his interest on the grounds that if someone
wants to discover a relation between two factors, all other
variables must be kept constant. In this way, one would be assured
that what was learned was about the factors in question. I believe
this is, in fact, what Tooley had in mind for at the end of his
analysis of some objections to MSP, he writes;
There is a way in which one can reduce the initial appearance
of counter-intuitiveness that the moral symmetry principle
has for many people. That is by explicitly building into the
statement of the principle reference to other morally
significant factors that may be present in typical cases, and
which may make a difference in the wrongness of two actions.
Thus, one might specify that the motivation should be the same
in the two cases, that the action should involve no risk, and
minimal expenditure of energy, that the actions should have
no further consequences, and that the actions should be
intentional.
The advantage of this type of formulation, which I have
adopted elsewhere, is that it explicitly draws attention to
factors that must be kept constant in evaluating the principle.
(Tooley,1 983:1 90)
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What we have then with MSP is a principle for assessing the
comparative moral weight of two characteristics of actions where
all other morally relevant characteristics are taken to be on a moral
par. Given these parameters, we should concede that MSP is not so
counter-intuitive after ali: But, is it interesting?
The qualifications Tooley has built into it make it virtually
sterile as a working moral principle. For two human actions to be
morally identical in all but one characteristic is, practicably,
impossible. Thus, while MSP may have some purely theoretical
merit, as a moral principle about actual human actions, it is
unhelpful. It has, I would say, died the "death of a thousand
qualifications."
Aside from this, what can be said about MSP as a theoretical
contradiction to the Potentiality Claim?
It is difficult to see how MSP could contradict the Potentiality
Claim because MSP is about interrupting, i.e. destroying, a process,
C, whose moral value is derived from its causal relation to a
resulting good, E. Now, unless Tooley believes that the process that
leads to E is a potential E, he is talking about something different
that what is asserted in the Potentiality Claim which is about
potential persons. MSP is about a process that leads to something
good, presumably the existence of a person. Thus, if MSP is to have
any bearing on the argument under consideration, we will have to
assume that the gestational process is a potential person. This is a
-tough assumption to make.
However, since Tooley thinks that systems can be potential
persons and that collection of things can "almost" be potential
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persons, it may not be too farfetched for him to say that a
gestationai process is also a potential person. It does, after all,
"give rise to a person."
Let us assume, then, that Tooley does think that the gestational
process is a potential person, that it is a process that has moral
significance only because it brings about something that is morally
significant, a person. Does MSP contradict the Potentiality Claim?
That depends. As noted above, MSP's plausibility derives from a
consequentialist understanding of "morality. That is to say, MSP's
credibility depends on the truth of a consequentialist ethical theory
that would measure the morality of actions exclusively on their
outcome. But, we have also seen that no consequentialist would
defend the Potentiality Claim as a good moral principle, (cf p.
above) Hence, to show that the Potentiality Claim is falsified by
MSP is less than interesting for consequentialists who denied it in
the first place.
This objection may not be important because if the Potentiality
Claim is the sort of claim that would be advanced by deontologists,
one would want to argue against it in a manner interesting to them.
But MSP is ill-suited for the task because it is a consequentialist
principle. No deontologist would think that a process could have
intrinsic moral significance because of its outcome. They would say
that if a process had intrinsic moral significance it would be
precisely for reasons other than its outcome. Therefore, for
deontologists, MSP begs the questions against a deontological
understanding of intrinsic value.
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All told, an argument against the Potentiality Claim that is
based on MSP appears to have little chance of success. Because it is
so extremely qualified, it will be uninteresting to those who require
moral principles to be useful for making actual moral decisions.
What will it matter if MSP contradicts the Potentiality Claim since
the probability that there could, in actuality, be two actions which
differed only in the respects stipulated by MSP is nil.
Further, for MSP to begin to do its work, it must be assumed that
the human gestational process Ts a potential person. Such an
assumption could make sense only if Tooley's characterization of
potential persons were well-founded, which it is not. And, drawing
the inquiry even further, we see that MSP is plausible for
consequentialists but uninteresting as a contradiction to the
Potentiality Claim for no consequentialist would accept the truth
of the claim in the first place. And, deontologists who might defend
it would reject MSP because of its consequentialist interpretation
of intrinsic value. It becomes for them an instance of begging the
question against their moral theory. In the end, then, MSP fails to
provide a good reason for rejecting the Potentiality Claim.
IV. The Moral Comparability Principle (MCP)
The Moral Comparability Principle is a variation of the Moral
- Symmetry Principle, "similar to, but more modest than, the basic
moral symmetry principle." (Tooley, 1 983 : 1 94 )
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Tooley formulates MCP to ease doubts about MSP that could arise
from a belief that an action of tailing to save someone is less
seriously wrong that than of killing someone.
Recall that according to MSP the moral quality of a pair of
actions that have the same outcome is the same. But if this were
true, it would seem that it would be as moral (or immoral) to fail to
save someone as it would be to kill someone because the outcome of
both actions is the same, viz. the death of a person. Yet, some
thinkers believe it is more seriously wrong to kill a person than it is
to fail to save oneJ ^
Tooley tries to make an allowance for the difference of opinion by
suggesting that someone who thought it was more wrong to kill a
person than to fail to save one might very well accept the following
principles:
(1) Failing to save someone is, in itself, almost as seriously
wrong as killing.
(2) Killing and failing to save are comparable in the technical
sense of there being some number n such that failing to save
n people is, in itself, more seriously wrong than killing one
person.
(Tooley,1 983:1 94)
Assuming that the weaker principles will be acceptable, Tooley
formulates a "toned down" version of MSP, the Moral Comparability
Principle:
1
3
For example, the basis of Baruch Brody's argument against Judith Thomson's view is
that the case of the dependent violinist is not comparable to that of a fetus because
detaching oneself from the violinist is an action of letting him die while aborting a fetus
is an action of killing it. He assumes that the lack of "moral symmetry" between the two
will be obvious. (Brody:1972)
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'^'^ere there is some
nncc
^ occurrence, E, such that processes of type C would
th!ft th°
'olrinsic moral significance were it not for thefact that they result in occurrences of type E.
Then:
There is some number n such that the characteristic ofbeing an act of ensuring that n causal processes of type C
which It was within one’s power to initiate, do not get
initiated, makes an action intrinsically wrong to at least as
great a degree as does the characteristic of being an act of
intervening in a process of type C, thereby preventing the
occurrence of an event of type E.
(Tooley,1 983:1 95)
Given MCP, we can proceed as with MSP concluding that there is
some number n such that intentionally refraining from bringing n
persons into existence is morally comparable to destroying a
potential person. And, since it is not seriously wrong to refrain from
bringing into existence n persons, it is not seriously wrong to
destroy a potential person.
Tooley at this point, acknowledges a likely objection to his
proposal based on the quality of the lives of the potential persons
involved. Someone might say for instance, that where it was the
case that if n persons were created they would lead happy lives and
the potential person would lead an unhappy life, it would be more
seriously wrong to fail to bring n persons who will be happy into
©xistence that to destroy a potential person who will be unhappy.
In view of this, Tooley concedes that MCP must be modified to
-accomodate the objection but he maintains that it will still be a
strong objection to the conservative view that rejects the claim
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that the quality of the future person's life is irrelevant to the
morality of destroying it.
I think that in spite of Tooley's generosity in weakening MSP to
accomodate doubts about the moral equivalence of killing and letting
die, those who do see a moral difference between the two actions
would not accept MCP. Both MSP and MCP are clearly
consequentialist principle and will be rejected by moral theorists of
other persuasions who will, for the most part, be those inclined to
defend a conservative view.
Further, MCP like MSP, is open to the criticism that it rests on
the unintelligible assumption that the human gestational process is
a potential person.
Tooley's discussion here, however, touches on an interesting and
important issue, that is, of the moral comparability of killing and
failing to save. One need not depend on consequentialist principles to
argue that the boundary between the wrongness of the former and
the permissibility of the latter is not very clearly defined.
But the point I would like to make here is that regardless of how
one decides on principles about killing vs. failing to save, there will
rarely be need to call upon those principles for questions about the
legitimacy of elective abortions. In the vast majority of cases,
fetuses do not need to be "saved" from anything. They are not under
any threat to harm. Thus, appealing to distinctions between killing
and failing to save (or the lack thereof) in order to justify abortion
js unreasonable.
Such principles would come into play in cases where a fetus
would die or come to harm if it did not receive medical assistance
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or if the pregnant woman did not refrain from behavior that
endangered it. In such instances fetuses would be threatened and
perhaps the failure to save them would not be morally equivalent to
killing them in a standard_abortion procedure. Perhaps it would.
But, this is irrelevant to the question of the morality of
destroying fetuses in elective abortions. Unless a fetus (or, for the
matter, any living thing) is in danger, it makes no sense to ask
whether not saving them is tantamount to killing them. One cannot
fail to save something that is not in danger in the first place.''*
Thus, although it was generous of Tooley to attempt to
accomodate misgivings about the distinction between killing and
failing to save, his efforts were really irrelevant to the issue at
hand.
The view that abortion is wrong because it destroys potential
persons is unquestionably one that is espoused by many
conservatives. Tooley's discussion of it is challenging and
illuminating in several ways. And, at the same time, it is woven
with difficulties.
The first and most serious of them is his understanding of
potentiality, especially that of
.
potential personhood. His
ConsidGr, for GxampiG, thG statG of affairs whorG ProfGssor Jorgs is gazing
contGntGdIy out of his window at ths old campus chapol made lovsiy by surrounding fall
foliage when he is brutally shot by an irate but articulate student of ethics who claims
that his act was probably permissible because there is no clear moral boundary between
failing to save Jones and killing him. Certainly killing someone who is not in danger
cannot be construed as even morally comparable, much less symmetrical, to failing to
save someone.
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character,zat.on of active potentiality as the abiiity of an entity to
acquire a property without any support or assistance whatever is
mistaken. Above and beyond non-interference, a certain amount of
assistance and certainiy that of an environmental support system is
allowed to potential property bearers. There may indeed be a cut-off
point where one would want to say that, where so much assistance
was required to get S to acquire property P, S really had not much, if
potGntisI for P. But Gssistoncp in tho fr>rmdbb bia e njhe form of oxygen, nutrition
and shelter do not begin to count as such excessive helps.
In view of his conclusions about active potentiality, Tooley
developed a characterization of potential persons as entities that
have almost all the properties needed to give rise to a person.
These vagaries were capitalized upon in the arguments he offered
against the proposition that it is intrinsically wrong to destroy
potential persons, and, so I have claimed that his unwarranted and
admittedly vague definition of "potential person" became but a straw
man against which to argue the inadequacy of the Potentiality
Claim.
Tooley's difficulties are also at a more basic level. It becomes
clear from the principles he offers that he is a consequentialist
moral thinker. The moral intuitions he finds plausible are certainly
so - if you are a consequentialist. What Tooley fails to appreciate is
the deep difference of perspective between himself and someone
who would seriously defend the Potentiality Claim. Such a person,
_presumably_ a deontologist in the natural law tradition, could make
no sense of Tooley's principle.
Thus, one very good thing to come out of reading Tooley is an
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understanding of how deeply rooted may be the difference of opinion
between liberals and conservatives. One begins to suspect that the
difference is fundamentally a difference in ethical theories held.
And, should this prove true, the end of the abortion debate will be no
nearer in sight than that of the end of the consequentialist-
deontologist or utilitarian-natural law disagreements.
Another feature of the abortion discussion that surfaces here is
what one might call a difference of moral ontology. Thinkers like
Tooley are prepared to accord tTe same moral status to future
states-of-affairs, possible entities, as they are to actual entities.
This would conflict with views of people who would give preference
to entities that actually exist, that are continuants rather than
possible states-of-affairs or to entire processes. There is a hint
that the differences at work here go down even to the deep
structures of ontology.
In its way, then, Tooley's work on this conservative argument is
very helpful. Nonetheless, because of his mistaken understanding of
potentiality and potential personhood, the arguments he offers fail
to defeat the Potentiality Claim.
2.4 Conclusion
There is good reason to conclude that Tooley’s forceful and
perceptive line of argumentation does not enjoy the success he
expected. Tie has not shown definitively why the conservative's
claim that all fetuses have moral standing is unjustified.
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But he has argued against the right premisses. Having a right to
life, being an innocent human being and being a potential person are
as strong reasons as anyone could give for saying that an entity
counts.” And his stategies are potentially effective. There is, after
all, no point in arguing for or against a fetus' right to life if it is not
even the kind of thing that can have rights at all. It will not be
helpful to claim that a fetus ought not be destroyed because it is an
innocent human being if there is nothing morally significant about
being a member of the species homo sapiens in the first place and
If the term "potential person" is so broad as to include processes
that give rise to persons, it will not serve as a basis for asserting
the moral status of fetuses because they are potential persons.
As we have seen, however, the theory of rights that Tooley
develops to substantiate the charge that fetuses are net the kinds of
things that can bear rights is not plausible. There is trouble in
moving from a description of rights as conditional upon interests to
rights as conditional upon desires. Further, his understanding of
desire as conditional upon propositional attitudes seems misguided
or at least premature. Finally, his attempt to accomodate the
intuition that rights ought not be conditional on desires that are
held only at certain times in a right-holder's life (e.g. when he is
awake or grown up or free of previous "conditioning”) led him into an
apparent contradiction. He qualified his original theory by adding
that S would have a right to life if and only if S could at some time
..in its life 'desire its continued existence. It seemed that fetuses,
later in their lives, would desire to continue existing and that, in
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virtue of this, they should now have a right to life, which Tooley
denies.
This last point carried Tooley into the need to justify his belief
that a fetus and a later human being were not the same subject of
consciousness. He reasoned that later human beings do not remember
things that happened to the fetus and that no causal connections
could be discovered between the states of consciousness of fetuses
(if they have any) and those of later human beings. Hence, they could
not properly be said to be the same subjects of consciousness.
I suggested that once a fetus had the capacity for intentional
behavior, once it had a "psychology", it might be reasonable to say
that there was a " psychological connectedness" between a fetus and
a later human being. I thought also that the physiological continuity
that held between the two might substitute for the absence of
intrauterine memories - at least enough to say that there was a good
(though not excellent) basis for asserting a claim of personal
Identity between a fetus and a later human being. The issue of
whether a fetus is the same being, the same subject of
consciousness or the same person as a later human being is an
interesting one and will come to the fore again in the discussion of
the conservative view in Chapter 4 below. Its resolution is not
crucial here because the difficulties with Tooley's theory of rights
are enough to vitiate his attempt to show that fetuses cannot have a
right to life.
His reasoning about the significance of being an innocent member
of homo sapiens was more fruitful. He showed that the Innocence
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Principle was not a good basic moral principle because it is not
wrong to destroy every innocent human being. Those that are brain
dead or have only a functioning brain stem are cases in point. It
appeared though that the Innocence Principle could be a worthwhile
derived moral principle either as derived from basic principles about
the wrongness of destroying one's kin or about fair play. The issue of
fair play, i.e. the permissibility of destroying a much weaker
opponent would probably rarely be relevant to the question of
destroying fetuses but there is ne_ed to discuss the implications of
the fetus’ relation to the pregnant woman. Its being her kin may
count as a serious reason against the permissiblity of her destroying
Last, we have seen that it is still possible that a fetus may gain
moral standing in virtue of its being a potential person. Because
Tooley needlessly discarded two more attractive definitions of
"potential person" in favor of a vague and somewhat obscure
characterization, he was able to formulate four arguments that
seemed to show that things like gestational processes, certain
electrical or mechanical systems" could be potential persons. He
further reasoned that since it was not seriously wrong to destroy
the systems or prevent the processes, it would not be wrong to
destroy fetuses. My contention is still that his definition of
potential person” is a straw man and that his arguments do not
defeat the conservative view.
All of this will not take away from the rigor and honesty of
Tooley s work. Among liberal authors, he stands out as having driven
very hard to refute conservative claims and to respond to objections
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that have been raised against his own view over the years since its
first pubiioation. I have not in this space been abie to do justice to
the breadth of his work and oniy hope that I have oaptured the
essential lines of his arguments.
Chapter 3: L.W. Sumner: A Moderate View
In contrast to the liberal and conservative positions, Sumner's
"differential view" represents a moderate stance on fetal moral
status. He claims that fetuses acquire moral standing gradually
during gestation, that they have none to-begin with and as much as a
neonate just before their birth.1 He argues from the principle that
the capacity for sentience is the necessary condition for moral
status and infers from this that the greater a being's capacity to
suffer pain and enjoy pleasure, the greater its moral standing. Thus,
early, non-sentient fetuses are not morally considerable at all; older
fetuses with a minimal capacity for sentience have greater status
and end-of-term fetuses, being as capable of pain and pleasure as
neonates, have as great a moral standing as do the neonates.
(Sumner;1981 :126)
Sumner believes that this view avoids some of the inherent
weaknesses of the liberal and conservative positions. For example,
both liberals and conservatives must lay great moral weight on one
event in a fetus' development; the moment of birth or the moment of
conception. It seems to Sumner that this is not quite right. No one
moment should bear such significance. Further, liberals and
conservatives attribute a uniform moral status to all fetuses
Other authors who advocate a "graduated" view of moral standing, but not necessarily
on the basis of increasing sentience are Daniel Callahan (1970), Joel Feinberg (1984),
Edward Langerak (1979), Peter Singer (1979),.
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granting either no moral status at all or full moral status. Such a
stance, he observes, ignores the radical developmental differences
between earlier and later fetuses. It also fails to attach appropriate
significance to fetal development. Sumner's intuition is that the
degree of moral standing a fetus has should reflect and parallel its
physiological development. The view he proposes takes these factors
into account and so, he would say, h is, on at least two counts,
preferable to a liberal or conservative view; it neither requires that
moral status descend suddenly, as it were, nor does it ignore the
significance of fetal development and the great differences in a
fetus at the various stages of its development.
It IS not altogether clear to me that either of these factors adds
much weight to Sumner's view though its moderateness is, in itself,
an attractive feature. For one thing, there is no contradiction in
saying that a morally significant event occurs "all of a sudden."
Consider such events as the proclamation of war, taking an oath of
office, rendering a courtroom verdict, pronouncing a marriage vow or
even lowering one's imperial thumb. All carry tremendous moral
weight and yet are sudden events. On the face of it, then, there
seems to be no great difficulty in saying that an entity could acquire
moral standing at a given moment in its life, as one acquires legal
standing upon reaching the age of majority or social standing as in
the feudal practice conferring peerage.
And, though the physiological differences between a near-
microscopic zygote and an 8 lb. full-term fetus provide material
enough for many a textbook, it does not follow that those
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physiological differences are morally significant. Both liberals and
conservatives, for instance, are more impressed with what they
perceive to be morally significant similarities among fetuses at all
stages of their development, viz. that they are all unborn or that
they are all living human beings. It is not that liberals and
conservatives deny the differences: it seems simply that they are
more impressed by what they perceive to be significant similarities.
In both cases, physiology is thought to be morally relevant but we
have, as yet, no reason to think that the differences carry greater
moral weight than the similarities.
It may nonetheless turn out to be the case that Sumner is right
and moral status is acquired gradually and that the fetus’ increasing
capacity for sentience mirrors its increasing moral standing. This is
the claim that Sumner must establish; the task is one of the major
focal points of his discussion in Abortion and MnrpI Thpnry
His defense of the thesis has four parts: he first argues that the
liberal view of fetal moral status is untenable, then, that the
conservatives fares no better. After this, he offers what he calls an
intuitive defense of his differential view and finishes by showing
how his opinion derives from classical utilitarian moral theory.
I continue then with a review of Sumner's work, always with an
eye to developing a good principle about the necessary conditions
for moral standing.
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3.1 Failure of the Liberal View
Sumner criticizes liberals on abortion on a number of counts .2
The part of his discussion that is of interest here is his contention
that the liberal's claim that no fetus has moral status is untenable.
Sumner reasons that if liberals contend that all abortions are
morally justifiable, it is because they assume that fetuses have no
moral standing. He claims that the liberal's view on the morality of
abortion stands or falls with her defense of this assumption. He
writes:
The liberal view is utterly and unalterably dependent
on denying moral status to the fetus; it cannot be
supported on any other basis. (Sumner, 1981:72)
Not read in context, Sumner's assertion would be too strong for it
IS open to liberals to defend abortion as an act of self-defense or as a
legitimate denial of support to an entity that is otherwise conceded to
have a right to life. At this point in his discussion, he has already
shown to his satisfaction that other liberal strategies for justifying
all abortions fail. Thus, the only reason left to think that ail abortions
are permissible is that no fetus has moral status.
Be this as it may, Sumner needs to show why it is not true that no
2 His criticism is fourfold. Hg contends that there is no existing theory of rights that can
accomodate the liberal claim that all abortions are justifiable, that arguments intended
to show that abortion is morally permissible even where fetuses are granted a right to
life fail, that separating questions of public policy from questions of morality in the
abortion dispute is unhelpful and, finally, that the liberal claim that all fetuses lack
moral standing is untenable.
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fetus has moral standing in order to establish the first support for
his view on moral status. Whether he has adequately refuted liberal
arguments for the morality of abortion based on reasons other than
the fetus' lack of moral Standing holds only marginal interest for us
here. Our task is still to determine whether or not fetuses have
moral standing at all, not to develop moral guidelines for abortion in
general.
Thus, If Sumner is going to succeed in establishing his claim that
moral status is acquired gradually during gestation, he will have to
show why opposing opinions are false.
Liberals are wrong about the lack of fetal moral status, he
contends, because both intuitive and, deeper, theoretical defenses of
the claim are bound to fail. He says they are faced with a dilemma:
If they (liberals) wish to deny standing to (at least
previable) fetuses but not to infants, then in seems they
must defend a threshold that is arbitrary and abrupt.
If, on the other hand, they devise a deeper and more
general criterion, then it threatens to deny standing
to infants as well as to justify infanticide.
(Sumner, 1981 :64)^
His strategy, then, is first to show that deriving the liberal
3
Recall that establishing a moral principle about moral status "on an intuitive level"
means attempting to establish it as a basic moral principle where a good basic moral
principle is one that does not admit of counterexamples. Devising a deeper and more
general criteriond is treating a principle about moral status as a derived moral
principle, the "deeper and more general criteria" being basic principles about rights or
principles from moral theories themselves, from which the principle about moral
status would be derived.
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claim from established theories or moral principles entails
endorsing the morality of infanticide. Second, he shows how an
attempt to establish it on an intuitive level fails because all the
possible basic principles about moral status that would support the
liberal claim turn out to be arbitrary and shallow.
Sumner supports the first horn of the liberal's alleged dilemma by
citing Michael Tooley's work as an example of a liberal argument
that leads to the justification of infanticide. As noted above,
Tooley's work is certainly the most articulate and complete defense
of the liberal position in the current literature. His derivation of the
liberal claim from his theory of rights-as-desires is exactly the
kind of derivation from "deeper and more general criterion" that
Sumner alludes to.
And, if one refers to the previous chapter, it will be clear that
Sumner is right, for one of the main stumbling blocks for Tooley all
along was that if his criterion for moral standing was to be
maintained, infants would lack moral standing as would other
incompetent human beings. ^ So,~ it does seem true that the liberal
has at least one horn of the dilemma to contend with: she must find
some moral theory or theory of rights from which to derive the
claim that human fetuses - and only human fetuses - lack moral
standing.
There are two authors who offer arguments which, in fact,
purport to._do just this. I believe it is important to look at them
^The stumbling block is, more accurately, one for Tooley's readers and not for himself
since he accepts the morality of infanticide..
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before conceding Sumner's point. Christina Hoff Sommers and Ronald
Green conclude, from separate arguments, that while fetuses lack
moral standing, both infants and other human incompetents merit
our full moral concern. (Sommers:1985 and Green:1974)
3.1.1 Christina Hoff Sommers: The Principle of Nurture
Sommers develops her view in the context of a review of Tooley's
Abortion and Infanticide
. She takes issue with his claim that there
is no objective difference between previable fetuses and infants
that would warrant our saying that the one is morally considerable
and the other is not. Her argument has two parts. In the first, she
establishes a moral principle to show that parents have an
obligation to care for their infants. In the second, she provides an
analysis of moral obligation from which we are to conclude that the
obligation of parents to care for their infants cannot be extended to
their fetuses. Thus, it will follow that while parents retain a duty
to care for their infants, (making infanticide wrong) they have no
such duty towards their fetuses, (making abortion permissible).
Parents have an obligation to care for their infants, Sommers
claims, because human parents are moral agents. Anyone with a
moral sense will recognize the obligation they have towards their
young. As she puts it...
A "possible world" in which moral agents produce
helpless and vulnerable children for whose nurture
and protection they bear no moral responsibility
would be morally unrecognizable. (Sommers;1 985:41)
Parents who are moral agents, then, are bound by the Principle of
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Nurture:
Moral agents are obligated to nurture and protect
their infants. (Sommers;1985:41)
By Itself, however, the. Principle of Nurture does not rule out the
possibility that moral agents also have a duty to care for their
fetuses. Just as it is evident to Sommers that a world in which
moral agents failed to have duties towards their infants would be a
morally unrecognizable world, so would conservatives find a world
m which they had no obligations towards their fetuses. Thus,
Sommers needs to provide a basis for the rest of her claim; she must
justify her denial that there is an objective difference between
infants and previable fetuses such that fetuses could not be covered
by a principle of nurture comparable to the one she has asserted for
infants.
To do this, she appeals to a fact about moral responsibility, viz.
that moral agents have duties only in cases where they are free to
fulfill them. For example, though a moral agent might be bound by
the Principle of Nurture to care for his infant, if it were not
possible for him to do so, (e.g. because of ill health or disability)
then he would be relieved of the responsibility. His infant, in such a
case, would also have no right against him that he should care for it.
In the case of a human fetus, Sommers would say, neither the
woman nor anyone else can nurture or protect it. The help a fetus
receives is given involuntarily through the reflex physiological
processes of the woman who bears it. It is not until birth that moral
agents are able, voluntarily, to extend care and protection to their
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offspring. Sommers puts it this way:
Birth is when the baby leaves the protection
of the mother's reflex physiological activities
and becomes wholly dependent on the voluntary
action of moral agents. The primary responsibility
to the infant thus has this natural starting point.
(Sommers,! 985:41)
and...
What morally counts is the infant's capacity
to survive in total dependence on the voluntary
acts of the responsible moral agents committed
to its care. (Sommers,! 985:42)
This is why a principle of nurture that would extend to fetuses
would still fail to guarantee them a right to protection. No moral
agent, by Sommers' lights, can freely extend them such protection.
Hence, previable fetuses have no rights against moral agents to
receive it.
Here is the crucial difference that she sees between infants and
previable fetuses. Infants have the capacity to be helped by those
who are responsible for them. Previable fetuses lack that capacity.
The conclusion she desires follows from what has been said;
infanticide turns out to be wrong while abortion is permissible.
It seems to me that there are some difficulties with Sommers'
argument. For one thing, she is wrong about the impossibility of
freely nurturing and protecting human fetuses. Previable fetuses not
infrequently become patients and may be helped by intrauterine
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surgery or other medical intervention. Further, a woman may
voluntarily nurture it by refraining from the use of alcohol, drugs
and so forth during the pregnancy. And, certainly she may protect the
fetus by not aborting it. Thus, it is hard to see why Sommers would
think that fetuses cannot be freely nurtured and protected.
I believe she thinks this way because she construes nurturance
and protection as requiring some kind-of direct interaction with the
recipient. She writes:
In emphasizing the importance of "interactions" for
the moral status of newborns, Zaitchik is quite
properly attending to what Tooley is systematically
ignoring. (Sommers, 1985:42)
The passage that she chooses from Zaitchik to support her view
also illustrates her understanding of interaction:
We know what it is to fondle it (prematurely born
infant), to change its diapers, to get up in the
middle of the night to see why it is crying, to
invite relatives and friends to visit it, and so on
.... Given these interactions between ourselves
and the prematurely born baby, we see it as one
of us, as a member of the human community, as
a person. (Sommers, 1985:42)
I understand her to mean that in order for something to count as
voluntary nurturance or protection it must involve some sort of
direct interaction with the recipient. Thus, presumably because no
direct interaction with a fetus is possible, no voluntary help for it
is possible.
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As noted above, however, some interaction with previable fetuses
IS possible in the form of medical interventions.
I don't know what
Sommers would say about the obligation of moral agents to provide
medical treatment for previable fetuses
Moreover, I fail to see why she wants to make direct interaction a
necessary condition for an act to count as an extension of care or
protection. It seems to me that there are many instances of both
that do not involve direct interaction with the recipient. For
instance, when one steps forth to shield another, there is no direct
interaction with him (though there might well be a lot of direct
interaction with the offense.) Passing laws is another way of
protecting entities, human or otherwise, without directly
interacting with them. As for nurturance, I would count Thanksgiving
baskets and charitable donations as well as blood transfusions and
organ donations as provisions of sustenance yet none of them need
involve direct interaction with the recipient.
If I am correct in thinking that voluntary help and protection can
be extended without direct interaction with the recipient then the
actions that a pregnant woman performs when she deliberately eats
nourishing food and exercises are instances of voluntary nurturance
of her fetus. When she takes special care to wear a seat belt in the
car or moves out of a smoke filled room, she is attempting to
protect the fetus from possible injury. Further, one of the clearest
_examples to me of voluntarily protecting one's fetus is to refrain
from aborting it.
Hence, if it is possible for moral agents to nurture and protect
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their fetuses, then Sommers’ argument has provided us with no
reason to think that they ought not do so - at ieast, no reason that
would not equally apply to infants. I think that Tooley’s observation
that there is no objective moral difference between previable
fetuses and infants still stands good.
3.1.2 Ronald Green: Conferred Moral Status
Green is unique in the literature on moral status in seeing two
ways to acquire moral standing. Until now, it has been assumed that
an entity had moral standing in virtue of some property it possessed;
Green sees the situation differently. He will move from principles
about the nature of morality to the conclusion that some entities
acquire moral standing, naturally or, in the traditional way, as it
were, because of a property they have, and other entities acquire it
in a different way, i.e. by decree. These latter have it conferred upon
them by those who have it naturally. Moral standing thus derives
from either of two sources, from a property that one possesses or
from the consensus of the moral community.^
In the case of infants and fetuses, it will be seen that infants are
^Edmund Pincoffs has likened the situation to one of making membership decisions
where "we" (those who possess moral standing naturally) must reach a consensus about
whether to admit a class of beings (who lack moral standing) into the moral community,
i.e. to accept them as one of us, conferring upon them the priviliges of membership in
the moral community. He will admit that the metaphor has some limitations but that it is
useful for understanding the abortion choice, namely that it is a choice made by the
moral community or some authorized part of it to extend or deny membership in the
community to fetuses. (Pincoffs;1977: passim 43-48)
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morally considerable and fetuses not so because the moral
community decides to confer standing upon the one but not the other.
To use Pincoffs' metaphor, we have decided to extend membership in
the moral community to infants but not to fetuses.
To see why Green thinks the moral standing of both infants and
fetuses is determined by community consensus, it is necessary to
follow his derivation of the thesis
_from his theory about the
foundation of morality.
He begins with what he calls a largely Rawlsian interpretation of
the foundation of morality as a
..."non-coercive, rational means of
settling social disputes." (Green, 1974 ; 60 ) Differences can be
settled either by force and coercion, he notes, or by rational means,
viz. by cooperating in the development and enforcement of principles
of acceptable conduct. Clearly, the more civilized choice is to
engage in moral discourse.
If this rings true thus far, it becomes evident that there is a
class of beings who "naturally" engage in moral discourse and who
ought to be included in all such discourse.
Thus, our understanding of the function of morality
leads us to identify a class of agents who, by virtue
of the very function of morality, must possess
fundamentally equal rights: all those agents with
whom we can possibly come into dispute, who
display an elementary rational ability (that
is, the ability to take effective means to ends)
and who are capable of understanding and
respecting moral rules. (Green, 1974: 58)
Basic rights - or - "natural" moral status, here, are thought to be
generated from a being's capacity to cause social conflict and to
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engage in the rational adjudication of such conflict. As Green puts it:
Without seeking to convey the full depth of this
issue, I can put the matter bluntly by saying
that any being with the capacity to pull the trigger
of a gun arid to refrain from doing so out of obedience
to moral rules, deserves our moral respect.
(Green, 1974: 61)
Clearly, on this account, fetuses? infants and other human
incompetents do not, naturally, af any rate, deserve moral respect
because most of them are incapable of causing social conflict and
all of them lack the capacity to understand or be persuaded by moral
discourse.
Nonetheless, Green concedes that many entities lacking this
capacity appear to have moral rights. Pets, domestic animals, the
severely retarded or senile, infants and young children fall into this
category. Given his account of the origin of rights, he needs to give a
reason for our apparent duties toward some incompetents.
Green's solution is that incompetents are third parties whose
tolerance may or may not contribute to the production of a secure,
stable social condition in which rational agents may pursue their
interests. And, since the goal of morality was just to insure such a
condition, part of the community's moral discourse will be the
evaluation of the effect of maintaining or destroying a class of
incompetents. Where the destruction of members of a class of
incompetents would affect the rational agents in a negative way, the
community ought to confer rights upon those class members. But, if
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maintaining a certain class of incompetents proved socially harmful
then the community would decide not to confer rights on its
members.
Thus, it would come to be that though an entity lacked the
capacity to engage in moral discourse, it could share in the benefits
of membership in the moral community. Its status would have been
conferred upon it in virtue of its value Jo rational moral agents.
In considering the way in which beings who are not
rational or who lack moral capacity are to be
treated, rational agents must ask how particular
forms of behavior with respect to these beings
affect themselves. Should they decide that certain
actions jeopardize their own security and inflict
unacceptable evils, they can formulate, and enforce
rules to prohibit that behavior. Their decision in
this regard amounts to conferring rights on these
beings.
...Conferred rights are not necessarily
weaker or stronger than basic rights since
their force and their enforcement depends upon the
decision of rational agents. (Green, 1974; 61-62)
Basic rights, as he calls them, are possessed by rational moral
agents - naturally - in virtue of their capacity to engage in social
conflict and participate in the rational adjudication of it. Since
neither infants nor fetuses can do this, neither has basic rights or
natural moral standing. If infants have moral status, which they
certainly seem to, it is because rational moral agents have weighed
the consequences of not protecting them and seen that this course
-Would threaten their own security and inflict unacceptable evils
upon them.
However, the situation is different with fetuses. Granting rights
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to the class of fetuses would Impose considerable hardship and
sometimes serious danger to many rational moral agents. Thus, the
decision is made not to confer rights or, alternately, moral standing,
upon the class of fetuses
-
This view does not preclude the possibility that someone may
choose to confer moral standing on an individual basis. Though the
community will not give blanket protection to all fetuses, it may
protect the fetuses of women who elect to have them protected. The
view accomodates the "pro-choice" claim about the appropriateness
of letting each woman, qua moral agent, decide for herself whether
to extend her own and the community's resources for the support of
a fetus. Because the woman is in the best position to know whether
or not the continued existence of a particular fetus will threaten her
own well-being it is she, as a moral agent, who must assess the
consequences of carrying a pregnancy to term. If doing so
jeopardizes her own or other moral agents' security, if it inflicts
unacceptable evils, then she must not confer moral standing upon the
fetus. But, if she sees that continuing the pregnancy will, at least,
produce no harm, then, she may elect to confer status upon the fetus
and bring to bear her own and the community's resources for its
well-being.
Green's account is thought-provoking. One cannot fail to applaud
the primacy given to moral agency, as we have been taught to do
since at least Kant's time. Further, it appears to capture the heart of
the liberal's overarching belief that decisions about the treatment
of fetuses ought to be made by the moral agents who will be
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affected by it. Only in the case where failing to extend protection to
them would cause turmoil and harm to the community at large is it
thought that laws and policies should be established to ensure their
protection. Otherwise, the decision should be left to the rational
agents immediately concerned.
Applying Green’s theory across the board, we would be led to
conclude that in our society, harsh treatment of the insane, the
senile, and infants must be thought to threaten our own security, to
insult our sensibilities, for we have conferred moral standing upon
them. The abortion of fetuses must pose no comparable threat since
the decision is left to the individuals concerned.^
In spite of its explanatory value, there are reasons why Green's
view does not settle the issue of moral status. First off, it is bound
to a specific understanding of the foundation of morality as a
process for adjudicating social disputes. Many will disagree with it
only for this reason. For instance, anyone who thinks morality is for
maximizing happiness or for promoting virtue will reject his
interpretation. Second, the theory of rights he proposes does not
clearly follow from his view about the nature of morality. Fie has
said that there is a class of agents who bear fundamentally basic
equal rights in virtue of their capacity for rationality and their
ability to respect moral laws. In other words, one has natural moral
On Green's view, it would seem that the moral community is now in the process of
weighing the status of the irreversibly comatose as the courts debate whether they are
to be protected by law or whether the decision will be left to those who are most directly
affected by their continued support.
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standing if and oniy if one has the capacity for moral agency, it
seems, however, that entailment here is too strong a reiation. If the
foundation of moraiity is the resolution of sociai confiiot, then it is
true that only moral agents can participate in that resolution. But
what follows from this is that only moral agents have duties to
abide by moral rules, for they are the only ones who are capable of
governing their behavior according to them.
The link between the capacity to_ be persuaded by moral reasoning
and the obligation to settle (or avoid) social disputes by using moral
principles is dear enough, but I do not see the further implication
that only moral agency entails moral privilege. If anything, it seems
more likely that the capacity to enjoy the fruits of social concord
should imply moral privilege. There is some plausibility to the claim
that where an entity can benefit from social harmony and community
support. Its welfare ought to be weighed in the moral deliberation of
those whose duty it is to establish and maintain a working moral
community.
Green might object to my reasoning here on the grounds that
rights are, necessarily, the correlates of obligations. This would
support the conclusion he wants, viz. that only moral agents have
basic rights (or, alternately, that only moral agents have natural
moral status.) But he has not argued this way. All that he has said is
that it follows from the nature of morality that only moral agents
_have natural moral standing. And, as noted above, it is not
unreasonable to maintain that from his theory of the purpose of
morality, it could follow as well that any entity that can enjoy the
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fruits of social harmony has a prima facie right to do so - not only
those entities that can be persuaded not to cause social conflict.
Also, Green's reasoning does not escape Sumner's criticism, for
on his theory infants turn out to have as near tenuous a moral
standing as do fetuses. If their rights exist only where it is
perceived that their conferral causes no great discord or
overwhelming difficulty for the ^community, then should
Circumstances change for the
_worse, infants’ "rights" would
dissolve. Though Green is persuaded that "conferred" rights would be
no weaker or stronger than "basic" rights, I cannot see the basis for
his confidence. Given differences of perception and opinion that
moral agents are bound to have on the matter of how much turmoil
the continued protection of a class of incompetents will be allowed
to cause before it is "too much", the "conferred rights" of infants and
other incompetents seem shaky indeed.^ They are more like
conditionally tendered benefits than "rights" at all.
In the end, then. Green has offered an intriguing view about the
source of moral status, or rights, ~but one which breaks too hastily
and, I believe, unnecessarily, with the traditional understanding of
moral standing as being predicated on the possession of some
natural property. The consequences of deriving the rights of the
entire population of human incompetents from the consensus of
^From the point of view of prudence, I wonder if Green's theory would not prove a
temptation to overrate the "threats" to our security posed by the demands of providing
for incompetents. At the least, it would make it harder to see the boundaries between
moral hardiness and genuine heroism.
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those who are considered morally competent are so grave that only
the clearest and strongest of arguments ought persuade us on this
account. And, Green's argument has not that strength.
Returning to the mainstream of the discussion where Sumner has
posed a dilemma tor liberals, we conclude that one horn of it still
stands strong. The theories that would support a denial of fetal
status also support infanticide.
The second side of the dilemma Sumner poses is that liberal
attempts to establish their claim by appeal to moral intuitions
requires their defense of "a threshold that is arbitrary and abrupt."
As we have seen above, the charge that the acquisition of moral
status is abrupt, or sudden, is not a serious one, for many morally
significant events occur suddenly. However, if the preferred
threshold of moral standing is arbitrary, then there is good reason to
reject it.
Sumner contends that if liberals think all infants have moral
standing and all fetuses lack it, then the threshold of moral standing
must be birth itself. There must be something about the neonate that
birth has occasioned, something that the fetus lacks and that
something must be the necessary condition for having moral status.
Thus far he seems to be on the right track.
His next move is to examine the changes for the fetus that come
about as a result of its birth to see if any one of them is morally
significant.^He lists four possibilities:
A. the fetus ceases to inhabit another person's body;
B. the fetus becomes more accessible to others of its kind;
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respiration, digestion
D. the fetus' direct link to another person's body is severed.
(Sumner, 1981: 52)
In the first case, a fetus, in being born, changes its location.
Sumner does not think that location is an important factor in the
determination of moral standing. He cites the case of the scientists
in Fantastic Voyage as examples of entities who were inside a
human body but did not forfeit their moral standing because of it. In
this he seems correct, where an entity is ought not affect its
importance, though its location may well have significant bearing on
the kind and amount of help we may extend to it should there be a
need. Thus, we might say that the voyagers' actual positive right to
life is weakened by their location.
^
In the second case, the fetus, in being born, becomes more
accessible to other human beings. Again, Sumner finds this an
unlikely source for moral standing. He argues that astronauts in
quarantine become no less worthy because of their isolation, which
is true. Neither do hermits in the desert or inhabitants of remote
villages count less for their inaccessibility. But, as we observed
above, their ac tual positive rights may turn out to be weaker than
those of people we can reach to extend help that is needed. The
solitary monk meditating high on some Himalayan crag, of course,
has a prima facie right to life, both in the positive and negative
8
I am appealing to the distinction between a negative right to life which entitles the
bearer not to be killed and a positive right to life which would guarantee him that which
he needs to maintain his life..
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sense, but the strength of his actual positive right is limited by his
inaccessibility.
Be that as it may, it will not apply to fetuses, for as the
discussion of Sommers' view above has shown, fetuses are
acce ssible to us. Were they not, there would be no need to discuss
the ethics of abortion.
9
Upon birth, the fetus also changes in that it now begins to handle
Its own respiration, digestion and exc“retion. These capacities are
obviously poor choices for indicators of moral status. As Sumner
notes, many entities that have a clear cut right to life do not
"handle" their own bodily functions. They use respirators or dialysis
machines to do it for them. Thus, from the point of view of morals,
a human being who cannot breathe or process waste or food does not
count less than one who can. If anything, we treat them more kindly
because of their disability.
Finally, Sumner considers the possibility that infants possess the
moral standing lacked by fetuses because infants are no longer
directly linked to their mother's body. If this were the case, moral
status would be predicated upon not requiring another's body for life
support, or, as Sumner puts it, upon not being parasitical upon
another s body. The point liberals would be making here, he suggests,
^Daniel Callahan has pointed out that the fetus' accessibility has generated a
particularly troublesome difficulty for the "pro choice" position on the permissibility
of abortion. It is now at the same time legally permissible to destroy a healthy 22-24
week old fetus where imperilled fetuses of the same age may be the objects of heroic
..
life-saving attempts. This disparity of treatment, he says, "calls attention to the
apparently arbitrary and contingent value of the fetus: an abortable 'product of
conception' from one value perspective, and a cherished 'baby' and 'patient' from another
- but the same organism in either case." (Callahan, 1986:34)
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is that it may be permissible for hosts to act on parasites in ways
m which it would be impermissible for them to act on other
creatures.
But Sumner rejects the notion that being parasitical on another
should affect one's rights. The parasitical relation could be morally
significant, he concedes, but not in such a way that it would grant or
deny rights. For instance, he writes:
... morally significant relations among right-bearers
do not affect the sets of rights they possess... but
only what those rights require or permit in those
circumstances. (Sumner, 1981:53)
He argues that such relations do not affect rights because if they
did, then the rights in question would turn out not to be natural
rights. A natural right, he claims, is a right possessed independently
of the bearer's relation to others. (Sumner, 1981: 53)
I believe he is not altogether correct in saying that natural rights
are not contingent on the bearer's relation to another. For instance,
it seems that a child s right to be provided for by its parents is a
natural right (as opposed to a conventional one) and it derives from
This is precisely the position defended by Marjorie Reilly Maguire in a paper read for
the panel on "Personhood and Value in the Reproductive Rights Debate" at the December,
1986 conference,.. Ethical Issues in Reproductive Health: Religious Perspectives.
sponsored by Catholics for Free Choice. She distinguished between helpful and harmful
parasitism and concluded that a fetus' moral status or "personhood" was determined by
the woman's perception of the parasitical relation as a helpful one.
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the child's special relation to certain adults. But the natural rights
to life, liberty, education, and so forth, do seem to be held
independently of the bearer's relation to anyone else.
His claim here is no doubt too strong; not all natural rights are
held independently of the bearer's relation to others, but perhaps the
right to life, which is the one in question, is held independently.
What he should say is that morally significant relations among
right-bearers do not affect the right to life they possess, but only
what the right to life requires or permits in certain circumstances.
I doubt that such a conclusion would be seriously challenged. It
would be easy for Sumner to support it with the example of Siamese
twins where the one's life depends on its continued use of a vital
organ in the other's body. The dependent twin seems no less a moral
object than its "host." Both are believed to have a right to life
though it will not be possible to honor the parasitical twin's right
for very long. Hence I believe that Sumner is ultimately right in
saying that an entity's parasitical relation to a human being does not
affect its moral standing per se but only what one may do to it in
these circumstances. But he has not made a clear case for this in the
text.
- Overall, however, it seems that Sumner's criticism of the liberal
view that birth constitutes a moral watershed is effective. There
appears to be no property that a fetus acquires during the birth
process that would mark its acquisition of moral standing.
Sumner is also right in saying that attempts to ground the liberal
view in a deeper, more general theory lead to the acceptability of
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infanticide. Tooley's arguments do this as does Sommers' appeal to a
"Principle of Nurture" and Greene's attempt to defend the very risky
view that the rights of human incompetents are derived from the
consensus of moral agents. It was seen that Sommers'
"Principle of
Nurture" could apply to fetuses as well as to infants and that the
moral guidelines Greene offers for conferring rights can be used to
deny them to infants as well as to fetuses.
The liberal is indeed caught in a dilemma. If she denies that any
fetuses have moral standing, her claim is based either on a shallow
and ad hoc criterion for moral standing or she draws it from a more
general moral theory that ends up denying moral status to infants as
well.
3.2 Failure of the Conservative View
Sumner's criticism of the conservative claim that all fetuses
have moral standing runs parallel to his criticism of the contrary,
liberal claim that none of them has moral standing. Conservatives
are caught in their own dilemma, he contends. If they appeal to
moral intuitions to support their claim, they, like the liberal, will
ond up defending a shallow criterion of moral standing but if they
attempt to derive their conclusion from a more general moral
Jheory, they will have to accept the unhappy and unlikely consequent
that gametes, as well as fetuses, have moral status. He sums it up
this way:
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Preserving the significance of conception requires
resort to a shallow criterion of moral standing
(menribership in the human species). A deeper
criterion, if it awards moral standing to fetuses
wi I award it also to gametes, the conservative’s’
attack on abortion thus also condemns contraception.
(Sumner, 1981; 105)^ ^
If, as conservatives say, fetuses acquire moral standing at
conception, then there is some property they acquire at that time
that IS a necessary condition fo? "counting", for being a moral
object. Sumner suggests that the only morally significant property
they acquire at conception is that of becoming a member of the
human species. He can see no other trait in the miniscule "product of
conception" that would warrant its being morally considerable.
But, if membership in the human species is what it takes to
"count", then the criterion is indeed shallow, for there is no self-
evident reason to think that the human species, merely in virtue of
its being human, merits greater respect than any other. To claim as
much is to exercise our own brand of chauvinism, a "species
chauvinism."
Sumner, though, considers the possibility that the conservative's
criterion for moral standing is not membership in the species
simpliciter but membership in a class whose typical members
’’^Sumner's reflections on the conservative's claims about the moral status of fetuses
are part of his criticism of the conservative position on the morality of abortion. He
thinks conservatives are wrong about the ethics of abortion not only because their claim
that all fetuses are morally considerable is untenable but because the arguments they
offer based on a principle of self-defense and the natural law principle of double-effect
also fail.
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display a morally significant property and which, coincidently, is
also the class of human beings. Thus, although the scope of the class
of human beings is the same as that of the class whose typical
members possess a morally significant property, it is membership in
the latter set that guarantees moral standing. Sumner explains it
this way:
f being human fails as a criterion, this does not imply that it
s irre evant to the distribution of moral standing. It is simply
not intrinsically relevant, as a criterion must be. But it could
only human beings have
moral standing, because all and only human beings have some
further property that is a plausible criterion of moral standing
his does turn out to be the case, then species membership canfunction as an indicator of moral standing (we will be able to
creatures with a right to life by attending to
their species), though not as a criterion. (Sumner 1981- 93)
still
If
There are a number of properties that present themselves as
likely criteria for moral standing and whose possession is
restricted to typical members of the human species. A high level of
intelligence (compared to that typical of other species), rationality,
moral agency and the capacity for a rich life are some of them.
If it were the case that, for instance, rationality would be the
criterion of moral standing, then, because typical members of the
human species are rational, all other, non-rational, members of the
species would also merit respect. As Sumner puts it, they
would. .."ride the moral coattails of the paradigm rational being." The
determination of moral standing turns out to be a two tiered
process, first one identifies a natural kind whose typical members
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possess the morally significant property, perhaps rationality, and
then one makes the inference that the kind, or class, is morally
significant.
face of it, then, the conservative's claim would be
plausible. All fetuses would have moral standing because they were
members of the ciass whose typical members possessed the morally
significant property of rationality.
One problem Sumner sees with this is that it contradicts a
further claim made by conservatives, i.e. that all and only human
beings have moral standing. He sees no reason to use the criterion of
rationality for determining which class has moral standing but not
to use it to determine which individuals have moral standing. It is
odd to think that rationality (or some other morally significant
property) should be important in a class of beings but not in an
individual being. Yet if conservatives rule out moral standing for
intelligent non-human animals, machines or, perhaps,
extraterrestials, whose typical class members happen not to be very
bright this is precisely what they must do. They must say that the
class of beings counts" because it, i.e. its paradigmatic members,
are rational but an individual entity that is rational does not "count"
(unless, perchance, it is one of the paradigmatic members of a
rational class.) Sumner observes that all of this seems to be but a
thinly veiled assertion of species chauvinism. For if rationality, or
..whatever p^roperty is morally significant, is what makes an entity
important, then it ought to do so regardless of whether its bearer is
a class or an individual. Anything that has the morally significant
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property ought to have moral standing just in virtue of having it.’
2
Thus, If conservatives were to maintain that all and only human
beings have moral standing, they would be basing their claim on the
legitimacy of species chauvinism. As such, their position would be
unimpressive.
Further, even if conservatives allow that "qualified" non-humans
can have moral status, they will be guilty of chauvinism if they say
that human fetuses and "unqualified" human beings also have moral
standing. Just being part of species does not seem to be enough to
warrant the special status of the paradigmatic members. What
presents itself as more important is having whatever property is
necessary for moral status - or, at least, having the potential for
it.is
However, without the assumption of species chauvinism, there
appears to be no reason to say that those who will never be rational
or morally competent have moral standing. We may wish not to harm
or destroy them for other reasons, but not because they have moral
standing.
Sumner's contention, then, that conservatives flirt dangerously
with species chauvinism is not without merit. Those who claim that
all and only human beings have moral standing are hard put to
That anyone should say that each member of a class has moral standing because the
class itself has it can also be construed as a simple fallacy of division.
1
3
It makes more sense to say that if we value rationality or moral agency, that every
entity that is rational or morally competent merits our respect and that those who will
come to be rational or morally competent might also have some claim to it than to create
a golden parachute for humans who otherwise do not satisfy the criteria for moral
standing.
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explam away their bias in favor of the human species. If they allow
hat non-humans that meet the necessary criteria for moral standing
ave it, they will still have the problem of explaining why it is thathumans who fail to meefthe criteria and lack even the potential for
-T^eetmg them, nonetheless have moral status - al, this without an
appeal to the inherent worth of our species. If conservatives refuse
to consider the possibility of rights for non-humans or cannot
explain why some humans who do not meet the criteria for moral
standing have it still, then, assuredly, they are caught on the first
horn of Sumner's dilemma. 1^
We must wait until the discussion of the merits of the
conservative view in Chapter 4 to see whether or not conservatives
can justify their position on fetal standing only if they assume that
the human species merits moral privilege just because it is "the
human species."
However, perh aps more headway can be made in assessing
’Jit is possible that conservatives base their argument on a species chauvinism but onehey feel is justified by religious belief. For instance, in the religious traditions ofJudaism and Christianity, humanity is exalted as the crowning piece of creation, as God’s
chosen people made in his image and likeness. The species as a whole is said to be
preserved and saved by his divine intervention. That God should choose to create and
interact with such a species would be a convincing reason to believe that each of its
members and no others merits moral standing. Add to this the scriptural injunctions to
love even the ’’least of the brethren" and so forth, there is considerable weight behind
the belief that each member of the species "counts."
It is Peter Singer’s opinion that such religious beliefs have become so ingrained in
Western thought that their enactment has become the very measure of a nation’s
civilization. Yet, he contends, since they are religious beliefs, they will not serve as a
good basis for rational discourse. That all humans have moral standing must be
established on other, non-religious grounds. (Singer, 1979: 125)
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Sumner’s second line of crifioism. Here he contends that if
conservatives attempt to give their thesis a theoretical backing,
they will end up either with a distorted understanding of rights or,
by condemning contracephon with the same force as they do murder',
neither of which is a tolerable alternative.
His reasoning is that the conservative view, if it has a
theoretical basis, has it in natural law theory, and, specifically,
from a natural law understanding of potentiality, Sumner has it that
conservatives attribute a right to life to fetuses on the basis of
thGir potGntial for futur© rights.
But, he thinks that such potential cannot be the basis for moral
standing. One reason is that assigning rights on the basis of
potential properties rather than actual ones is an unusual and
counterintuitive way of assigning rights. A second reason is that if
potential for moral standing is enough for having a right to life, then
gametes have a right to life and contraception becomes seriously
wrong, which is unlikely. These two charges together constitute the
second horn of Sumner's dilemma for the conservative.
In the first case, Sumner says that assigning rights on the basis
of potential deviates from the customary way of assigning rights.
Rights are normally owned by (and duties owed to)
creatures in virtue of the properties or abilities
those creatures actually possess, not in virtue of
those they will come to possess in the future. Thus
Jhe right to vote is owned by those who have actually
achieved a stipulated age and not by those who will
reach that age in the normal course of development.
(Sumner, 1981: 102-3)
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Sumner further claims that the feature of datedness is not
peculiar to conventional rights but holds for natural liberty rights
as well. (Sumner, 1981: 103)
In response to Sumner's observation, it seems that daledness
does not necessarily preclude the possibility that fetuses would
have a right to life. Though it may appe_ar paradoxical, it can be said
that some rights are predioated on the possession of an actual
property, but the actual property is potentiality. For example, we
assume that ohildren have a right to be educated. And the right, I
wouid think, is derived from their potential to learn. In much the
same way, we think that peopie who are ill have a right to medical
care; I presume that the right is derived from their potential to
benefit from it. Thus, it is not so unintuitive to say that a fetus may
have a right to life because it has the potential to continue living or
because it will benefit from it.
Tooley's problems with the rights of little boys and infant girls
are also cases in point. That the infant girls have a right not to be
conditioned into future dullness and the little boys not to be made
into eunuchs for the sake of the choir can be interpreted to mean
that their actual rights are predicated on their potential for, in the
first case, living stimulating and challenging lives or, in the second,
their potential for sexual activity. Thus, again, it would appear that
.some actual rights are derived from the, actual, possession of the
property of potentiality.
As in the case of the right to education and the right to medical
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treatment, it is the possession of a certain potentiality, that
guarantees the rights of Tooley's infant girls and little boys.
I would suggest that a fetus' right to life can be construed as a
right based on potential. If a fetus lived, it would come to have many
capacities from which it would derive its rights. To destroy it now
would be to prevent it from achieving what it would were it allowed
to live.
Another way of putting this is
-to say that entities have a right,
now, not to be deprived of what they will need to exercise future
rights. Fetuses, minimally, need to stay alive in order to exercise
their future rights. Thus, they have a right, now, not to be killed, as
children have a right not to be conditioned or castrated or deprived
of education or medical attention - and, all of these rights amount
to rights based on potentiality.
Sumner's appeal to the datedness of rights, then, does not
constitute a real stumbling block for the conservative. Thus, the
weight of the argument for the second horn of the dilemma falls
entirely on his claim that defending the moral status of fetuses
means defending that of gametes.
Sumner derives this conclusion from his understanding of human
potentiality and the biological data of human reproduction. The
potentiality argument for fetal status, he says,
... assigns moral standing to that which in the normal
^course of development will come to display rationality.
(Sumner, 1981 ; 103)
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He is careful to specify that "in the normal course of
development" is to be understood as teleological normalcy and not
statistical normalcy. This is the more accurate interpretation of the
conservative, i.e. Aristotelian-Thomistic, natural law notion of
potentiality. He writes:
... I IS also normal for ova to be fertilized (though it is
unlikely that any given ovum will fertilized) and for
spermatozoa to fertilize (though it is overwhelmingly
unlikely that any particular spermatozoon will do so)
bince both are gametes (sex cells) fertilization is what
they are for. But then if protection of life is to be
extended back to fetuses, embryos or zygotes in virtue
of their potential, it must by parity of reasoning be
extended back to ova and spematozoa in virtue of theirs.
(Sumner, 1981: 104)
If Sumner is correct, conservatives believe:
a. that whatever will come to display rationality has
moral status at every stage of its development, and
b. that gametes normally develop into rational adult
human beings.
But conservatives probably do not believe a. I know of no
statement in the current literature which ascribes to conservatives
the view that a half-built artificial intelligence machine, for
example, has moral status. And, usually, conservatives claim that
the insane, retarded children and other irreversibly incompetent
humans also have moral standing. So, it is unlikely that they would
agree to a.
Neither would they assent to b. for if my understanding of the
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biology is correct, gametes cease to exist uporr fertilization and a
new entity comes into being. A sperm or an ovum does not itself
develop into a mature human being any more than chlorine, alone,
develops into salt. Thus, just as it would be wrong to say that
chlorine has the potential to taste salty it is wrong to say that an
ovum has the potential to reason.
Dennis J. Horan has made the same observation this way:
The natural end of the individual sperm and ovum is
death unless fertilization occurs. In other words we
are neither grown-up sperms nor are we grown-up
eggs. At fertilization a new and unique individual
is created which, although receiving one-half of its
chromosomes from each parent, is really unlike
(Horan, 1977: 564)
The conservative sees potentiality (for any trait or capacity) as a
property possessed by an individual entity, possessed in such a way
that the entity, itself, will come to display in the normal course of
Its development.'' 5 For the conservative, the biologioal fact that
gametes, qua gametes, do not possess the potential to develop
whatever property guarantees moral status (for they cease to exist
upon conception) is enough for them to say that gametes are not
potential bearers of moral standing.
But, evidently, this is not the way Sumner understands the
concept of potentiality. He does not explain his objection further
^?cf. discussion of May, Ch. 4 below. See also Francis Wade, "Potentiality in the
Abortion Discussion", Review of Metaphysics , vol.29, December, 1975: 239-255, for
a very good exposition of the conservative understanding of the concept of potentiality.
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and, given that the biological data is not at all esoteric, one has to
wonder what would motivate him to think the way he does. My only
suggestion is that Sumner may be assuming a process centered
ontology rather than a metaphysics of continuants. If this were the
case, then a human being would be a process whose beginning would
be difficult to pinpoint but part of which would certainly be the life
of a particular ovum and sperm. Thus. jf a fetus had moral standing
because it had the potential to develop into an adult human, every
other part of the process that ended in an adult human ought also
have moral standing. Hence the case for the inviolability of gametes.
All of this is tentative of course; Sumner has nowhere said that
he espouses a metaphysics of process. But it seems to me that it
would provide him with support for his claim that a fetus'
potentiality falls into the same category as that of gametes.
The dilemma Sumner posed for conservatives has some force. On
the one hand, conservatives, even if they accede to the possibility of
rights for non-humans still have to explain why they think that
humans who lack even the potential for meeting the standard of
moral status — be it rationality, moral agency or the capacity for a
rich life — nonetheless have moral standing, without assuming the
truth of species chauvinism. One way they might be able to do this is
by defending a criterion of moral standing so low that even a
profoundly retarded human or a deeply psychotic human could meet
_it. The danger here, of course, is that many non-human animals will
also be able to meet the criterion and the scope of animal rights
will be correspondingly enlarged. I think there is a point where even
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the most enthusiastic supporter of animal rights will want to say
that an autistic human counts for more than a very bright dolphin.
But, the conservative has yet to explain why this is so.
However, a conservative appeal to natural law theory would
justify the view that a fetus' potential to become an adult human
being warrants its having moral status. We saw above that such an
appeal would not entail a distorted method of assigning rights, as
Sumner had contended, but that it did assume an ontology of
continuants. That is to say, gametes, as individual kinds of things,
do not develop into adult human beings; they die at the time of
conception. Thus, they do not have the potential that individual
fetuses do. But, this makes sense only if individual things or
continuants are the basic ontological "reality”. If someone were to
hold an alternative metaphysical theory, viz. one where processes
were basic, then it would be reasonable to say that gametes did have
the same potential as fetuses for they are as much a part of the
process that ends in an adult human being as are fetuses.
The difficulty for conservatives is at the level of deep structure.
In order to defend the unique potential of fetuses, they must first
defend an ontology of continuants.
Given the scope of this research, it is not feasible to argue the
merits of one ontology over another. Thus, since Sumner has not
stated his preference of a process centered metaphysics, I will not
assume it in his behalf and will, rather, conclude that he is wrong in
saying that gametes have potential to develop into adult human
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beings.
It turns out at this point that Sumner has provided serious
chaiienges to both the conservative and the iiberai. He has argued
forcefuiiy against the criteria of birth and conception as morai
watersheds and has shown the difficuity of attempting to maintain
the i,berai's stance on the moraiity of abortion with the immorality
of infanticide and the conservative's view about the immorality of
abortion with the morality of contraception.
^
Sumner then may go into the next part of his defense of the
"differential” view with some confidence, if he can show that his
view is less problematic than the liberal's or conservative's, we
would be compelled to accept it as the best current theory.
3.3 Intuitive Defense of the Differentiai View
The differential view is moderate, assigning moral status to
some fetuses but not to others, thereby justifying some abortions
but not all. Sumner claims that fetuses acquire moral standing
gradually during gestation. He believes that sentience is the
property that indicates moral status; that as fetuses become
sentient and then increasingly so, they cross a threshold into moral
significance and acquire progressively greater moral standing until
such a time as they join the ranks of paradigmatic bearers of moral
^standing, he. of "adult human being(s) with normal capacities of
intellect, emotion, perception, sensation, decision, action, and the
like.” (Sumner, 1981: 128)
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The view is differential in that it provides a criterion for
distinguishing among those fetuses that are morally considerable
and those that are not. For instance, fetuses that are not yet
sentient will have no right to life; older fetuses that give evidence
of some degree of sentience will have a weak claim to life and
mature fetuses that are as sentient as neonates will have as strong
a claim as do neonates. The view also accomodates the intuition that
from the point of view of morals, early abortions are not as serious
as later ones.
Sumner does not assume that sentience is the obvious criterion
for moral standing. He discusses three others at some length before
settling on the sentience criterion. Intrinsic value, life itself and
rationality seem, initially, also to be plausible criteria.
He contends that intrinsic value as a normative property, does not
lend itself readily to the task because a criterion of moral standing
must connect moral standing with some property of things whose
presence or absence can be confirmed by a settled, objective, and
public method of verification"' (Sumner, 1981 :130-1). But the
confirmation of the presence of a normative property like goodness
or value (intrinsic or instrumental) is always done indirectly by
confirming the presence of another property in virtue of which
something is good or valuable. Thus, a property like intrinsic value
is not well suited to provide a norm for moral standing, for it is,
Jtself, a norm for something else. His point is well taken:
... if things have moral standing in virtue of having
intrinsic value, and if they have intrinsic value in
virtue of some natural property, then it is that natural
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property wh^h is serving as the real criterion of moral
standing and the middle term is eliminable without loss
ofS c/ ' H a criterion ‘t moral standing but intrinsic value cannot itself
serve as that criterion. (Sumner, 1981 :131)
But If intrinsic value is not a good measure of moral standing,
perhaps life itself is. Perhaps it is sufficient that something merely
be alive for it to have moral standing.
-This is the view defended by
Kenneth Goodpaster (Goodpaster, 1978).
Sumner rejects Goodpaster’s conclusion for three reasons. First,
he thinks that the notion of mere life being the criterion for moral
standing is counterintuitive; second, he objects because a standard
like "being alive" would provide no comparison criteria, i.e. no
guidelines for preferring the interests of one entity over those of
another, and, third, he believes that Goodpaster's view is internally
inconsistent (Sumner, 1981 :passim,1 32-7).
The substance of Sumner's first objection is that adhering to the
life criterion would mean according moral weight to the lives of
plants and simple animals. He asks rhetorically, "How could we
conduct our affairs if we were to grant protection of life to every
plant and animal species?" Such a stance would be at the least
counterintuitive.
Goodpaster, however, recognizes the potential trouble and is
careful to distinguish between moral obligations that are
regulative lor an agent, that is, that are "defensible on all grounds
independent of operativity" and those that are operative for an
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agent, i.e. where the "thorough acknowledgment of X' (moral status)
IS psychologically (and in general, causally) possible" for the agent
(Goodpaster, 1978: 313). The distinction is meant to be akin to Ross'
categories of prima facie_vs. actual duties (Goodpaster, 1978: 313)
By appealing to the distinction, Goodpaster is able to acknowledge
that It probably will not be humanly possible to protect the life of
every living thing. But this will not be to say that some living things
have no moral standing. Hence, we wiirbe able to conduct our affairs
as before; the difference being tha't we would have some obligation
not to destroy living things wantonlyj ®
Still, if we are to respect all living things, how are we to decide
competing claims when it is not possible to respect them all? How
IS a moral agent to determine which obligations are only regulative
and which are both regulative and operative for them. Since, as
Sumner observes, all beings that are alive seem to be equally alive,
we would be at a loss to decide which of our obligations to expend
our resources on. We should have no reason, say, to prefer the life of
the tribesman over that of the^ tiger that was attacking him.
Goodpaster's theory, then, does appear to fall short for lacking
"comparison criteria"
-In his behalf, however, we should say that he recognizes the
desirability of comparison criteria. At the close of his paper, he
writes.
As indicated earlier, numerous other questions are
waiting in the wings. Central among them are
1
Goodpaster's intuitions are strongly reminiscent of those expressed by Albert
Schweitzer in Reverence for Life (Schweitzer, 1969) or, perhaps, it is vice versa.
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questions dealing with how to balance competing
c aims to consideration in a world in which competing
claims seem pervasive. (Goodpaster, 1978: 325)
Further, there seems to be no inherent difficulty in separating the
task of determining an inclusion criterion from that of developing
comparison criteria. Sumner's plan of providing a criterion that is at
once inclusionary and discretionary would yield a more elegant
theory but this is not to say that a two-part theory such as
Goodpaster has in mind could not be a good one.
So far, then, Goodpaster's proposal, that being alive is necessary
and sufficient for having moral standing, does not do too badly.
However, I believe that Sumner's third point of criticism will carry
through and that Goodpaster's "life" criterion turns out to be
internally inconsistent - but not exactly for the reason Sumner
gives.
In order to understand Sumner's criticism it will be necessary to
backtrack a bit to Goodpaster's justification of the "life" criterion.
He observed that all living things were teleological systems, that is
to say, that they have "functions, ends, directions, natural
tendencies, and so forth". (Sumner, 1981: 132) In virtue of their
teleology, living things then have needs or conditions which must be
satisfied if they are to achieve their purposes. As such, they can be
harmed or benefited. They are harmed when they are prevented from
achieving their purpose (from living and thriving): they are benefited
when they are helped or at least not hindered from achieving their
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telos. And, as Sumner puts it...
...it is common to construe morality as having essentially
to do with benefits and harms or with the good of
creatures.- So doing will lead us to extend moral
standing to all creatures capable of being benefited
and harmed, that is, all creatures with a good.
(Sumner,1981: 132-3)
Life, then, would turn out to be the“ only reasonable criterion for
moral standing. Yet, Sumner observes, not only living things are
teleological systems. A lawnmower, for instance, has as a purpose
the trimming of lawns and it can be benefited or harmed by, on the
one hand, being tuned up, having its blades sharpened etc. and on the
other, by being left out in the rain or being run over rocky and pitted
terrains. Thus, Sumner contends, Goodpaster ought not restrict the
possession of rights to living things; if having a telos means having
interests, then many non-living things have interests and, so, have
moral standing.
In defense of Goodpaster, I would suggest that Sumner has
misinterpreted his intention. Sumner claims that Goodpaster thinks
that possession of any end is sufficient for moral standing but I
believe that Goodpaster has something narrower in mind,
specifically the possession of what I will call a "natural" telos.
Consider the following passage from Goodpaster's paper.
Nor will it do to suggest, as Feinberg does, that the
needs (interests) of living things like trees are not
really their own but implicitly ours : "Plants may
need things in order to discharge their functions, but
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their functions are assigned by human interests, not
o l!
interests that assigned
t trees the tasks of growth or maintenance! The
interests at stake are clearly those of the living things
themselves, not simply those of their owners or
users or other human persons involved.
-(Goodpaster,1 978: 31 9)
Goodpaster distinguishes between interests that are owned, as it
were, by a subject and those that belong to the subject's architect
or proprietor. Only if the interest is ow'ned by the subject, only if it
IS a "natural" telos, he would say, will the subject have moral
standing. Thus, I believe Goodpaster would reject the view that
lawnmowers have moral standing in virtue of their function because
that function is not natural; it was determined and assigned by
human beings.
Still, this move will not save Goodpaster from a charge of
inconsistency. Even if one grants that only natural functions certify
moral standing he would be wrong to conclude that only living things
have natural functions. Rivers, for example, have a natural function
of wearing away river banks, forming canyons and so forth, and
strong winds can count among their functions that of providing
organic matter for forest growth by blowing down trees and leaves.
If Goodpaster is right, it would be immoral to dam up rivers or
prevent erosion or even brace up saplings for fear of frustrating the
natural functions of water and air.
I suspect that Goodpaster would revert this problem to the
broader task of providing comparison criteria. He could maintain
that rivers, wind or the ozone layer of the atmosphere all have moral
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standing but that their interests are secondary to those of living
things. Much would hinge on Goodpaster’s success at providing a
convincing guid© for weighing interests.
Beyond this, there is a question as to the justifiability of
Goodpaster's preference for "natural" teloi over man-made versions.
One may speculate about the Aristotelian roots of Goodpaster's view
but that will not justify it. In light-of this, Sumner's criticism
assumes greater force for if the "ends of living things insure their
moral standing then why not the ends of machines and other
implements?
Perhaps Goodpaster could expand his view to include lawnmowers
or typewriters and such. It could then be the job of the comparison
criteria theory to explain why it is more important to feed the cat
than to oil the lawnmower. Doing this would place enormous weight
on the success of the theory that determines comparison criteria. It
would also trivialize his moral status theory, for if all that
Goodpaster s claim means is that everything that has some purpose
ought to be respected then it is not very illuminating. Virtually
everything either has a "natural" purpose or can be used for
something or other.
The "life" criterion then is too broad to be of service. On the other
hand, rationality, the last of the suggested criteria for moral
standing, is too narrow. Sumner reasons that if an entity had moral
status only if it were rational, killing non-human animals would be
no more wrong than weeding a garden. However, this is not the case
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since the great majority of people think that killing non-human
animals is an evil to the animals themselves, an evil which needs to
be justified.
Further, Sumner maintains that many human beings would be
excluded from the moral community if rationality were required for
membership. The group of human incompetents whose status has
frequently been cited in this research, would again be
disenfranchised under a rationality criterion. Thus, if it is true that
the deaths of non-human animals and non-rational humans are not
trivial and that we have a duty not to kill them without just cause,
then it is also true that they have moral status regardless of their
lack of the capacity for rational thought.
Sumner also briefly considers the possibility that the capacity
for moral agency, a form of the capacity to reason, could be the
criterion for moral agency. He rejects this alternative because, like
rationality simpliciter, it is too narrow. He concedes that the class
of moral agents is co-extensive with the class of those who have
moral duties but denies that it Js co-extensive with that of the
entire moral community. The moral community includes rights
bearers who do not also have moral obligations, for example, all
human incompetents, and is thus broader in scope than the class of
moral agents.
Neither intrinsic value, life nor the capacity to reason will serve
as good indicators of moral standing. Thus, the way is clear for
^
^Ronald Greene's view, discussed above, contradicts Sumner's intuitions here. If
Greene's thesis were defensible then the class of moral agents would be co-extensive
with the moral community except where moral agents chose to include "others" in it.
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Sumner's defense of sentience as the necessary and sufficient
condition for having moral status.
Sentience, he writes,
... is the capacity for feeling or affect. In its most primitive
form It IS the ability to experience sensations of pleasure and
pain, and thus the ability to enjoy and suffer. Its more
developed forms include wants, aims, and desires (and
thus the ability to be satisfied and frustrated); attitudes,
tastes, and values: and moods, emotions, sentiments, and
passions. (Sumner,1981 :142)
Sentience is a graduated property that is possessed in varying
degrees by various entities. In its primitive form, it is possessed by
lower animals and mid-trimester fetuses. Late term fetuses,
neonates and higher non-human animals, say cats and dogs, possess
it to a greater degree and developed animals with the capacity for
psychological "feeling", i.e. aesthetic, intellectual and moral
pleasure or insult have the most.
As an inclusion criterion, sentience would encompass all entities
that can feel either physically or psychologically. As a comparison
criterion, it would assign the greatest moral standing to fully
developed sentient entities and diminishing amounts to entities that
have less and less capacity for feeling. Sumner concludes:
If all affect and responsivity are absent, and if they
cannot be engendered, then (but only then) are we
no longer dealing with a sentient creature.
(Sumner.l 981:1 45)
Creatures that cannot feel, physically or psychologically would be
beyond the pale of moral concern.
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The empirical property indicating the capacity for sentience in
the species that we are familiar with is the presence of the
forebrain. The degree of its development in an entity will correspond
to and mdioate the degree of the entity's moral standing's In the
oase of pre-born humans, Sumner thinks that it is difficult to locate
with accuracy the stage of development during which sentience
emerges but that certainly there is none at the zygotio or embryonic
periods. Zygotes and embryos, then, would lack moral status where
fetuses began to acquire some minimal standing and newborn infants
quite a lot.
Intuitively, Sumner's view is appealing. A criterion such as his
that is at once an inclusion and a comparison criterion is desirable
from a strategic standpoint and moderateness, as a rule of thumb, is
a pretty steady guide to reasonableness. Further, that an entity can
suffer as a result of our treatment of it (or failure to treat) must be
a major determinant in whether we count it as "one of us" or not.
Intuitively, the sentience criterion must be very close to the mark.
There are two factors, however, that prevent a wholehearted
endorsement of it. The first is a worry over its utility as a
comparison criterion. Sumner has it that human fetuses and lower
non-human animals merit little moral concern because they have
very little capacity for sentience. And, further, that we know this
^^Sumner does not rule out the possibility of according moral standing to
extj;aterrestial cre^ures. In those cases, we would have to find an analogue to the
. - forebrain to ascertain the degree of moral standing to be accorded. (Sumner,1981:
passim 147-8)
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because their forebrains are very little developed.
I think that
maintaining this line of reasoning will lead Sumner into rough seas.
For instance, Sumner assumes that newborn infants are sentient.
(Sumner.1981:148) Yet-the forebrain of a newborn infant is
considerably less developed than that of a six year old child.'' 9 And,
the sentience" of a six year old child in terms of moral or aesthetic
sensibility is hardly to be compared to that of an adult. Thus, on
Sumner’s account, the adult should
_rate highest, then the six year old
and finally, the newborn infant .20 Yet, intuitively, it seems that
there ought to be no difference in their moral standing. Further, the
brains of many primates and cetaceans are better developed than
that of newborn human infants. Again, from the point of view of
intuitions, it does not seem that bright non-human animals count for
more than human infants.
This leads to the second point of difficulty with Sumner's theory.
One suspects that one reason why bright non-human animals do not
count for more than human infants is that human infants have
potential for much greater sentience as they develop. Eventually, if
they are average human beings, they will be capable of a much
greater range of sentiments than will the brightest chimp or dolphin.
If this were not the case then we should hear great protest over the
use of vital organs taken from primates to save or extend the lives
^®See, for example, J.Leroy Conel. The Postnatal Development of the Human Cerebral
Codex, VolumesJ and VIII, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967).
Of)
In a land of plenty, the question would be purely one of theory but where there is a
need to distribute scarce resources for life itself, then the question of which one
"counts" most takes on a practical urgency.
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of human infants, as in the 1984 case of Baby Fas. The intuitions of
most people on that occasion, including those of the chief surgeon,
did not at all incline them to suppose that the baboon counted for
more than the human infant.
The point is that Sumner's view does not take into account
potential for sentience. There seems to be a significant moral
difference between 3,,,33 constitutionally lack sentience and
those that lack it temporarily. As. Sumner wrote, it is only when
...'all affect and responsivity are absent, and [when] they cannot be
engendered, then (but only then) are we no longer dealing with a
sentient creature." (Sumner,1 981 :145) Although there is, strictly
speaking, no engendering of sentience possible in human embryos and
no way of immediately incrementing sentience in human fetuses or
infants, if they are but given appropriate support, the higher degree
of sentience will come of itself. Thus, it seems that Sumner ought
to expand the criterion for moral standing to include entities with
constitutional potontial for sentionco.
If he were to do this, the disturbing inequity in moral standing
cited above, between newborns and six year-olds, and again with
adults, would dissolve. All three would bear equal moral status, the
adult in virtue of its actual sentience; the child and infant in virtue
of what they have and what they will have. But, doing it will defeat
21
In one essay, the author characterized those who protested the use of the baboon's
heart because it was a violation of the animal's rights as some who "could safely be called
..eccentric."
; he also noted that in a carnivorous society such as ours, "the idea of
weighing an animal's life equally against a human baby's [was] bizarre." (Charles
Krauthammer, "The Using of Baby Fae". ( Time . December 3, 1984:87-88).
134
his original thesis that embryos have no moral standing and fetuses
have but little. In virtue of their potential for sentience, they would
turn out to have as much moral standing as children and adults. Thus,
from the point of view of moral intuitions, sentience serves well as
an inclusion criterion only if potential for sentience is allowed as
part of the criterion.22
As a comparison criterion, it poses greater difficulties, for it
implies that humans of lesser sensibility count for less than those
with greater capacities. And, here, even if we include a proviso for
potentiality we will end up assigning inferior status to human
incompetents. This would mean that in situations where it was
impossible to respect the interests of both a competent and an
incompetent human, as in the distribution of scarce life support
resources, we ought to give preference to the competent human and
where there are conflicts between more and less sentient humans,
we should prefer a Michaelangelo to a mere Rembrandt (and a run of
the mill philosopher wouldn't have a chance). Again, from the point
of view of moral intuitions, these consequences rule against
accepting sentience as a comparison criterion.
Sumner's defense of the sentience criterion on an intuitive level
22
If, as Sumner says, an entity is non-sentient only where sentience cannot be
engendered in it then he should allow that an entity which will display sentience in due
time should also have moral standing. All things being equal, if an adult human were not
able to emerge from a coma until nine months had passed, I believe Sumner would count
him_ among the sen^tient. His doing so would have to be based on the adult's potential for
-- sentience not his actual possession of it. Given this, Sumner then should also allow that
embryos and fetuses are among the sentient in the same way as the temporarily comatose
adult.
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does not succeed in the way he would have it. As an inclusion
criterion, it is convincing if potentiality for sentience is added in;
as a comparison criterion it leads to the counterintuitive conclusion
that incompetent humans count for less than competent ones.
3.4 Theoretical Support for the Differential View
Thus far, Sumner’s arguments against the liberal and conservative
theses and in favor of his differential view have been based on moral
intuitions. We saw that Sumner rejected the liberal view because it
implied either that birth was the indicator of moral standing, so
that things like one's location, accessibility, or physiological
autonomy would be morally significant, or that infanticide was
morally acceptable. It was through intuition that one was expected
to see that infanticide could not be morally acceptable and that
one s location, accessibility, or physiological autonomy were
morally irrelevant. The conservative view was found lacking in that
it allegedly implied that gametes
-were morally considerable - and,
everyone could see that gametes were not morally considerable
things. But the differential view was thought to be better because
everyone could see that benefit and harm were morally important
factors and that actions which caused neither were morally
innocuous. Thus it seemed most reasonable to conclude that only and
all entitle^ that could suffer or be benefited would be morally
considerable.
However, being what they are, intuitions sometimes conflict. And
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when they do, there is no justification of one's preference of
intuition. For instance, if Sumner sees that infanticide is wrong and
Tooley does not, it seems to me that all other things being equal, the
most we could say in behalf of Sumner's opinion and against Tooley's
would be that Tooley was perhaps morally blind. But he might
respond in kind to the effect that Sumner was suffering from some
sort of moral hallucination. Or if someone were to declare that good
Samaritainism was minimally moral behavior and another saw it as
a category of supererogatory action, then there would be no further
basis for discussion, for if the criterion of reasonableness is
"seeing" that something is right or wrong then there is nothing to be
said about a divergent moral opinion other than its holder is either
morally callous or a bleeding heart.
This is not to say that moral intuitions have no place in moral
reasoning but only that their foundation is not in reason. Hence,
there is no way to convince someone, by reason, that their intuitions
are true or false.
Yet if moral claims are to be more than assertions of moral
sentiments, there must be some way of indicating the worth of
moral intuitions. It is to Sumner's considerable credit that he has
recognized the futility of arguing only at the intuitive level. He
breaks this moral stalemate by requiring that views about moral
standing follow from an established moral theory. In this way, he
provides a way of justifying one's choice of moral status indicator
beyond the fact that it would include entities we feel ought to be
included and exclude those we feel are not morally considerable. A
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justification by appeal to an established moral theory will be less
subjective, less culture-bound and hopefully more conclusive than
the appeal to moral intuitions.
One might rejoin, however, that laudable as this strategy may
seem, Sumner has only moved the discussion a step backwards, for
even if his view is supported by a credible moral theory, in his case,
by classical utilitarianism, the liberal's and conservative's views
may well be implied by some other established moral theory.23 in
such a case, we would end up with consistent, self-contained but
incompatible conclusions about moral status. Each view will turn
out to be theory bound.
There is also another sense in which Sumner may be moving the
discussion but a step backwards. This is that the basis of moral
theories themselves may well be built on the shifting sands of moral
intuitions. How else are we to account for Mill's or Bentham's
"seeing" that maximizing happiness was the key to morality or
Aristotle's fascination with living in accordance to one's "nature" or
Kant's attention to the dignity of moral agents and our duties
thereon. There is sufficient disagreement in the current literature
on the foundations of morality to justify at least a suspicion that
deriving a particular moral claim or principle from an established
Recall from above that Sumner contended that there was no deeper theory that could
justify the liberal claim without also justifying infanticide and that the conservative's
view had its roots in natural law theory. However, if infanticide was not thought to be
necessarily wrong7the liberal as well as the conservative view would be grounded in a
deeper moral theory.
138
moral theory may not prove any more an "objective" defense of it
than an appeal to intuitions simpliciter.
This does not take away from the helpfulness of Sumner’s insight.
That two distinct strategies are employed to justify moral claims is
a most illuminating observation, one that helps understand and
organize arguments to be analyzed. But it does dampen enthusiasm
for this aspect of Sumner's defense.
With dampened enthusiasm, then, let us look at that defense. His
claim is twofold, first, that the best form of utilitarianism is
classical utilitarianism, and second, that his view on abortion,
including the graduated status of fetuses, is derivable from
classical utilitarianism.
It is beyond the scope and purpose of this dissertation to assess
the validity of Sumner's characterization of his preferred ethical
theory as that of classical utilitarianism. Suffice to say that he
devotes Chapter 5 of his text to a discussion of the various models
or utilitarian thought and settles on a very general version which he
refers to as classical utilitarianism. It defines moral behavior in
terms of achieving the greatest net social utility, where utility is
taken to mean enjoyment and disutility, suffering. For example, he
writes:
But when we choose a course of action on the ground of its
benefits (to those who gain by it) over the costs (to those
who lose) is more favorable than that produced by any
alternative, we are aiming at the greatest net social utility.
And that is all that utilitarianism requires that we be
able to do. (Sumner, 1981 :1 86)
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Now, if the criterion of right action is the production of
enjoyment, it only stands to reason that actions will have a moral
quality when they
-affect
-the enjoyment of some creature(s) either
positively or negatively. Here then is the justification of sentience
as the indicator of moral standing. Wherever a creature has the
capacity for enjoyment or suffering, that creature is de facto a
member of the moral community whose utility must be taken into
account. Sumner explains it thus:
Utilitarian impartiality requires that the utilities of all
creatures affected by an action be included in calculating
the social utility of that action, and that utility count
regardless of its location. All and only sentient beings
are capable of having experiences they like or dislike.
All and only sentient beings, therefore, have utilities.
If having moral standing means having one's utility included
in the calculus, sentience must be the criterion of moral
standing. A criterion that included any nonsentient
beings would be redundant, and a criterion that excluded
any sentient beings would be discriminatory.
(Sumner,1 981:1 98)
It seems to me that Sumner's claim that this utilitarian view
implies a sentience criterion of moral standing is correct. If
morality is about causing enjoyment and avoiding suffering then all
and only those entities that have the capacity for these are moral
objects. 24
24Qoodpaster comes to much the same conclusion; he writes, "...if one's conception of
the good is hedonistic in character, one's conception of a beneficiary will quite
naturally be restricted to beings who are capable of pleasure and pain. If pleasure or
satisfaction is the only ultimate gift we have to give, morally, then it is to be expected
that only those equipped to receive such a gift will enter into our moral deliberation.
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Sumner’s use of sentience as a comparison criterion also follows:
where a creature is capable of only limited enjoyment, its utility
will not be as great as that of a more sentient being who is capable
not only of physical sensation but of emotional, aesthetic or
intellectual sentiment as well. Thus, the interests of a more limited
entity, like a fetus, are overidden by those of more a more capacious
one, like a an adult woman.
However, as noted above, the use of sentience as a comparison
criterion is unfortunate. Sumner appears not to notice the
possibility that if sentience is used as a comparison criterion,
certain cases of infanticide and the killing of other incompetents
will be justified. Neither infants nor, say, the uneducably retarded
nor the severely autistic have the capacity for significantly high
degrees of enjoyment (though they are more sentient than any
fetuses). Thus it would follow that their interests could be
overidden by those of developed, fully sentient adults. And if their
deaths would produce the greatest social utility it would be right to
do away with them.
My objection is perhaps based only on an intuition as opposed to
being derived from a moral theory. It is the intuition that it is wrong
And, if pain or dissatisfaction is the only ultimate harm we can cause, then it is to be
expected that only those equipped for it will deserve our consideration. There seems,
therefore, to be a noncontingent connection between a hedonistic or quasi-hedonistic
theory of value and a response to the moral-considerability questions which favors
sentience or interest possession (narrowly conceived). (Goodpaster, 1978:321)
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to kill incompetents who are personal or social burdens even when
their continued existence yields small enjoyment and much
difficulty for families and communities. Yet, from a utilitarian
perspective, it seems correct to say that, as a last resort, where the
life of an entity causes great disutility for one or more adults, its
interests are overidden and it is right to end the less sentient
being's life. I find it intuitively difficult to accept this stance but
cannot fault it on the grounds that it is inconsistent with utilitarian
principles.
In view of this, sentience, as a comparison criterion, must be
discounted. And since it follows validly from utilitarian moral
theory, we are lead to question the worth of classical utilitarianism
itself.
The implications for sentience as an inclusion factor, then, are
also bad, for this part of Sumner's defense of it was to show that it
was derivable from classical utilitarianism - whose worth we must
now question.
Sumner himself must contend with a dilemma. If he keeps
sentience as a comparison criterion, he loses his grounding theory
^^This may not be so much a criticism of Sumner's particular opinion as one of
utilitarian theory in general. Sumner will inherit such utilitarian dilemmas as the
apparent rightness of killing those whose expectation of happiness is negative regardless
of the level of their sentience, the duty to bring into the world only those whose
expectation of happiness is at least positive but preferably higher than the present
average and, (to vary an example of Tooley’s) the apparent lack of moral difference
between killing arf already existent but terminally unhappy person and failing to bring
such a one into existence.
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because since sentience is not a good comparison criterion,
classical utilitarianism is of questionable worth. But if classical
utilitarianism is suspect, there is no point gained in deriving
sentience as an inclusion criterion from it.
It seems that as a last resort, Sumner could fall back on moral
intuitions - but, on that level, as we have seen, sentience as a
comparison criterion still fails. And, as an inclusion criterion, it is
plausible if one expands it to include potentiality for sentience
along with or in lieu of actual sentience.
3.5 Conclusion
Sumner's appeal to classical utilitarianism yields sentience as an
inclusion criterion, which intuitively, has much merit. It would have
more, however, if the criterion were expanded to include also the
constitutional potential for sentience.
An appeal to classical utilitarianism also serves to confirm
sentience as a comparison criterion, and, we have seen that this
would justify the inferior status of human incompetents. Beyond
this, however, Sumner would do well to notice that the espousal of a
classical utilitarian moral theory does more than justify a
differential and counterintuitive assignment of moral standing. It
justifies a liberal position on the morality of abortion, rather than
the moderate one he supposes. Sumner has assumed that a decision
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about the morality of abortion was tied exclusively to the moral
status of a fetus, where the abortion would be permissible only if
the fetus had very little status or none at all. But, in a utilitarian
decision about the morality of an abortion, the fetus' moral status
would be only one item in the hedonic calculus. The woman's
interests as well as that of other relevant parties' would also count
in. Thus, whenever they outweighed the fetus' interests - even if the
fetus' were as great as an adult human's - it would still be
permissible to terminate the pregnancy. Thus, any pregnancy would
be, in principle, justifiably terminated where its continuance would
serve social disutility. This looks very much more like a liberal
position on abortion than a moderate one.
An alliance with classical utilitarianism inherits many
difficulties. The priority of social utility creates tough problems for
utilitarians as they must justify the apparent rightness of killing
even adult human beings when their deaths would serve social
utility. Homicide and infanticide as well as abortion all become
justifiable options so long as they are the alternative that yields
the greatest social utility. As Philip Devine has observed, "The
obstacles to a credible utilitarian ethics of homicide. ..are very
great." (Devine, 1978:33)
Thus, Sumner's best strategy, though he would not like it much,
would be to defend his preferred criterion on the intuitive level. An
appeal to~ classical utilitarianism gives him an unacceptable
comparison criterion and commits him to a liberal, not a moderate.
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view on the morality of abortion.
In the end, though he has raised important and serious questions
for liberais who contend that fetuses have no moral standing and
conservatives who
-think they have as much as anyone, there are
serious and important questions that must be answered about the
differential view itself.
Chapter 4: William May: A Conservative View
It may be that fetuses possess the property that certifies morai
standing from the .time of conception. If so, then what is usually
called the "conservative view" will be correct. It will be the case, as
one Roman Catholic prelate put it, that "the baby, still not born, is a
man in the same degree and for the same reason as the mother,"'
In other words, there will be no time 7rom conception through birth
that a fetus lacks moral standing, 'it will always count for as much
as any human adult or child.
We have already seen in Michael Tooley's and L.W. Sumner's work
reconstructions of defenses of this conservative claim. They
discussed the plausibility of proving it by arguing in behalf of a
fetus' right to life, from the inviolability of human life in general
and from the moral consideration due to potential persons. Such
arguments were constructed in behalf of the conservative and have
not so far been show conclusively to have failed, for the
reconstructions usually did not reflect an adequate understanding of
conservative principles, especially those pertaining to potentiality.
It is now time to look at the conservatives own defense of their
view.
I would like to focus on William May's work as representative of
arguments for the claim that fetuses have moral standing at every
point during gestation.
^ Pope Pius XII, address, "Acta Apostolicae Sedis," cited in May, 1974:13.
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4.1 Reconstruction of the Argument
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May develops his argument in narrative form; it can be
reconstructed from such passages as the following:
... being human is not primarily a matter of achievement-
rather it is a gift, an endowment that one has not
something worthwhile or is
actually capable of doing something worthwhile but simplybecause he is and is present (even if hidden in the
^ ^
womb) to his fellow men. On this latter view I am -
and you are - a being of moral worth-not because of
anything that I have done or actually can do but simolvbecause I am. (May, 198-:24)
I understand May to be disclaiming a "performance" criterion of
moral status where entities have standing only if they have the
capacity to perform certain acts like having a self-concept or
speaking and so forth. He is affirming a humanistic claim for the
moral dignity of each member of the species, regardless of its
capacities or level of development.^
In another passage, he gives this support for his belief;
The fetus, and we are here concerned with the human
fetus, is obviously an entity that is living, that is
individuated at least with respect to its parents if not
(prior to segmentation) with respect to any possible
twins it might have, and that is human. There is an
identity in being between the zygote, the fetus, the
neonate, the child, the adolescent, the adult, the
senior c itizen. (May, 198-:22)
2John T. Noonan, Jr. a frequently cited conservative author, has expressed a similar
view in a statemen^t to the N.Y. legislature: "I myself know only one test for humanity: a
being who was conceived by human parents and is potentially capable of human acts.
We know he is a man because he came of human flesh and is expected, at some point, to be
able to perform a human act, to think a human thought." (cited in Callahan, 1971)
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Fetuses are to be considered human beings for they are the same
beings as the adults they will become.
I believe these two passages are the basis for the premisses of
May's argument. Yet another passage lends substance to this
assessment:
The teaching [of the Roman Catholic Church] is predicated
upon the following beliefs: that fetal life is human life
that every human being is a subject of rights, such
as the right to life, that are his because they are God-
given (or in humanistic terms, because he is a human
being), and not because they have been conferred upon him
by society or because he has achieved something through his
own personal activity that gives him a claim to rights
that others do not possess. (May, 1974:15)
If May were to capsulize his reasoning into a small syllogism, he
would most likely write something like the following:
(1) Each human being has a moral status equal to that
of any human being.
(2) All fetuses are human beings.
(3) Therefore, each fetus has a moral status equal
to that of any human being.
4.2 The First Premiss: A Humanistic Principle
The first premiss is a humanistic principle. It is based on a
thesis that is, to use Noonan's words, "... a refusal to discriminate
among human beings on the basis of their varying potentialities."
-
(Noonan, 1970:51) Expanding, we may say that it implies that, for
example, differences in physical, intellectual or social status are
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not to imply a difference in moral status among humans. It is not to
matter for purposes of moral consideration, whether humans are
intellectually gifted or stunted, physically capable or handicapped,
healthy or ill, young or old, rich or poor - whether they are social
benefactors or criminals. All are to be entitled to equal
consideration, equal respect and protection under the law, just in
virtue of their humanity. All that (1) asserts is that among human
beings, there is no difference in moral standing. It is a humanistic
bid for equal rights for all human beings.
Intuitively, such a humanistic principle presents little difficulty,
for its denial calls up images of class privilege and rigid caste
systems, of the worst in human history. Yet attractive as it is with
so ugly a contrary, we must ask if it can be rationally defended.
May spends some time providing a rationale for the humanistic
principle. There are two steps to his reasoning. In the first, he
develop s a theory of human nature. In the second, he derives the
normative claim of equal rights from his conclusions about human
nature.
May's understanding of human nature is drawn from the natural
law tradition. 3 He begins by observing that the term "human" is
used in two distinct ways. In one sense, an entity can be said to be
human if it is a member of the same biological species as other
humans, or, in other words.
Definition (A): S is a human being iff S has a human genotype.*^
.. ^For instance, he writes, "In common with many moralists in what can be termed the
natural law tradition, I conceive the human good...." (May, 1974:18)
^To be more precise. May should add, "... or some recognizable variation of the human
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The second sense of the term, May writes. "... implies that a
human being is not totally human when he comes into existence...
being human is not something factually given but is rather a process,
a growth. (May, 198-:18) Further, the process is ”directed.''5 That
is to say, - ^
tomaTjLrt (what we can call thehu an good or bonum humanum) perfective of a humanbeing and that human beings are summoned, individually
and as members of the human_community, to struggle to
achieve those goods that are perfective of them.
(May,1974:18)
It seems fairly clear from this that May is speaking
teleologically. Human beings develop in directed patterns; the
process of their growth is aimed at a paradigmatic state, the
perfected state of the mature member of the species. If we know
what a mature human being is then we also know the goal towards
which every member of the species "struggles." Given all of this, the
second sense of "human being" would be:
Definition (B): S is a human being iff S is in the process
of developing the properties that are typical of
mature or "perfect" human being.^
genotype," to include cases of trisomies.
The expression is coined by Daniel Callahan in his discussion of the significance of
potentiality. (Callahan, 1 970; 366-70)
0 Callahan develops this notion quite well; for example, he writes, "My working
assumption is thatr when we speak of human life, we must also speak of (a) human
potentialities, and (b) potentialities in a direction, i.e. not random potentialities, but
potentialities which,speaking teleologically, can...be said to be directed. This term does
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It IS further understood that in order to develop, human beings
need certain “goods." Thus if a "perfect" human being is a rational
animal, all human beings will require certain things in order to
achieve and maintain their rationality. All of them will need life for
one can be neither rational nor an animal without it. Further, truth
will be needed in order to exercise reason, so, it too, will be a
human good. And it human beings are by nature social creatures, they
will require justice, friendship and peace to thrive as social
entities. All of these goods then will be parts of the bonum
humanum, that which is needed fo? a human being by Definition (A)
to be also a human being by Definition (B).
I believe that May assumes also that if an entity is a human being
in the first sense, it is also one in the second sense for it is part
and parcel of having a human genotype to be growing in the direction
of perfect humanity until one has reached maturity.
A last feature of May's characterization of human nature is that
he believes that man's "supreme and absolute good," that which
distinguishes him from all other animals, is his capacity for moral
agency. (May, 1974:19) Thus, humankind's highest goal is to be able
to exercise the capacity to "distinguish between is and ought,
between what men actually are and do and what men ought to be and
ought to do." (May,1974:18)
not imply a director but is only meant to be a way of interpreting the apparent fact that
human development shows certain characteristic patterns and directions. These patterns
and directions are toward rationality, individuality, culture-making, language, human
relationships, tool-making and so on. It is because we know the whole human career ...
and because we know man as a whole ... that we are justified in talking of human beings
in terms of their actualized realities and their as yet unrealized potentialities. Our
knowledge of the former enables us to speak of the latter, and to speak of the latter in
teleological language." (Callahan, 1970: 366)
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The next step for May is crucial. Having given a non-normative
description of human nature, he now moves to justify claims to
those goods that are perfective of human nature:
Because they are real goods corresponding to real needs
existing in every human being just because he is human
they generate real rights: each human being has a right
’
to them, a claim on them, precisely because he is a
hurnan being and because they are the realities that
make a human being more human. (May,1 974:1 8-9)
According to May, it is precisely "because human beings share a
common nature that they have common goals. To meet those common
goals certain goods are required: life, truth, freedom and so forth.
Thus, all human beings, having the same basic human needs, come to
have equal rights to life, truth... etc. Rights are generated from
human needs for goods that are perfective of human nature.
May also distinguishes between needs that he calls "real" and
those that are not. "Real" needs correspond to "real" goods which are
goods perfective of human nature. Human beings have rights only to
"real" goods. Ruled out then are any alleged rights to things that
hinder the humanization process or demean or harm human beings. No
one would have the right to help in cultivating ignorance, ill health
or antisocial behavior.
If the reasoning above is correct then one can account for the
rightness of providing individual humans with what they need to
develop their human capacities, great or meagre, and for the
.
.
wrongness 'of depriving any human of life or liberty, health care or
the opportunity for learning.
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It IS appropriate here to resurrect Sumner's criticism of
conservatives on the grounds that, from the perspective of moral
intuitions, their position was chauvinistic. Thus far. May has shown
that human beings have rights to develop their human capacities,
great or meagre and so forth. But he has not given reason to suppose
that non-human animals lack rights to develop their capacities, even
if their only capacity is managing to stay alive. If he and other
conservatives were willing to accord this courtesy to members of
sN spGciGs, CGrtainly thGy would not bo chauvinistic.
But May, for one, doGs not bGliGVG that animals havG any rights,
not GVGn thG right to life. Hg is quitG ciGar about his bGliof that
momborship in thG human spGciGS has a spGcial moral significancG.
In an GndnotG, he explains why he thinks there is a difference in kind
between animals with a human genetic code and other animals and
why that difference has moral ramifications:
My basic point is that being a human being does make
a significant moral difference because the difference
between man and other animals demands, for its
sufficient explanation, the presence within man's
makeup, that is, within his being, of an element not
found at all in other animals, namely spirit.
(May,1 974:34)
What he asserts is that all and only human beings have spirits
and, thus, only they have "human" rights. I assume that this implies
that entities that lack spirits, regardless of their capacities for
speech and reason, lack any rights at all.
One wishes that May had not added this bit of clarification. His
reasoning in the main body of the paper would have committed him.
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at the most, to an acknowledgment of some animal rights, but that
seems to be less of an embarrassment than the need to explain how
he knows that only animals with a human genetic code have spirits,
especially without appealing to capacities as evidence of its
presence. Further, the Jask of explaining why it is that only
enspirited beings have rights seems also quite formidable. But, since
May has left it that non-human animals have no rights, it is fair to
say that his construal of the rationale for Premiss I is, in fact,
chauvinistic.
However, if a conservative were to disagree with May on the topic
of spirits and allow that non-human animals had at least a prima
facie right not to be killed, they would not, as Sumner charged, be
chauvinistic.
Beyond this, for the defense of (1) to be satisfactory, it must
also genuinely follow from natural law theory and natural law
theory must itself be true. Both criteria are difficult enough but the
second presents the greater problem. Criticisms of natural law
theory are not new. Two are pertinent here. The first would contest
the validity of May's very quick move from the having of human needs
to the possession of corresponding rights, on the grounds that
"Because they are real goods corresponding to real needs ... they
generate real rights." (May,1974:18) This is a move from a non-
normative to a normative proposition, or a derivation of an "ought"
from an "is" statement. Natural law theory assumes that because
human beings display patterns of directed development, it is morally
- right for them to do so; because they are developing towards
maturity, they ought to develop towards maturity. But, as Hume
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observed long ago, the move from "is” to "ought" is an illicit one.
Considerable discussion has been joined since Hume's time over
the validity of deriving normative statements from non-normative
ones. And, though I am not prepared to defend either side of the issue
here, it seems to_ me that the body of literature devoted to the
problem must at least give us reason to pause before assenting to
the natural law supposition that because something is a natural
human goal it ought to be met.
Aside from the logic problem for nalural law theory, it has been
criticized for its assumption that there is "a" human nature. Daniel
Callahan, for instance, reviewed the conflicting opinions of
zoologists over what is known as the "species problem", i.e. the
debate over which are appropriate criteria for characterizing a
species. (Callahan, 1970:356-364)
Opinion appears to be divided into two schools of thought, the
typological and the "population." The typological concept, writes
Callahan,
... is Platonic: it begins with the assumption that each
species manifests an "idea," some common, underlying
trait which a given specimen manifests and which is
shared by other specimens of the species: "The typo-
logical species concept treats species merely as random
aggregates of individuals which have the 'essential properties'
of the 'type' of the species." (Callahan, 1970:358)
The population concept is a newer (late '30s- early '40s) method
- of classification. A "nature" is a composite picture, as it were, of
all the members of a population. Similarities and differences among
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all members of a population are computed and averaged out
statistically to generate a picture of the typical member. Entities
are then classified as members of the population or species if they
have characteristics that are statistically average for its members.
For instance, where individuals in a population, P, on the
(numerically determined) average possessed properties a,c,d and r
but not s or t, then any entity with a,c,d and r but not s or t would be
said to be a member of P.
The population concept yields a more fluid schema than the
typological. Being a human being would mean having the properties
possessed on the average in a given population of humans -
something that may change from population to population over time
or according to geographical location. On the typological model,
however, being human means closely resembling an archetypal
human, the characterization of which never changes.
The significance of the "species problem" for a discussion of
human nature is obvious. It becomes extremely difficult to maintain
a single-character description of the human species in face of it.
Further, a number of anthropologists describe human nature in
terms of the interrelationship of the biological with the
psychological and the cultural, (cf Callahan, 1970 :360 -61 ) Humans
are thought to be much more than animals with a certain genotype:
they are animals with personalities, behaviors and interpersonal
relationships. Being a member of the human species appears to go
considerably beyond the possession of a human genotype and the
- capacity to develop in the direction of human "perfection."
However, it would be unfair to both the conservative and the
humanist to let it go at the unspoken implication that recent work in
zoology and anthropology shows that a population concept of human
nature defeats the humanistic principle that is premiss (1).
Certainly there must be some universal notion of humanity or it
would be impossible for zoologists and anthropologists to pick out a
population as a human population in the first place.
Also, May could argue his case by saying that what the
anthropologists have found is not a new and changing concept of
human nature but rather a variety of ways in which intellectual,
social, moral and cultural goals have been met. It might not be the
case that those goals were absent in certain human populations and,
hence, not normal for some human beings, but only that the various
cultures expressed them differently. For example, he might say that
moral agency is normal or essential for human beings without
requiring that every society have the same moral code. What would
pose a serious threat to May's view would be the discovery of a
population of human beings where, on the average, the members were
incapable of moral decision making or lacked even the capacity to
think or judge. I don't know if even a populationist would call this a
human population. But if he did, there would be a conflict with May's
position. Otherwise, the two do not seem to be incompatible.
It is the problem of deriving the normative from the non-
normative that is the more serious difficulty for premiss (1). And I
can see no way to circumvent it. What can be said is that this is a
problem for natural law theory, just as the apparent legitimacy of
- suppressing individual rights is a problem for classical utilitarian
theory. We do not have at this point any "fullproof" normative theory
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and so premiss (1) is perhaps as solidly based a principle as we can
hope for in the realm of applied ethics/
4.3 The Second Premiss: the Fetus' Species
Though premiss (1) is the mainstay of liberal thought, just the
opposite is true of premiss (2). The assertion of fetal humanity
marks the point where liberals and conservatives part ways. As
Roger Wertheimer has put it, the liberal cannot make sense of a
claim that would have newly fertilized ova and adult persons be the
same kind of being. Such an assertion, he says
... is not simply false, but wildly, madly false, it is
nonsense, totally unintelligible, literally unbelievable.
Just look at an embryo. It is an amorphous speck of
apparently coagulated protoplasm. It has no eyes or
ears, no head at all. It can't walk or talk; you can't
dress or wash it. Why it doesn't even qualify as a
Barbie doll, and yet millions of people call it a
human being, just like one of us.
(Wertheimer, 1971, in Feinberg, 1984:46)
What could motivate a conservative to maintain such an
unintuitive stance? As a number of authors have thought, it is like
pointing to an acorn and pronouncing it an oak tree.
May, as a conservative, sets appearances aside and maintains that
^1 have not directly addressed Sumner's criticism of conservatives on account of the
"species chauvinism" implied in a "humanistic principle." However, I do not think that
it is a serious criticism unless conservatives insist that non-human animals have no
rights to the goods that they require to reach the goals peculiar to their species. If they
will allow that we have at least a prima facie obligation not to frustrate their "struggle",
the humanistic principle will be good as an application of a more general principle that
all living things ought to fulfill their "natures."
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the amorphous specks of apparently coagulated protoplasm are
indeed "one of us." He gives two reasons to support of his assertion.
The first is that biomedical science shows that at conception a
new organism comes into being. It is distinct from its parents,
genetically unique (unless there is twinning, in which case the
unique” genetic code is duplicated) and the new organism has the
capacity to complete its development without any further stimulus
from outside. The data from biomedical research, he contends, are
"reality-making" factors. They paint a picture of fetuses that shows
that in spite of their appearance, ‘they are identifiable members of
the human species - not parts of the mother, gametic material or
mere blueprints.
May’s second reason for thinking that all fetuses are human
beings is that they are the same entity as a later entity that is
undoubtedly a human being. He reasons that it fetus and adult are the
same being, they must assuredly be of the same species. For
instance, he writes:
There is an identity in being between the zygote,
the fetus, the neonate, the child, the adolescent,
the adult, the senior citizen. (May,1974 :22 )
-Jt is a view, I believe, that assumes that human beings as well as
some other entities are substances whose properties may change
over time but which nevertheless remain the same being. Thus a
human being, though it had at the beginning of its life few of the
-
properties that would characterize it when it is an adult would
nonetheless be the same being as the adult. And, if, as an adult, it is
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a member of the species homo sapiens, then, as an embryo, it would
also have been a member of that speoies and vice versa. There is no
pent in development. May would say, when the fetus-later child-
later adult undergoes an essential change, i.e. goes from being one
kind of entity to being another. The entity that resulted from the
fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm is the same one that
is later an adult human being.
There is an intuitive plausibility to_ the view. Modern obstetric
practice and fetal medicine, for instance, affirm a continuum in
human growth and development that begins at conception and
continues to maturation.8 Geneticists have also traced the source
of various abnormalities to irregular patterns of ceil division in the
conceptus. And, of course, the effects of maternal diet, drug and
alcohol use during pregnancy are recognized as significant factors in
infant health. All this lends support to May's claim. It seems most
reasonable to believe, for instance, that the entity that was
undergoing deviant mitosis patterns one day after conception is the
same one that now has Down's syndrome one year after birth.
Mays sameness of being" claim, however, is not justified
primarily by its intuitive appeal. It is more substantially grounded
in Aristotelian principles of potentiality. It is because the fetus has
the active potential to develop into an adult human being that May
knows it will be the same being as a later adult human being.
Francis C. Wade, another conservative author, has explained the
g For example, Mary Lou Moore writes, "Growth and development follow very specific
patterns in an orderly sequence. Both are part of a continuum for many years after
birth. Realities in C hildbearing. fW.B. Saunders C.,1 983:1 82).
viGw most ciGarly. Hg writGs,
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The central purpose of the Aristotelian notion of potency
IS to explain continuity, both in becoming (one being acquiresa new characteristic) and in generation-corruption (whereone being IS turned into another kind of being.) If one deniescon inuity in change, he will have little use for potenSv
fyoiftLi h “w I'’® 'ypes- And there are
one to account for continuityin beroming and generation, another to account for continuity
^
acifip to acting. The first type, where
something happens to a being, is called passive potency the
second type where a being itself actively does something
IS predictably called active potency.
(Wade,1975:239)
Wade has articulated in a detailed way what May seeks to convey
in his assertion that there is an identity in being between a fetus
and a later human being. The fetus, itself, develops into an adult.
Further, to follow Wade, the fetus must so develop for not only does
it have an active potential to do so but its active potential is
natural as opposGd to spGcifiabiG. (WadG, 1975: 243-5)
WadG is appGaling to a furthsr Aristotslian distinction bstwssn
thG capacity of an entity to change either as a result of a choice it
can make (specifiable potency) or as a result of its very nature
(natural potency) or, as we might say today, because of its genetic
programming. The fact that fetuses will change i.e. develop into
adults, is not open to any choice on their part; they must so develop.
Hence, there is a guarantee that we have before us an entity that is
the same being as a human being and so, is itself a human being.
To quote Wade further ...
Where the future is prescribed, then it is present in that
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prescription. The genotype is actually in the present its
potential future because its constitutional prescription
in the present will control and guarantee the future.
... The potentiality of the fetus to become an adult is not
a passive potency, which is neutral to the future; nor a
specifiable active potentiality, which is a very "iffy"
promise, but is an active natural potentiality or tendency
which IS a guarantee of the future as far as the agent is
concerned.
_
(Wade,1975:245)
In spite of Its intuitive appeal and theoretical support, not
everyone would agree with the claim that every unborn human is the
same being as a later human being. No one is saying that fetuses are
not humans in the sense that they are fetuses of another species, but
there is considerable difference of opinion over whether they are
human beings as opposed to human things. If they are but human
things, they are not the same beings as later human beings. Only if
fetuses are human beings to start off with can they share an
identity with a later human being. .
First of all, there is a difference of opinion among writers in the
Aristotelian tradition itself. Some authors, notably Aristotle and
St.Thomas, claimed that the early fetus, though physically
continuous with the mid-term fetus, was not the same being because
it had undergone an essential change. They believed it had made a
transition from a vegetative form of life to an animal form of life
and in so doing had developed from a human thing (as a human heart
or human tissue are human things) into a human being, an individual
member of The species homo sapiens.
A second line of objection derives from out of the Aristotelian
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tradition, from Lockean and post-Lockean ontologicai anaiyses
where the ianguage of substance is abandoned.
To attempt a response in May's behalf to this second objection is
beyond the bounds of what can be done here. As in the previous
chapter where the issue was between ontologies of substance over
those of processes, we cannot hope to provide adequate grounds for
deciding in favor of one ontological system over another. It must be
sufficient to note that the locus of one's metaphysical sympathies
will more than likely determine one's willingness to continue
thinking about May's view.
For our purposes here, we will suppose that an Aristotelian
ontology of substance is still defensible. We may then focus on
objections to May's claim levelled from within the Aristotelian
tradition.
4.3.1 Joseph Donceel: The Hylomorphic Theory
One such objection is raised by Joseph F. Donceel, S.J., in his
paper, "A Liberal Catholic's View" (Feinberg, 1984:1 5-20). The
objection is derived from the hylomorphic theory which he espouses.
According to that doctrine, the soul is the formal cause of a human
being. It is that which gives it its shape (as the form of a statue
informs a block of marble). Thus, it is not until a body displays the
peculiarly human shape that it can be said to be ensouled or
animated. This is the time when it is genuinely a human being. A
being certainly exists prior to animation but it is not a human being
until it has a distinctively human form. This view, which claims that
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there is a time span during which a fetus is not a human being until
animated, is generally known as the theory of delayed or mediate
animation.
An important point that Donceel stresses about his view is that it
IS not to be confused with dualism. Dualism contends that the soul is
a complete substance able to exist independently of the body to
which it temporarily attaches and thus, theoretically, could exist in
any kind of body. A single celled zygote could serve nicely. In which
case, a human soul could be present
-at conception thereby casting
doubt upon the theory of delayed animation.
The hylomorphist understands the soul as an incomplete
substance, something that does not exist outside of or independently
of a body, for it is the very form of the body. Donceel would say then
that displaying a human form is a necessary and sufficient condition
for being a human being.
From what embryology has shown, it is not until the sixth or
seventh week of gestation that the fetus has developed basic organs
and looks more human than not.® Prior to this time, it would be
presumed that the fetus, though a human thing, was not yet a human
being.
There is something to be said for this view. Though it lacks the
elegance of May's simple identity, it captures the roots of an
uneasiness over calling a morula, a blastula or a C-shaped, 4mm.
long, detailed entity a human being. Neither the zygote's morphology
nor its physiology match ours.
Donceel's view also avoids the worrisome facts that part of the
^l am judging from illustrations in Arcy, Developmental Anatnmv: A Taxthnnk and
j^aboratorv Manual of Embryology. (W.B. Saunders Co, 1974 ).
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conceptus develops into the amnion and that the entire conceptus
may divide to duplicate itself. In a sense, there is Just too much in a
very early fetus for us to think of it as a human being; human beings,
intuitively, are not the kinds of things that can sprout a cocoon like
shelter or divide to become two entities.
Nonetheless, I believe that Donceel's view creates more problems
than it solves. For one thing, he does not explain how it is that the
soul comes to inform the embryo’s body. That body has been in the
process of acquiring a human form over a period of some weeks -
presumably without the benefit of help from a human soul. Did the
soul then only put on the finishing touches? Or had it been slipping
into the body gradually, infiltrating rather than being inserted all at
once? Further, Donceel does not indicate a criterion for determining
when there is a complete human form. Would a general outline with
rudimentary organs suffice or would the body not be animated until
the organs were functional and the form refined? And, finally, if the
soul is the form of the body and nothing else then it seems that talk
about souls is superfluous. Why not simply say that something is a
member of the human species when it looks like an adult human
being?
4.3.2 Lawrence Becker: The Form Criterion
This latter strategy is adopted by Lawrence Becker
(Becker, 1975). He has proposed that an entity becomes a human being
when the metamorphosis from a human-becoming to a human-being
is complete:
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... the metamorphic phase of human generative
development (i.e. the fundamental differentiation)
IS complete when (1) the organism has assumed
Its basic gross anatomical form, normal or not
(by which I mean basic skeletal structure,
musculature, arrangement of organ mass and
distribution of tissues): (2) the organism’s
inventory (normal or not) of histologically
differentiated organs is complete. (Becker,1 975:343)
He IS stipulating that a human form is necessary for humanity proper
and that the form must be quite refined for the fetus to count as a
member of the species. His reasoning is that until this point of
development, the fetus is still evolving towards its final form.
Beyond this point of development it merely grows and matures. He
feels confident that by about six and one half months gestation a
fetus has achieved its form. It is no longer becoming but actually is
a bona fide member of homo S3piens.
Becker's argument for this thesis is analogical. He proposes that
we understand the development of a fetus into a human being as akin
to that of the metamorphosis of a caterpillar into a butterfly. He
suggests that as it would be inaccurate to call a pupa or a larvae a
butterfly, so it would be to call an early fetus a human being.
The analogy is not very good because the caterpillar, strictly
speaking, never becomes a butterfly. Rather it carries the butterfly
embryo within itself and that is what eventually emerges as a
butterfly. Further, even if someone thought that a caterpillar became
a butterfly, they would not be justified in believing that caterpillars
_.were butterfly things, like butterfly wings or butterfly antennae.
Any given caterpillar is a unique entity of the same species of
insect as the butterfly from which it came; it is a butterfly at the
larva staged
In view of these inaccuracies, Becker's argument is not
compelling. But there appears to be no reason why we could not take
his view simply as a proposal to use form as an indicator of
humanity along with the stipulation that "form” means "refined or
completed form."
We would then have two separate assessments of what it means
to have a distinctively human form. The one would say that a fetus
became a human being when it displayed a minimally identifiable
human shape, the other when its development was virtually
complete. I"' With no way to judge between the two, one would
conclude that if form is to be an indication of humanity, a fetus
becomes a human being at any time from two to seven months
gestation. Further, the preference of an earlier date when the form
is just discernible or a later one when the metamorphosis is almost
complete appears to be quite arbitrary.
The looseness of the time boundaries, however, seems not to
spoil Donceel s or Becker's efforts to rebut a conservative position
because, if their reasoning is good, there is no human being for at
^°lt is easy to assume that, (i) "This entity is a butterfly at the larva stage," means the
same as (ii) "This entity is a butterfly larva." However, it may or may not be the case
because (ii) is ambiguous between, (iii) "This entity is a butterfly, a lepidopterous
insect that is at the larva stage of its development" and (iv) "This entity is a butterfly
larva, a butterfly thing." (i) and (ii) mean the same only where (ii) is the same as
(iii) and not (iv).
Oddly enough, Becker does not think that the devlopment of reproductive organs or
_
anything like social or intellectual development are necessary for an entity to be
properly thought of as a human being. But it seems that he should require these for the
sake of consistency.
167
least six or seven weeks atter conception and perhaps none for up to
seven months. In either case. Premiss (2) would be false because not
all unborn humans would be human beings; at the zygotic stage and
during at least some of the embryonic, they lack even a rudimentary
human form.
At this point, it becomes difficult to choose between May's view
and Donceel's and Becker's. Both alternatives have merit.
May would say:
(1) S is a human being at ti“iff S has active
natural potential for-becoming an entity S'
which is a human being at t-^^p,
and Becker,
(2) S is a human being iff S has a human form,
i.e. the form typical of adult human beings.
(1) is appealing because we know that fetuses develop into
adult human beings and that they are at least physically continuous
with them and because it has the weight of embryonic science
behind it. Still, (2) is attractive because physical likeness is also
part of identifying an entity now as the same one that existed
earlier.
The most I would venture to say at this point is that (2) is a bit
more plausible than (1) because the physical continuity appealed to
in (1) is very murky. Recall that zygotes are also continuous with
amnionic sacs and sometimes two or more embryos. Thus, in a sense,
zygotes are physically continuous with a later member of the human
-.species but in another sense, they are not. For instance, it would be
wrong to say that this zygote was physically continuous with Jane,
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a later member of the species, because that zygote would also be
physically continuous with the amnionic sac in which Jane, as a
fetus, will be enclosed and, perhaps with Jean, Jane's twin, and her
amnionic sac.
At least, if a fetus displays a human form, we know that it is
physically continuous with a later human being. Thus, the presence
of a human form can serve both to indicate that an entity is a
member of the human species and to insure the presence of one
individual that is a human being and physically continuous with one
later entity which is also a human being. A form criterion would
indicate individuation as well as species membership.
4.3.3 Gareth Matthews: The Psychological Criterion
There is another proposal which, if plausible, would be consistent
with the form criterion but not with May's version of a continuity
norm. The argument is proposed by Gareth Matthews in his paper,
"Life and Death as the Arrival and Departure of the Psyche"
(Matthews, 1979). He suggests, in essence, that there is no human
being unless there is a living human entity that is possessed of a
psyche:
The life of a human being begins when a human
body is first invested with a soul or psyche,
and it ends when that body is last invested
with a soul or psyche. (Matthews,1 979:1 51)
To have a soul or psyche, Matthews contends, is to be alive in the
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way that animals are alive. To be a human being then is, at least, to
be an animal. Thus, though conservatives are right, in a sense, that
even zygotes are the same beings as later human beings, they may
not be justified in their claim that the zygote's and embryo's life is
the life of a human being. If Matthews is correct, they will have to
show further that zygotes and embryos are alive in the way that
animals are alive, viz. that they possess souls or psyches.
The notion of soul as the essence of animal life is not new,
Matthews reminds us. His analysis
-of life is drawn from the
Aristotelian distinction among vegetative, animal and human life.
For instance, he writes that ...
... [Aristotle] seems to suggest that the Greek word
for "to live" has one sense in which both plants and
animals can be said to live, another in which animals
but not plants, can be said to live, and a third in which
human beings, but not animals or, of course, plants,
can be said to live (De Anima B2). (Matthews.l 979:1 52)
In trying to determine whether or not a given fetus is a human
being then, one would be tempted to decide on the basis of the life
style, as it were, of the fetus in question. Is it alive in the sense in
which only human beings are alive? Or perhaps only in the sense in
which plants or animals are alive? But first we must know what it
means to be alive in any of these senses.
Matthews denies that there is a sense of "to live" that applies
only to human beings and not to animals and plants. The several
Junctions that are usually associated with human life, such as
speech, judgment, reason, moral agency and so forth are not unique
to human beings, he claims. Higher primates, for example, are
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capable of sign language where neonates, or certain stroke victims
are incapabie of speech. One could add that the ability to use tools,
develop political strategies and display altruistic behavior have also
been observed m primates. Having the capacity for what has been
thought to be distinctively human behavior then would be neither a
sufficient nor necessary condition for living a human life. Thus
trying to decide a fetus' humanity by appealing to the third sense of
"to live" is not helpful.
In view of this, Matthews looks to the second sense of "to live,"
that in which animals but not plants are said to be alive. For to be
alive as a rational animal means, at least, to be alive as an animal.
When is there first, as Matthews would say, "a little animal?" What
function reveals the arrival of an animal soul? He suggests that the
distinguishing capacity is psychological control.
(Matthews,1 979:1 52,1 53) i.e. when the entity can act to satisfy
desire in accordance with perception. (Matthews, 1 979:1 54) This
capacity reveals that the entity has a psychology and is thus an
animal or, alternatively, that its psyche or soul has "arrived."
The view has much to be sajd for it. As with Donceel's and
Becker's, it avoids identification of one's self with a mass of living
cells that bears no physical resemblance to us. A second advantage
to -Matthews' position is that it squares more with the usual criteria
for personal identity over time. By this I mean that in discussions of
personal identity, one ordinarily determines whether S at t-| is the
same being as S at t2 by looking to see whether S at t-| is physically
- continuous with S at t2 - Where S is a psychological being, we also
look for psychological connectedness between S at t-| and S at t2 -
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The case for personal identity would be even stronger if S at tg
could rentenrber S at t^ and S at all or most all of the times between
t-| and t2-
When May and other conservatives claim an identity in being from
conception to death as an adult human being, they are saying that S
at ti is the same being as S at t2 on the basis, initially, of only
physical continuity between the two. But, since in this case, S at t2
IS a psychological being, it would seem that this is not enough. There
ought also to be psychological connectedness which, of course, is
impossible when one of the partners, S at t^
,
lacks a psychology.
But, if the identity is asserted only once there is a psyche,
something Matthews’ view would insure, it would make much more
sense to say that S at t2 was, in fact, the same person as S at t-]
.
Best of all would be if S at t2 could also remember S at t-|
,
but
since there is little evidence of intrauterine memories, we cannot
with any confidence assert that S at t2 has memories of S at t-j
Nonetheless, it is plausible to think that where S at ti is a fetus
that shows evidence of psychological behavior, which may be
psychologically connected and physically continuous with a later
human being, S at t2^ that S at t-^ is the same being as S at t2-
Certainly it is more plausible to say this than to assert the identity
of-,an adult human being with an embryo that lacks psychological
capacities and even less plausible to assert it with a zygote whose
physical continuity with the adult is conceptually murky.
That Matthews' view has advantages from the point of view of
-
questions about personal identity over time is not part of his
defense of it. He, himself, defends the psychological criterion with a
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negative argument; he argues that conception, viability and birth are
not dofonsiblo throshoids of humanity.
His reflections on the inadequacy of conception as a threshold of
humanity are a oounterargument to May's’ view. They are drawn from
the phenomenon of twinning and can be expressed as a syllogism:
(i) No human being has within itself the potentiality
to become two human beings.
(ii) Every one-celled zygote has within itself the
potentiality to become two human beings.
(iii) Therefore, no one-celled zygote is a human being.
(Matthews.l 979:1 54)
Matthews' criticism is direct, he points out an essential
difference between one-celled zygotes and human beings, viz. that
the latter never have, within themselves, the capacity to twin and
the former do. Hence, one-celled zygotes cannot be human beings.
The first premiss seems true enough especially keeping in mind
the distinction between potentialities that are "within" and those
that are without. Potentiality that is "within" an entity is
generally thought to be active potential or a capacity that can or
will be exercised if nothing blocks its development or expression.
For example, an athlete has "within" himself the potential to run a
four minute mile; he can do it if it doesn't rain at the appointed time
or if no one steals his running shoes. I, on the contrary, even with
ideal meteorological conditions and in my Sunday Nikes, have not
that capacity. He has an active potential that I lack. I might have a
- passive potential for it though. Some "outside" factor like steroid or
other drug injection could let me match the feat.
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If we keep clear this distinction, premiss (i) is uncontroversial.
Premiss (ii), however, is troublesome. The zygote’s potential for
twinning seems not to be altogether "within” itself. There seems
also to be a passive element in the twinning process because, as
Matthews observes, the ^'current research suggests that whether a
given zygote twins is a question of its chemical environment and not
a question of its genetic makeup." (Matthews, 1 979 : 1 54 ) This
suggests to me that the potential to twin is not entirely within the
zygote but rather a phenomenon cause'd by factors from without. At
any rate, the distinction is not as clear as Matthews would have it
with the result that the counterargument is not as conclusive as one
would like it to be.
But perhaps Matthews does not need the negative argument. The
animation criterion may be strong enough to stand on its own. It is a
more reasonable standard of identity than May’s solitary physical
continuity criterion and it is more intuitive.
It also avoids depending on a specific ontological theory and so
would avoid a criticism of being theory-bound. Psyche, or soul, it
seems to me can be interpreted equally as an independent substance
that joins to the body and animates it (dualism) or as a brain and
neuronal system that makes psychological behavior possible
(identity materialism) or as a function that becomes possible at a
given point in fetal development and thus signals the "arrival" of a
mind (functionalism). The theory can be adapted to one’s favorite
philosophy of mind. All that Matthews requires is that there be a
- mind (psyche, soul) "present" in the body before it can be
meaningfully called a human being.
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He predicts that research will show that the fetus is capable of
psychological behavior at about thirteen or fourteen weeks of
gestation, "sometime early in the second trimester." This is after
the time when it is capable only of reflex action and when the
sensory nervous systemJs sufficiently developed to enable it to
interprete its environment and act in response to that
interpretation. He cites as a supporting example an instance of
sweetening amnionic fluid with the result that the fetus swallowed
greater than usual amounts of it, thus rndicating a preference, a sort
of decision made. The fetus' behavior cannot be fully explained
without an appeal to motivation. Thus, it does seem like a good
example of psychological behavior.
A worry that I have with this view, however, is its silence on the
topic of human potentiality. Matthews is clear about using the
presence of psyche as a criterion for humanity at both the beginning
and at the end of life. (Matthews, 1 979;1 56) But there is a
significant difference between the embryo's lack of psychological
control at the beginning of life and that evidenced by a human being
at the end of life. The difference is one of potential.
The irreversibly comatose human not only lacks psychological
control but any potential for it as well, whereas even an embryo, and
in,, some sense a zygote, has active natural potential for
psychological life. It is not yet alive exactly in the way animals are
alive but neither is it alive in the way that plants are alive nor in
1 0What would turn the example into more conclusive proof of psychological behavior
would be complirhentary experiments where certain fetuses were observed not to
swallow greater amounts of sweetened fluid. The increased swallowing behavior would
then more clearly be an indication of preference.
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the way that debilitated humans at the end of life are alive.
The potential for psychological behavior then seems to put early
fetuses in a unique class. Their immediate "behavior", to be sure,
indicates life in the way that plants have it but their directed
development towards genuine psychological behavior makes their
life unlike the life of any plant. Further, their lack of psychological
control IS unlike that of the irreversibly comatose human being in
that its absence is but temporary. All of this is extremely puzzling;
early fetuses are certainly not dead but neither are they alive as
plants are alive or as animals are alive. The conclusion that presents
itself here is that the traditional categories are not adequate for
describing the reality of the fetus.
Thus, I do not think that a fetus' humanity can be determined only
by its immediate capacity for psychological behavior. The fact that
prior to acquiring that capacity, it is inexorably developing in such a
way that it must have it, precludes a neat categorization.
Nonetheless, I believe that from the perspective of establishing a
possible relationship of personal identity between adult humans and
fetuses, Matthews' criterion for_the "arrival" of the psyche is
invaluable. For, there can be no psychological connectedness with an
entity that lacks a psychology.
-'Is May correct in his assertion that all fetuses are human beings
and not mere human things. The support that he gains for his claim
from the biomedical sciences cannot be ignored. For instance, it
makes no sense at all to think of a human heart or a human liver as a
- patient but it is common practice to think of and to treat a fetus as
such. Human things like human tissue or organs have no interests of
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their own whereas fetal medicine treats even zygotes as having
interests of their own, interests that may conflict with the
pregnant woman's interests. Further, the physical continuity
between at least a differentiated fetus and a later human being
lends conceptual support. to May's claim as does its active natural
potential for developing typically human behavior and form.
Donceel’s appeal to hylomorphism does not weaken May's position
because, for one thing, as he himself points out, hylomorphism today
IS held in disrepute. Talk about souls being infused into bodies and
giving them their form is nol very enlightening especially
considering the imprecision of the notion of "form" itself and the
difficulty of accounting for the directedness of the fetus'
development prior to its display of a distinctively human form.
Though Becker's view avoids the difficulties that attach to
hylomorphism as a theory, it shares with hylomorphism the inability
to explain why an entity that is developing a refined human form
falls into the category of human thing rather than that of human
being.
Matthews gives reason to consider a deeper and more significant
change in the fetus' development, a change that can be more cogently
construed as a transition from the status of "human thing" to "human
being" than Becker's or Donceel's form criterion. But the view still
fails to take into account the fetus' active natural potential for
psychological control. If a thing that is now alive as a plant is alive
will, very shortly, become alive as an animal is alive, then the thing
- is not, strictly speaking, alive as a plant is alive because no plant
has the active natural potential to become alive as an animal is
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alive. I think then, that Matthews has given us a good criterion for
deciding when life has ceased but not such a decisive one for
deciding when human life begins.
To sum up, then, it is extremely unlikely that even the earliest
human fetus is anything but a human being. There is room for debate,
I believe, about the status of zygotes because in their case there is
not a differentiated it that we can point to, as it were, and say that
here is a human being. Zygotes are a unique class of entities.
Paradoxically, they are both human thing's and human beings and they
are neither human things nor hurhan beings. It is their potentiality
that makes any classification of them unintelligible. The usual
ontological categories are just not serviceable here.
May, then, by and large is correct in his assessment of the fetus'
humanity. If we take potentialities seriously, as I think we must,
there will be uncertainty only in the case of zygotes because of the
inability to discern any discrete entity that is physically continuous
with a human being and has the active natural potential to develop
into one - as opposed to an entity that is physically continuous with
and has the potential to develop into a human thing, an amnion.
4.4 Conclusion
How are we to describe the status of May's argument? The first
1
3
On© might phras© this criticism in th© Aristot©lian languag© of causality wh©r© w©
would say that Matth©ws has tak©n into account only th© formal caus© of th© ©ntity but
not_its mat©rial cajjs©, (th© g©n©tic stuff out of which it is mad©), its ©ffici©nt caus©
- (par©ntag©) nor its final caus© (th© ©nd to which it develops, that for which it has active
potential). Aristotle, I believe, would have us take into account all four causes to
determine the nature of a thing.
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premiss is a "humanistic principle" that asserts an equality of
rights among members of the human species. It affirms that every
human being has a prima facie right to what it needs to develop into
a mature rational animal to whatever degree that that
accomplishment was possible. At the least, each human being has a
right not to be killed or prevented from acquiring knowledge and
exercising freedom to whatever degree he or she is capable.
May draws his defense of the humanistic principle from natural
law theory where entities are first of ill described in terms of the
telos that is natural to them. Given that each individual has a
degree of perfection toward which it "struggles", May goes on to say
that each one had a right to the goods which she or he needs to reach
her or his natural end. Hence, since normal developing human beings
are developing into rational animals that are social and political
beings as well, each has the right to receive what he or she needs to
maintain the "struggle." Those who because of a physiological or
psychological defect, will not develop into fully rational animals,
have rights to develop to the extent they can.
May draws upon the traditionaj basis for natural rights and the
natural dignity of all members of the human species. I think there is
no one who will quarrel with him seriously over the humanistic
principle.
Nonetheless, as we saw above. May is not open to the possibility
that every animal has a prima facie right to fulfill its nature; he
subscribes to the humanistic principle quite literally. He thinks
- that no no-human animals can have rights. In this he is chauvinistic.
But if a conservative were to allow that non-humans also had a
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pnma facie right, at least of a negative sort, not to be killed or to
have their habitats destroyed wantonly, they would not join May in
his species chauvinism.
Although conservatives may disagree with May about the rights of
non-human animals. I do.not see how they can escape the criticism
of natural law theory on account of its derivation of a normative
claim from a non-normative statement. This is seen by many as a
problem for natural law theory in general. Thus, depending on one's
position vis a vis the ”is-ought" derivation, one is more or less
likely to agree with May’s reasoning. We oannot hope to reach closure
on the issue here.
The humanistic principle that is Premiss I, then, is not so solidly
established as might be thought. I cannot resist speculating,
however, that this will not shake contemporary society's faith in it.
In our culture, at least, it has become a moral axiom.
May's second premiss is more secure. He believes that it is quite
plausible to claim that all unborn humans are members of homo
sapiens because biomedical science does not doubt it and because
there is an "identity of being" between fetuses and later human
beings. I agreed that May's position on the humanity of all fetuses
had the support of biomedical science and that this was significant.
However, I argued that, conceptually, the case was weaker than he
We assume here that any human beings in question are innocent, i.e. have not done anything
that would call for a curtailment of their natural rights, say to bear arms or to assemble or
speak freely. Further, to be completely fair, we should allow that, upon reflection,
probably most liberals would not agree with the humanistic principle in that they will
deny that fetuses, if they are human beings, have moral status or rights equal to other
human beings. Their task all along has been to find non-arbitrary reasons for excluding
human fetuses.
thought because the physical continuity between a fetus and a later
human being was not clear until a point of differentiation. Until
then, it is hard to say whether there is a human thing or a human
being or some combination of the two.
did not think that Donceel's or Becker's arguments completely
defeated May's position. For different reasons, they claimed that a
developing unborn human was a human thing, a "human becoming"
(Becker) until it acquired a typically human form. At that point in its
development, it became a human being: But there seemed to be no
non-arbitrary reason to choose the time at which a human form is
first in evidence over that at which it is more refined (or vice
versa) as the time when the fetus becomes a human being. Thus, the
form criterion turned out to involve an unacceptable degree of
arbitrariness. Further, I thought that the fact that pre-formed
fetuses were in the process of developing a typically human form i.e.
that they had active, natural potential for doing so, set them in a
category apart from other human things and marked them as very
immature and undeveloped human beings.
I thought that Matthews' argurnent was a more effective rebuttal
of May s claim of "sameness of being" between fetuses and later
human beings. On May's account, all fetuses were human beings
because they were the same beings as later human beings. But if one
leaves potentialities aside, the only "sameness" between early
fetuses and later human beings is one of physical continuity, which
isn’t very much in the way of identity. Matthews thought that prior
- to the fetus' development of psychological capacities, it was not yet
a human being but rather a "proto-human", a human thing that was
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alive in the way that plants are alive. My observation was that since
the later human being is a psychological being (an animal), it
seemed more reasonable to say that any entity that is the same
being as a human being must be more* than physically continuous
with it (as May would have it.) I thought that it should also be
psychologically connected to it, something Matthews view would
provide for. However, in the end, I could not overlook the proto-
human s active, natural potential for psychological control. Such
potentiality blurred Matthews' neat “distinction between proto-
humans and human beings. It seemed to me that having that potential
marked the life of proto-humans as different from that of any plant
or of any human thing.
It would seem, at this point, reasonable to agree with a weakened
version of May's view, i.e. that fetuses, at least from the point of
individuation, are members of the human species, that they are
human beings and not mere human things. This agreement, however,
must be tempered by the recognition that it entails subscribing to
several principles of natural law theory. But, as I noted above,
natural law theory rests on an ilHcit "is-ought" derivation. This will
be, for many, a sufficient reason to abandon it altogether along with
the principles that justify even a weakened version of May's view.
Further, it may be that the humanistic principle, even as derived
from natural law theory, does not guarantee that any human being
has rights equal to any other human beings. It may be the case that
in human beings where psychological life is constitutionally
- impossible to engender, there is not an equality of rights - for there
is no "perfection" towards which that human being is "struggling."
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Irreversibly comatose human beings thus may be a class of humans
that lack moral standing. Also, reasoning from the significance of
psychological capacities and potentialities, it would seem that
irreversibly oomatose humans are human things rather than human
beings and so our behavior towards them is not guided by the same
considerations as that towards human beings. Someone who believed
that irreversibly comatose humans were human beings with full
moral standing would then no doubt question the worth of what has
been said above.
Another deterrent may be May's insistence on the exclusiveness
of natural rights. As we saw earlier, because he believes that all and
only human beings have spirits, he concludes that all and only
humans have rights. For those who eschew such a display of species
chauvinism. May's argument will not be convincing. However, it
would not be inconsistent for a conservative to allow that both
human and non-human animals have prima facie rights, to be
determined by their respective teloi.
Nonetheless, these difficulties seem to be balanced off by the
conservative's understanding of the fetus' "reality." I have found that
the conservative's appeal to potentialities remedies a sense of
wrongheadedness in moderate and liberal talk about fetuses. In
these, the fetus has been treated, it seems, like an alien little
specimen, suddenly appeared on the laboratory table, a foreign thing
about which nothing is known except what is before our very eyes.
Thus have discussions gone 'round and 'round about the significance
- of a fetus' immediate appearance and behavior. It has seemed all
along that this approach was both bad ontology and bad taxonomy.
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A fetus at any point of development is not an alien thing. It is not
something we know nothing about. We know where it came from as
well as where it is going. We know also that in living things, growth
and development are entirely normal, that all living things pass
through stages of development on their way to maturity. To attempt
to categorize a living thing on the basis of its immediate properties
alone is bad ontology, for a living thing’s past and future are part of
what makes it to be the kind of thing it is.
Just as importantly for our purposes here, this approach is also
bad taxonomy. Not only adults of a species are classified as
members of that species. Others at various stages of development
are also placed in the category. Kittens are as much felines as are
cats and colts or yearlings are not of different breeds than their
sires. And (in response to a frequently made objection to this line of
reasoning) though an acorn, to be sure, is not an oak tree but only an
oak thing, a germinating acorn or an oak sapling are immature oak
trees and hence are not, like the acorn, oak things. All of this is to
stress that a living thing's kind is determined on the basis of its
ontogenesis and its potentialities as well as its current properties.
If one thinks of fetuses in this way, in context as it were, there
is little room to doubt that they are the most immature members of
our species. Each one is advancing, more or less successfully
towards maturity. It seems to me that this is a major motivation in
the conservative's appeal to principles of potentiality. It is their
assurance that fetuses do not change kind during gestation.
Though conservatives like May have not adequately proven that
every unborn human is clearly a human being (zygotes proving the
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exception), they have articulated what seems to me a rich and
reasonable understanding of unborn human beings. Certainly, an
adequate theory of the moral status of human fetuses will have to
take into account the full dimension of their being.
Chapter 5: Conclusion
In retrospect, neither Michael Tooley, L.W. Sumner, nor William
May has provided a fully satisfying defense of their criteria for
moral status or their conclusions about the moral standing of
fetuses. But, of course, this comes as no surprise. Had one of them
succeeded, the determination of the moral standing of human fetuses
would have come to closure with his publication and this project
would be of interest only as a historical research.
Although we have found no entirely satisfactory position on the
moral status of the fetus, I believe that more than historical
perspective has been gained here. The careful analysis of the views
of Tooley, Sumner, and May has provided a guide to pitfalls to be
avoided in the discussion of fetal moral standing. And, equally
important, it has uncovered the unique perspective that each has
brought to the study of moral status, forcing us to shape further
inquiry in such a way that their intuitions and moral reasoning be
taken into account.
The first part of this closing chapter is a summary of the
strengths and weaknesses in Tooley's, Sumner's, and May's work. In
the second part I discuss two problems that seem to preclude
arriving at closure on the issue of the status of human fetuses and
suggest that a view where potentialities are taken seriously may
-transcend other differences. I conclude that on this view human
fetuses from the embryonic stage onwards have a prima facie claim
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to our moral respect.
5.1 Summary
5.1.1 Michael Tooley's Liberal View
Tooley’s strategy for defending the liberal claim that no fetus has
moral standing is to refute three arguments intended to show that
all fetuses from the time of their conception do indeed have moral
status. He thus considers the argument that a fetus would have
moral standing if it had a right to life and denies that fetuses could
be the sorts of entities that bear rights. He further discounts the
view that a fetus has moral standing in virtue of its being an
innocent member of the human species because he thinks that moral
principles about the inviolability of every human life are
indefensible. And, finally, he rules out the possibility that fetuses
are moral objects in virtue of their being potential persons on the
grounds that a definition of potentiality that would support such a
conclusion also leads to other, absurd conclusions about the moral
status of gametes and systems of things that might give rise to a
person.
In the first case, Tooley thinks that fetuses could not have a right
to life because only entities that can desire their own continued
existence can be bearers of such a right. He further contends that an
entity can desire its own continued existence only if it can
understand propositions about itself and its continued existence.
And, since fetuses lack the conceptual capacity for this, they are not
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candidates for bearing a right to life.
Tooley's rights theory is unconvincing,
I argued, for three
reasons. First, the way Tooley derives his anaiysis of rights as
conditional upon desires from a theory of rights as correiates of
"unforgiven” obiigatjons is invalid. He begins with a view of rights
proposed separately by Stanley Benn and Richard Peters where
entities are thought to have rights if and only if someone else has a
corresponding obligation that the right bearer wants fulfilled.
From this Tooley reasons that rights' then must be conditional on
a right bearer's desires such that having a right means that if
someone wants something, others are under a prima facie obligation
not to deprive him of it.
And, finally, he thinks it would make no sense to talk about an
entity wanting something if it is incapable of desiring anything.
Thus, being capable of desire turns out to be a necessary condition
for having rights.
His move from the Benn-Peters analysis to his own is very fast
and, I believe, questionable. Where Benn and Peters point to a
symmetry between rights and dutLes (that have not been forgiven),
Tooley finds a symmetry between rights and desires (that ought not
be frustrated.) I argued that Tooley put too much weight on the role
of-^desire in rights and that this misplaced emphasis accounts for
the oddness of the view of rights he ends up defending.
There is also difficulty in his interpretation of desire as the
possession of a certain kind of propositional attitude, viz. a desire
- that a certain proposition be true. There are other views about the
nature of desire which do not entail that a subject be capable of
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understanding language. It may be the case that Tooley's
understanding of desire will turn out to be the most persuasive;
certainly, discussion of the issue is not closed. But, in view of the
diversity of opinion on the matter, it is hasty of him to assume the
truth of a view which claims that desires are necessarily desires
that certain propositions be true. Such a view is not well enough
established to provide a sound basis for a theory of rights. He ought,
therefore, to qualify his conclusion that the capacity for language
IS a necessary condition for possessing rights by noting that its
truth is contingent on the success of a particular understanding of
desire.
The third reason Tooley's view seems unconvincing is that on
his theory, entities that cannot desire not to be treated in certain
ways turn out to have no right not to be so treated. The examples he
cited are of unconscious people, of infant boys who cannot desire not
to have certain medical procedures performed on them and of young
girls who cannot desire not to be conditioned into mindless
automata. In all three cases, it would appear that according to
Tooley's theory, the individuals had no right not to be so treated yet
Tooley thinks we should say that they do have such rights.
His solution to the dilemma is to modify his theory by including a
time factor", that is to say, he allows that entities would have
rights if they can at some time in their lives have the appropriate
desires.
I argued that, on the face of it, the introduction of the "time
- factor" would lead Tooley into inconsistency because fetuses, at
some time in their lives, would assuredly desire their continued
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existence. Tooley anticipated such an objection and contends that
fetuses are not the same subjects of consciousness as later human
beings who desire to continue living. He argues that later human
beings have no memories of a fetus' life nor are their states of mind
connected to those of a fetus.
I suggested that there was merit to his rejoinder but that
physical continuity could substitute for memory in establishing an
identity relation between a fetus and a later human being and that
the relation would be stronger once a fetus developed a "psychology"
of its own. Hence, it seemed that some case could be made for saying
that a fetus is the same being or perhaps the same person as a later
human being.
The last conservative claim that Tooley addresses is the
contention that fetuses derive their moral standing from their
status as potential persons. As we saw above, Tooley disagrees with
this contention because on his analysis of the notion of "potential
person
,
no fetus can fit the description and, hence, no fetus has
moral standing in virtue of its being a potential person. In view of
this, he chose to develop a different definition of the term"*, one
under which fetuses would count as potential persons. He then shows
that if this new definition were used, gametes and systems of
things that could give rise to a person would turn out to have moral
standing — which would be absurd, or at least highly unintuitive.
Tooley's reasoning on this account is problematic from the
"'Tooley's preferred definition is, "X is a potential person if and only if X has all or
almost all, of the properties of a positive sort that together would be causally sufficient
to bring it about that X gives rise to a person, and there are no factors present within X
that would block the causal process in question" (Tooley; 168). •
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start. His motivation for developing the "newr” definition of
"potential person" is that fetuses, allegedly, would not be potential
persons if the usual definitions were used. I believe that his
conclusion here is unwarranted. The usual definitions that he rejects
are: - -
S is a potential person if S will, in the normal course
of affairs, develop into a person.
and
S is a potential person if S will, if not interfered with,
develop into a person.
He discounts the first definition because of the
counterexample of a society where most pregnancies miscarry. In
such a society, fetuses would not, in the normal course of affairs,
become persons for the majority of them do not. It would be "normal"
in such a society for a fetus not to become a person. I do not think
the counterexample is effective jDecause it assumes a statistical
understanding of "normal", i.e. x is "normal" in an environment if x is
statistically average in that environment. "Normal" also has a
teleological sense where x is normal if x fulfills its natural
function. For example, the purpose of the eye is to allow its owner
to see; if it does that, it is a normal eye. If it fails to do so; it is
abnormal. (I suppose that in a society where 60% of the people were
- blind, a "statistically" normal eye would be "teleologically"
abnormal.) In the case of the development of fetuses into persons, if
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one uses the teleological sense of ”normal”, then fetuses are
potential persons because in the (teleologically) normal course of
affairs, fetuses do develop into persons - even in societies where
most pregnancies miscarry.
Tooley rejects the. second definition of "potential person"
because he thinks that no fetus can become a person simply if others
do not interfere with the process; he contends that fetuses also need
to receive nutrients and shelter to develop into persons. Thus, since
fetuses need more than non-interference, it is not be the case that
they are potential persons.
I object on the grounds that it is unreasonable to say that
something lacks active potential to acquire a property merely
because it needs ordinary life support. Further, if Tooley is right, no
living thing has active potential to acquire any property because
they all need life support. Hence, Tooley's rejection of the second
definition is unjustified.
Tooley, then, has not satisfactorily shown that, under ordinary
definitions of potential person," a fetus is not a potential person.
Because of this, I claimed further that the arguments he develops to
show the absurd and unintuitive consequences of holding that
fetuses are potential persons (under his new definition) are, in fact,
arguments against a straw man. The "new" definition that he felt he
had to use was, by his own admission, vague; it incorporates
,
for
reasons I was unable to discern, terms like "gives rise to a person"
rather than the usual "becomes a person" and "all or almost all the
- properties" needed to develop into a person rather than, simply, "all
the properties..." needed to develop into a person. Given such open
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ended terminology, it came as no surprise to learn that all sorts of
things seemed to be potential persons. The biblical void itself would
be a potential person for, with a little assistance from God, it too
has given rise to many a human person. Of all of Tooley's arguments,
his response to the conservative appeal to the fetus' potential is the
weakest.
Though Tooley does not succeed in refuting the arguments he
addresses, his work is most helpful for understanding the notion of
moral status. His characterization of persons as entities that have a
right to life allows us to avoid the lengthy and confusing array of
discourses on the nature of personhood and its relevance to the
ethics of abortion. It prompts us to focus our attention on the
conditions for bearing a right to life, for it is assumes that if any
being has a right to life then, certainly, it has moral standing. This
distinction motivated my decision to eliminate discussions of fetal
personhood from this study, and I am indebted to Tooley for showing
that the question of personhood is not inextricably bound to that of
moral status.
Though his arguments are intricate and often difficult to follow,
the organization of his discourse is clear. He shows how the melange
of abortion talk about rights to life, potentialities, fetal
development, species chauvinism, and so forth, can be organized into
a coherent assessment of claims to fetal and infant moral standing.
He works simply with a list of properties that are assumed to
guarantee moral status and asks whether fetuses and, later, infants
possess those properties. His discussion is thorough and honest for
he goes to great lengths to respond to criticisms of his work. As a
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comprehensive research, Abortion and Infanticidf^ is enviable.
One last, particularly noteworthy contribution is Tooley's
realization of the dangers of discussing the morality of abortion in
isolation from that of infanticide and the killing of non-human
animals, (see especially Tooley; 422-424.) As he notes, unless
potentialities are morally relevant, there is serious need to revise
the view that the destruction of non-human animals is permissible
where infanticide is not. And if potentialities are morally relevant,
then liberals in the "abortion debate" must look for a basis for their
belief that abortion is moral while infanticide is not. Certainly,
one of the requirements of an adequate solution to the question of
fetal moral status will be that it articulates corollary claims about
the morality of infanticide and the killing of non-human animals.
5.1.2 L.W. Sumner's Moderate View
Sumner's strategy for defending the moderate claim that some
fetuses have moral standing and some do not is to refute the
contradictory liberal and conservative views and then to offer
defenses of his moderate "differential" view, first on the basis of
intuitions and then from moral theory.
Sumner's first argument is that liberals and conservatives are
caught each in their own respective dilemmas. Their views, he
contends, could be argued either on the basis of moral intuitions or
as positions validly derived from an established moral theory. If
they choose the former strategy they must adopt shallow and
arbitrary criteria for moral standing. Should they try to derive their
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claims from deeper, more general principles of morality, they would
end up with equally bad results. Sumner reasons that any theory
from which liberals can derive their thesis will also justify
infanticide and that the conservatives' appeal to natural law theory
requires that they concede the immorality of contraception. As
Sumner sees it, either way they turn, liberals and conservatives
Stand in that venerable strait between Scylla and Charybdis.
The sentience criterion that Sumner proposes as the standard for
moral status seems to square with moral intuitions and to provide
an elegant solution to the problem of establishing both inclusion and
comparison criteria. Further, he argues that the sentience criterion
derives clearly from classical utilitarian moral theory and that
classical utilitarianism is itself the best version of utilitarianism.
All told, his differential view seems to offer a much more
defensible position than either of the others.
Sumner s criticisms of the liberal and the conservative are
compelling. His objections to an intuitive defense of the liberal
view, I believe, are on mark, for if liberals claim that no fetus has
moral standing but that all infants do, they have to say that birth is
the occasion at which a fetus crosses over into the moral community
from which it has hertofore been excluded. Yet, all of the changes
that attend birth provide but arbitrary and shallow criteria for
moral standing. Sumner considers, for instance, the change of
location from inside to outside a woman's body. In and of itself,
locations seem morally insignificant, as do an individual's
accessibility. Also, that an infant "handles" its own respiration,
digestion and excretion is thought to be unimportant from the point
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of view of moral considerability, for many human beings cannot
perform these basic life functions on their own yet retain their
moral standing.
However, birth does occasion a change in the fetus’ condition
from Its being parasitical upon a woman to not being so, and it
seems that one can do things to a fetus qua parasite that ought not
be done to an infant. Sumner thinks that the parasitical relation does
not affect an entity's right to life, however, but only what can be
done to it in certain circumstances. I think his assessment is by and
large accurate and suggest that the case of Siamese twins where
one IS dependent on the vital organs of the other to sustain its life
IS a case in point. The parasitical twin is still be thought to be
morally considerable, though it is not wrong to kill it by detaching it
from its host. In view of these considerations, then, a liberal's
choice of birth as a moral watershed seems less than perspicacious.
The alternative of defending the liberal view as derived from an
Gstablished moral theory was seen to be no more rewarding. Sumner
holds out Michael Tooley's attempt to derive it from a theory of
rights as desires. Clearly, infants-_are no more capable of desiring
their continued existence than are fetuses and thus it follows that,
on this theory, both infanticide and abortion are justifiable.
Sumner's contention is that any theory that denies moral standing to
all fetuses also denies it to infants.
Sumner arrives at this conclusion very fast, without examining
any liberal theory other than Tooley's (which, ironically, he finds
- wanting) (Sumner,1981 :57-64 passim). I introduced Christina Hoff
Sommers' and Ronald Green's work as representative of other
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liberals who argue specifically against infanticide but for abortion.
Sommers derives the conclusion that while abortion is
permissible, Infanticide is wrong, from her Principle of Nurture.
The Principle of Nurture states that moral agents have obligations
to care for their infants. She thinks that fetuses are not covered by
this principle because moral agents cannot freely commit
themselves to the nurture of fetuses. The nurture of fetuses is the
result of involuntary physiological processes in the woman, thus, it
IS not something she can freely undertake and hence, it is not the
subject of her moral choice and does not bind her.
I disagree with Sommers' conclusions on the basis of what seem
to me clear examples of voluntary protection and nurturance of
fetuses, the treatment of the fetus as patient, perhaps as a recipient
of intrauterine surgery, a woman's abstention from alcohol, tobacco
or harmful drugs during pregnancy and finally, her refusal to
terminate pregnancy for the sake of the fetus.
The root of the difficulty is in Sommers' unusual interpretation
of "protect and nurture" as interactions that entail actual touching
or handling of the subject. I think her characterization is open to
counterexamples like the defense of a victim, the giving of
charitable gifts, and the passing of laws granting either liberty or
welfare rights. In view of all this, it seems that the Principle of
Nurture could apply to fetuses as well as to infants, thus vitiating
Sommers' attempt to justify abortion but not infanticide.
Ronald Green's approach is from a general theory about the nature
of morality as a vehicle for settling social disputes. He reasons that
if it were the case that morality was about avoiding and settling
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social disputes there would be a class of entities who "naturally"
came into the sphere of morality, viz, those who could cause social
discord and be persuaded by moral discussion to avoid or redress it.
Hence, that class of beings would "naturally" have moral status. Or,
as he put it, they would have "basic" rights. This would not preclude
the possibility of other entities having rights, for moral agents, he
says, can confer rights upon them. That is to say, they can decide to
include some other class of beings into the moral community with
all the privileges thereof. Such a class would have "conferred" rights
or moral standing.
The norm for granting "conferred" rights is, according to Green,
that the destruction of members of a class would cause serious
harm to moral agents. Hence, the decision to confer moral standing
is not to be arbitrary or whimsical; it is to be based upon the
effects that destroying members of a given class would have upon
the "natural" moral community, if the destruction would have
deleterious effects e.g. causing fear, insecurity, revulsion etc., the
members of the class would have rights conferred upon them. But
where this were not the case, the moral community would not be
compelled to protect it.
In the case of infants and fetuses, we would conclude from this
that infanticide is wrong because the destruction of infants is
harmful to the class of moral agents and that abortion is
permissible because there is no evidence that the destruction of
fetuses threatens the "natural" moral community (and there is
- evidence that preventing their destruction poses great difficulty for
some members of it).
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There are several points at which I think Green's theory is open to
criticism. For one, not everyone would agree with his understanding
of the foundation of morality. Quite a lot of people would say that
morality is about maximizing utility or about promoting virtue or
doing ones duty- towards fellow human beings. Further, his
derivation of the character of the "natural" moral community from
his social harmony understanding of morality seems also to be
inadequate. For, though the ability to create and redress social
discord can generate the responsibility or the duty to do so, it does
not necessarily entail that only those with duties have rights. It is
plausible to think that the enjoyment of rights derives from the
ability to enjoy the fruits of social harmony. Thus, the class of
entities with "basic" rights could be broader than that of moral
agents per se.
Finally, in spite of Green's assurance to the contrary, it seems
that conferred rights are considerably less stable than basic rights
just because their existence depends on the perception of moral
agents that the destruction of members of a class of incompetents
would be harmful to the moral agents. This opens up the possibility
of conferring rights and of then withdrawing them as perceptions
change. And, as Green has not provided any clearcut guidelines for
determining when there is or is not a threat to the "natural" moral
community, it is open to speculation what will be perceived as "not
posing a threat." Certainly, slave owners and Nazis thought that
blacks and non-Aryans were neither competent moral agents nor that
- their- destruction would harm the "true" community; histories of
imperialism should provide ample reason to avoid predicating rights
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on the perceptions of the “natural" superiors. In the end, then,
Green’s theory does no better at justifying abortion, while
forbidding infanticide, than does Sommers'.
Thus, Sumner's objections to the liberal thesis hold. So far, there
IS no moral theory that implies that no fetuses have moral standing
but that all infants do have it. And, liberals have not generated any
non-arbitrary standards to support the intuition that birth is the
event at which a fetus acquires moral status.
The dilemma that Sumner drew for conservatives, however, turns
out not to be so binding. Sumner had contended that their appeal to
the natural law principle of potentiality for protection of fetuses
forced them to accept also the wrongness of contraception.^ And,
that since contraception was clearly not wrong, a basis in natural
law would not be impressive. This point seems to me not well taken
because the gametes Sumner claims have potential for developing
into adult humans just do not have that potential. Sperm and ova, in
and of themselves, do not develop into adult humans. They, as
individual entities, cease to exist at the time of conception.
The only possibility for saving Sumner's point here, I think, is to
assume the "deep structure" of an ontology of process. It might then
be the case that gametes, as elements in the process that ends in an
adult human being, can be said to have potential for becoming an
adult human being. But, as Sumner nowhere asserts the truth of
^Sumner also contended that assigning rights on the basis of potentiality was
unusual and counterintuitive. I argued that it was not as many rights appeared to be held
on the basis of the bearer's potential, e.g. the right to an education and to health care and
the right not to be treated in such a way that a subject could not exercise some right s/he
would have come to possess in later life.
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process philosophy or his espousal of it, 1 think it fair to say his
criticism of the conservative view on this account is at a stalemate.
The difficulties Sumner discovers for the conservatives from the
point of view of intuitions are harder to dissolve. The conservatives'
conclusion about
-the moral status of fetuses is part of their
intuition that every member of the human species bears moral
status. Sumner thinks that if this means that they believe that being
a member of homo sapiens is sufficient for moral standing, then
conservatives are chauvinistic.
However, he considers the possibility that the conservatives’
underlying intuition is, rather, that all members of species whose
paradigmatic members are intelligent, bear moral status. In this
case, the property that indicates moral standing in a class of beings
is intelligence.
But if this is the conservatives' view, he contends, they must
account for their willingness to assert a criterion of moral standing
as good for a class but not for individual entities that can meet it,
i.e. it is inconsistent to say that the class of humans has moral
standing because its paradigmatic members are intelligent but that
individual primates, for example, lack moral standing, even though
they display intelligent behavior. There is no reason to suppose that
criteria for moral standing should be criteria for classes of beings
but not for individual beings. As Sumner charged, this is but a veiled
form of species chauvinism.
I suggest that his point is extremely well taken especially in
'•view of the fact that many people think it most virtuous to
recognize the moral status of even irreversibly incompetent humans
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while never entertaining the possibility of doing so for individual
non-humans that demonstrate the ability to reason, use language and
form relationships.
There is another way, however, to ihterprete the claim that all
human beings have moral- status. One can think ot it as a claim that
all human beings have moral status. It can be regarded as a denial
that some human beings on account of their race or sex or social
status, lack moral standing. Accenting "all" rather than "human
beings" turns the claim into a statement of humanism, not
necessarily into one of chauvinism.
As such it becomes a counsel to count in all human beings as
opposed to only elite humans and not a developed claim about
necessary and sufficient conditions for moral standing. It remains to
be seen whether humanism, however, does in fact imply chauvinism.
I suggested that judgment on the point should be reserved until the
conservative's defense of humanism could be examined in the next
chapter.
As it turns out, the conservative's humanistic premiss is derived
from natural law principles that- affirm an obligation to provide
entities with whatever they need to fulfill their natures. As such,
the claim that "all humans have moral status" is not chauvinistic
because the natural law principles could also imply that non-human
animals ought to receive what they need to fulfill their natures.
We are thus in a position now to conclude that Sumner's criticism
of the conservative's claim is not justified because that claim does
-not yield a shallow criterion of moral standing: it is not
chauvinistic. One horn of the dilemma is avoided. The other may or
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may not be serious depending on the strength of the ontological
theory from which it seems to be derived, viz. an ontology of
process. For the time being, though, it is fair to conclude that
Sumner has not discredited the conservative claim that all members
of the species homo sapiens have moral standing.
The last support for his moderate, differential view is a positive
defense of it, first, from the point of view of moral intuitions and
then as a claim derived from classical utilitarian theory. Sumner
proposes the capacity for sentience as a criterion of moral standing.
He takes it to encompass not only the capacity for physical
sensation but also the higher capacities for intellectual, aesthetic
and moral sentiments. Sumner reasons that it would be adequate as
both an inclusion criterion and a comparison criterion: all sentient
beings have moral standing but those with greater capacities have
more than those with lower capacities.
I took issue with Sumner's theory on the grounds that as a
comparison criterion, it leads to the counterintuitive conclusion
that human beings with little of the "higher" capacities count for
less than those who are more gifted. I also suggested that he was
inconsistent in ruling our at least normal human fetuses at all
stages of development because he stated that only when sentience
could not be engendered were we to conclude we were not dealing
with a sentient creature. It seems to me that although sentience
cannot be engendered in early fetuses, the fact that they will very
soon develop it should warrant their being included. I suggested that
- Sumner should agree with this because he would probably say that if
it took a few months to engender sentience in an adult, the adult
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would still count as a sentient being and thus if it would take a few
months for sentience to develop in a fetus, it, too, should count as a
sentient being.
From the point of view of moral intuitions, then, the sentience
criterion fails as a comparison criterion and would be admissible as
an inclusion criterion only if it were expanded to include the
constitutional potential for sentience.
Sentience, both as inclusion and comparison criterion, appears to
follow validly from classical utilitarianism. This would be a
strength except that as a comparison criterion, the conclusions are
so counterintuitive as to cast doubt on the worth of classical
utilitarianism itself. And, if that is the case, our motivation to see
its derivation from utilitarianism as a strength is defused.
Further Sumner's appeal to classical utilitarianism fails to
generate the moderate position on abortion that he assumes. The
moral theory gives him a moderate and differential view about the
moral status of fetuses but, in the utilitarian calculus on which
moral decisions are made, moral status is but one factor. The
central utilities of any entity, including morally considerable late
term fetuses, are overidden where the total of side utilities
outweighs it. In principle then, classical utilitarianism supports a
liberal view on abortion rather than a moderate one.
Nonetheless, Sumner's contributions to the project of fixing
criteria for moral standing are considerable. His insistence on
separating justifications based on moral intuitions from those based
on derivation from more general moral theory is an invaluable
heuristic device. The distinction helps identify modes of strategy
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thus enabling an appropriate response. Moreover, it forces a
recognition of the fact that claims about moral standing as well as
other moral principles may be embedded in a deeper moral or, as we
have seen in the discussion of potentiality, in a deeper ontological
theory.
Taking this phenomenon of embeddedness seriously in turn forces
a confrontation of the possibility that the question of moral status
cannot be answered outside of a successful defense of the deepest
structures of moral and perhaps ontological belief, "it also requires
contemplating the real possibility that if the deeper moral theories
themselves are not founded on reason but on moral intuitions, the
issue of moral status may just be altogether undecidable.
Sumner's work is also illuminating in other ways. His reiteration
of Tooleys caveat to liberals on the importance of taking the
infanticide charge seriously lends urgency to the task. And,
negatively he shows the importance of potentialities. His sentience
criterion would be a plausible inclusion criterion if it included
potential for sentience. His own admission that entities in which
sentience can be engendered count as sentient beings reveals, I
believe, his sensitivity to the importance of potentialities. Thus, he
has revealed at least two components of a good theory of moral
status: if it is going to deny standing to all fetuses, it must explain
why infants count and it must defend a credible statement on either
the relevance or irrelevance of potentialities.
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5.1.3 William May's Conservative View
May's argument for the view that all fetuses, from the time of
conception, have moral standing is derived from two claims. The
first IS a "Humanistic Principle" which asserts that every human
being, i.e. every member of the species, homo sapiens, has rights
equal to that of any other human being. The second is an empirical
claim, that every human fetus is a human being, a member of the
species, homo sapiens.
May draws support for the Humanistic Principle from Aristotelian
natural law theory. According to this theory, the reason that
members of our species have natural rights to life, liberty and so
forth, is that they are all either developing or maintaining a status
of perfect" or mature humanity. Being a rational animal is the
telos common to each member of the human species. Hence, as is it
our nature to become fully human (or to exercise our full humanity,
if we are already mature), each of us has a natural right to that
which we need to gain or maintain our human status - to whatever
level we are capable.
On the face of it, it seems that no one would deny that all human
beings are entitled to their natural rights. Michael Tooley, however,
suggested that irreversibly comatose human beings lack a right to
life. In this, it seems that May should concur because the
irreversibly comatose cannot either strive to acquire or to maintain
an even minimal level of human "perfection."
Gareth Matthews arrived at the same conclusion but derived it
from the Aristotelian characterizations of "life", where the
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irreversibly comatose are thought to be "alive in the way that plants
are alive" but, lacking the capacity for psychological control, they
are not "alive in the way that animats are alive." He thinks that the
lack of psychological control in early (up to 13-14 week) fetuses
reveals a comparable lack of "animal life." I expressed some
dissatisfaction with this conclusion on the grounds that early
fetuses, though they lack the capacity for psychological control,
still are not "alive in the way that plants are alive," in virtue of
their potential for psychological control,' a feature no plant displays.
At any rate, there are some members of the species homo
sapiens that do not have rights equal to those of any other member.
Since the irreversibly comatose lack a right to life, the Humanistic
Principle is not universally true. However, since fetuses are
struggling" to develop into mature members of the species, it
seems, according to natural law theory, that they have a right to the
real goods they require to develop to whatever degree they can.
Two further objections that conservatives like May need to
address are those of species chauvinism and the "is-ought"
derivation problem. In the first case, we saw that May, himself,
could justifiably be said to espouse a species chauvinism because he
believes that all and only human beings, in virtue of their possession
of-a spirit, have any rights. -
Barring any forthcoming defense of May's claim, there seems to
be no reason to exclude non-human animals from the domain of
natural law theory where they could be thought to have a prima facie
right to what they need to develop or maintain their respective
natures. This would require, minimally, that they not be killed nor
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that their habitats be wantonly destroyed.3 Were conservatives
willing to allow that non-human animals possess a prima facie right
to what they need to fulfill their natures, they would not be guilty
of species chauvinism. In other words, 'species chauvinism is not
intrinsic to the conservative's view on moral standing.
As for the second objection, that natural law theory derives
normative claims from non-normative statements, I see no avenue of
recourse for conservatives. It is indeed the basis of natural law
theory that because an entity has a certain nature that it ought to
have what it needs to live in accordance with it. I can only conclude
that there is room for doubt as to the soundness of natural law
theory as a whole.^
It would seem then that the strength of Premiss I, the Humanistic
Principle, is tied to the plausibility of natural law theory. But there
is also the possibility that it could be established on the basis of
moral intuitions currently shared by members of our culture. This
alternative seems quite likely since the denial of rights to members
I assert this with some hesitation, for according to natural law theory, only
members of homo sapiens are thought to be capable of developing or maintainng the
capacity for rational thought; non-human animals are, one and all, categorized as
irrational animals. Hence, they might have a right to life but nothing more. However, in
view of research that has revealed the capacity for rational thought in some primates and
perhaps, cetaceans, natural law theorists will need to rethink the basis for their
former conclusions. It may be that merely refraining from destroying intelligent non-
humans will not be enough.
^Still, the natural law theorist may charge tu quoque, for neither utilitarian
moral theory nor any of the deeper underlying theories of rights to which thinkers
appeal, are themselves flawless.
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of our species counts as an important counterexample to any
principle that would imply it.
Trying to establish the Humanistic Principle on the basis of moral
intuitions IS not an option conservatives should embrace. As we have
seen, intuitions, being what they are, are bound to differ. It is safe
to say that many of the members of our culture who are staunch
believers in liberal humanism do not "see", as conservatives do, that
the rights of humans ought also extend to members of the species
in utero. If conservatives want to' establish the Humanistic
Principle in such a way that it will imply that fetuses also have
rights, they will have to derive the principle from natural law
theory and respond as they can to the charge that their deeper moral
theory is founded on an error in logic.
May offers his second premiss as an empirical claim about the
species membership of human fetuses. He asserts that all fetuses
from the time of conception are members of the species homo
sap/er?s. Intuitively, one wants to agree with him, if only because
every text of developmental biology sets the beginning of human
ontogenesis at conception.
Nonetheless, there are differences of opinion. Joseph Donceel
appeals to hylomorphic theory to conclude that zygotes and perhaps
early embryos belong are not human beings because they lack a
characteristically human form which he takes to be the same as a
human soul. He thinks that no human being is present unless the
entity is animated by a human soul. The main difficulty I see with
' this view is that the talk about souls or animation is superfluous.
Donceel should simply assert that there is no human being present
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until there is a human form.
Saying this, Donceei wouid have said as much as Lawrence Becker,
the difference between them being that whereas Donceei thinks a
human form is present as soon as it is recognizable and that
rudimentary organs are formed, Becker thinks the form should be
refined and the organs functioning before we should say the fetus is
a human being. Between the two opinions, we could conclude that a
fetus becomes a human being at some point between s ix weeks and
seven months.
This indeterminacy is a drawback to the "form" criterion in that
it provides little basis for making a decision about the moral status
of fetuses during most of the period of gestation. Further, Becker
offers no reason for preferring a more fully developed human form
as a standard for humanity over a less refined form. Lacking such a
reason, one could say that a time during childhood or perhaps at
puberty, is the point where there the "human becoming" acquires
human form because after birth, the frontal lobes of the brain
develop enormously and the reproductive system is not fully formed
until even later. A crucial part to 3ecker's argument is missing and
its absence is seriously damaging.
Gareth Matthews argues that a human fetus becomes a human
being when it becomes a psychological being, that it to say, when it
develops the capacity for psychological control. Prior to this, the
"proto-human" is a human thing, a human body.
I think Matthews' view has two distinct strategic advantages. The
- first is that it is not theory bound in that all he requires for moral
standing is the capacity for psychological control. Dualists, identity
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materialists and functionalists could each fill this in as they saw
fit.5 The second is that it makes for a more plausible identity
claim between fetuses and later human beings. Once a fetus is a
psychological being, it can be psychologically connected with a later
human being. Since such a fetus is already physically continuous
with a later human being, a stronger claim can be made in behalf of
... "an identity in being" between it and a later human being.
The view is also intuitive in that we normally find it plausible to
discuss the rights of animals (especialfy if they are human) but not
so those of plants. Recent court decisions in behalf of ending life
support for irreversibly comatose humans also lends strength to
Matthews' intuition that moral standing ends with the "departure of
the psyche."
I hesitate, however, to endorse the view that humanity begins
with the arrival of the psyche" because the proto-human's potential
to develop psychological control makes it alive in a way that no
plant or human thing is alive. Though the "behavior" of the proto-
human is plant-like, its development in the direction of animal life
sets it apart plants and from human things like hearts and tissue. Its
potential makes it different from a human body that has lost all or
even only frontal brain function. I believe that the distinction has
important bearing on the way a human fetus ought to be categorized.
If it is true that potentialities are one of the factors that reveal
the species membership or the nature of an entity then. May's
^Perhaps a dualist would take issue here, for s/he might say that a soul was
present all aFong in the proto-human but could not function until the body was
sufficiently developed. I do not think this would constitute a strong objection to the
criterion because dualists would have to explain how they know a soul is present in the
body before it manifests itself - not an easy task.
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contention that human fetuses are human beings is correct. But, he
has not shown that all fetuses are human beings. Zygotes, it will be
recalled, are unique in the sense that they are developing into both
one or more human beings and one or more human things (amnion).
Thus, prior to the point of differentiation at the onset of the
embryonic stage, a fetus cannot properly be called a member of the
species because there is no discernible /fto call a human being. I
suggest that there is little sense In speaking about a member of the
human species until there is an individual entity to ‘refer to that is
at least in the process of developing Into a mature member of the
species.
In the end, May has not shown what he had intended to show, viz.
that "the baby still not born, is a man in the same degree and for the
same reason as the mother." But his is the most articulate use of the
principles of potentiality that have been such a enigma to moderate
and liberal thinkers.
His work reveals that potentiality is indeed the key to
understanding the conservative position. He has shown that it is the
foundation of natural law theory wjiere a human being is entitled to
natural rights just in virtue of its having the potential to develop
traits that are typical of a mature member of the species. Noonan
put it quite well when he said that he knew something was a man
because ... "he came of human flesh and is expected, at some point,
to be able to perform a human act, to think a human thought”
Drawing from natural law theory, the conservative sets the
- foundation of a fetus' natural rights in its potential to develop into
an adult human being.
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The conservative is confident in asserting that every fetus wili
develop into an adult human being because it is a member of the
species homo sapiens. He knows the fetus' species because the
fetus IS the same being as a later member of homo sapiens. It is in
virtue of the identity relation that a fetus holds with an adult human
being that it can be said that the fetus is the same being as that
adult. If they are indeed the same entity, one can be confident that
there has been no change of kind or essential change during the
course of gestation.
Here again, the conservative appeals to principles of potentiality.
It is because the fetus has the active natural potential to develop
into an adult human being that he knows that it will be the same
being as a later adult human being.
May’s argument is one of the best articulated conservative
statements on the moral status of fetuses. He takes great care to
justify the claims that, unfortunately, most conservative authors
assume everyone immediately sees the truth of. Further, the
justification he draws up is well founded in natural law theory. But,
as we have seen, this may well_ be his principal undoing for the
worth of his argument is bound to that of natural law theory.
Still, May's appeal to potentialities as the basis for natural
rights and for deciding whether or not human fetuses are human
beings is an attractive approach to the problem. An important
question to answer is whether the potentiality principles he needs
can be established outside of the framework of natural law theory.
213
5.2 Further Directions
At the beginning of this research, I warned that the definitive
answer to the question of the moral status of fetuses would not be
discovered here. But I believe that what has been accomplished is a
good "second best.” The result of tying to grasp and assess what has
already been said on the issue now enables us to sketch some of the
features that a definitive answer should have.
From our present vantage point we have an overview of the route
the arguments have followed, their points of departure, and their
overall "seaworthiness." One observation we are able to make is that
there are two points at which they repeatedly founder, two
difficulties that will have to be surmounted in an adequate theory of
moral status.
The first stems from the fact that the various views on the moral
status of fetuses are defended with principles and assumptions
which are themselves derived from more basic, incompatible
theories. Hence, there seem to be differences in "deep structure"
that may be irreconcilable.
The second difficulty has to do with the confusion surrounding
the significance of the fetus' potentiality. The notion appears in all
three of the positions discussed above, but there has been little
agreement on the meaning of "potential person" and less on its role
in the determination of the moral status of fetuses. This then, is a
second issue that needs to be resolved.
What follows is some further clarification of these two problem
areas offered in the hope of finding a way to get through them.
5.2.1 Differences in Deep Structure
Over and again, criticisms of arguments have ended by pointing
out that underlying principles or assumptions that had been appealed
to would not be acceptable to the "opposition." In some instances
they were principles derived from moral theories or intuitions
colored by the assumption of the truth of a moral theory. In others,
they seemed to go deeper, to the author’s basic ontological beliefs.
We have seen Tooley develop his theory of rights as conditional
upon desires from theories of rights formulated by Joel Feinberg,
Stanley Benn and Richard Peters. In all of these cases, however, no
mention was made of the natural rights theory from which
conservatives like May draw their conclusions. Thus, it should be no
surprise that what seems like a perfectly cogent solution to the
question of fetal rights to Tooley will make little impression on
anyone who does not see the plausibility of his rights theory. May,
for one, would never be persuaded that fetuses lacked a right to life
because they were incapable of desiring their continued existence;
nor, on the other hand, would he care that it was reasonable to press
their claims because they seem to have interests, as Feinberg
suggests. (Feinberg;1984) May is only looking at the fetus' "nature"
and that is enough to tell him that it has the same rights as every
other entity with a human "nature." Thus, since conclusions about the
fetus' rights are derived from a more basic theory of rights, it would
seem that we must wait upon the solution to the rights question
before we can get on to the fetal rights question.
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Difficulties arose in the same way where utilitarian principles
were used to respond to conservative arguments. Toole/s is the best
case in point. We saw that the bulk of his objections to the argument
from the fetus' potentiality were framed in utilitarian terms that
would only fall on deaj conservative ears. Sumner, of course,
deliberately developed his position from utilitarian moral theory
presumably because he finds it the most convincing. Hence, one
would not expect him to be persuaded by a good natural law
argument.
Some of the most interesting”^ differences emerged from the
incompatibility of theories of mind or human nature as in Tooley's
stipulation that fetuses and later human beings must be the "same
subject of consciousness" for them to be the same being, compared
to May's assertion of "sameness of being" on the grounds of the
fetus' active natural potency. And, a view like Donceel's where
human beings are thought to have souls, (or in May's case, spirits)
further widens the gap and must be addressed before we can speak
convincingly about the fetus' future and the significance of its
potential.
And, finally, both Tooley and Sumner at times have seemed to
assume principles of process philosophy, where the process that
yielded a human person was as "real" as a fetus. This comes out
quite clearly, I believe, in the four arguments Tooley offered against
the moral significance of the fetus' potentiality and it seemed to me
also the best explanation of Sumner's belief that gametes were
potential persons. That is to say, in both cases, it seemed that the
only reason one would think that a process or a system or a gamete
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was a potential person was that one believed that processes have
some ontological standing of their own, that they are not categories
of the understanding, or linguistic constructs, or beings of second
intention. If this is plausible, there is further cause to say that,
indeed, the end of differences is not in sight.
It IS true that I have only sketched my reasons for believing that
a significant obstacle to achieving closure on the moral status
issue lies in the incompatibility of the deeper theories from which
the arguments are drawn. Perhaps a sustained study would reveal
that my worries were unfounded but, for now there appears to be
cause for concern, for how else is one to argue for or against the
moral status of fetuses except by appealing to the principles of a
more general moral theory, and how can one escape seeing things
except through an ontological framework?
5.2.2 Potentiality, Rights and Sameness of Being
Among the factors which have been introduced into the arguments
for or against the moral status of fetuses, one offers promise for
advancing the discussion and may produce a "transtheoretical"
meeting place. This is the alleged fact that a human fetus is the
same entity as a later human being.
As we saw above. May's appeal to natural law principles of
potency is an attempt to establish that there is a "sameness of
being" between the fetus and a later human being. It is thought that
the fetus' active natural potency for developing traits typical of
adult human beings guarantees that it is an undeveloped or immature
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human being.
The issue of "sameness of being" also plays a significant part in
Tooley's argument for denying that fetuses are the subjects of
rights. He rules them out because he believes there is no time in
their lives in which they, are capable of desiring to continue their
lives or of desiring any other thing. However, he is prepared to
concede that if fetuses were the same "subjects of consciousness"
as later human beings, they would be the subjects of rights, for
there would be a time in their lives "(when they were older) that
they would have the capacity to desire.
Further, this "time factor", as I have called it, seems to be an
essential feature of any good theory of rights. We know that the
possession of moral rights is not necessarily contingent upon the
actual possession of certain capacities. Moral rights are retained
through sleep or coma or immaturity. We are not justified in
treating human beings in certain ways for example, killing them or
maiming them or brainwashing them because they cannot, at the
time, desire not to have such a thing done to them or because it is
not, at the time, in their interests.^ not to be so treated or because
they cannot, at the time, display psychological behavior. All that we
require of them, to certify their moral status, is that at some time
in their lives, they will meet the criteria (whatever they be) for
having rights.
Hence, the answer to the question of whether an entity, S, at t-| is
the same entity as S at is crucial to determining what may or
- may not be done to S at t-|
.
But, before bringing this point to bear in the case of fetuses and
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later human beings, it must first be determined that a fetus is, in
fact, the same entity as a later human being.
At least two answers are possible. One is Tooley's; he denies the
Identity because the criteria for establishing sameness of being
with a human being that is a "subject of consciousness" are not met.
He thinks that since the later human being has no memories of
himself as a fetus and that since there is no evidence of
psychological connectedness between the two, there is no basis for
asserting that a fetus is the "subject o’f consciousness" as the later
human being.
I argued that his criteria were too heavily focusses on the
psychological dimensions of seif and that physical continuity should
count towards establishing the identity relation. I argued further
that evidence of psychological behavior in a fetus that is physically
continuous with a later human being was sufficient to establish
psychological connectedness between the two. I concluded that,
together, physical continuity and psychological connectedness are
sufficient for establishing sameness of being between a fetus and a
later human being that is a "subject of consciousness."
My conclusion is compatible with Gareth Matthews' view that
there is a human being present once a fetus is capable of
psychological behavior though he himself has not argued along the
lines that such a fetus is the same entity as a later human being.
Matthews suggests that the onset of psychological life is at about
13-14 weeks of gestation. If this is the case, a fetus has moral
..status at that time because that is when it becomes psychologically
connected to a later human being as well as physically continuous
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with it. The view is attractive. From it, we determine that a fetus
with psychoiogical capacities is the same being as a iater human
being and that it is wrong to treat a fetus in such a way that the
later human being cannot exercise his rights. It will be wrong to
destroy a fetus and to ajfect it in such ways that the later human
being’s capacity to exercise his rights is impaired.
But, what are we to say of May's appeal to potentialities? Do they
establish an identity in being even before the onset of psychological
life? It IS hard to decide. Certainly, potentialities do little by way
of establishing personal identity; "some psychological capacity is
required for that.
I believe, rather, that potentialities are useful for establishing
an identity in kind, i.e. that an entity, S, at t^
,
is the same kind of
entity as S at t-i+p if S at t-| has active natural potency for
developing whatever traits S at ti^^ displays that indicate that S
at is a member of its kind.
Potentialities then, are useful for determining whether a human
fetus is a human being as opposed to a human thing, like a human
heart or human tissue or a human_^body. Where it can be ascertained
that a human fetus has active natural potency for developing traits
typical of humankind, it can be said that a human fetus is an
undeveloped or immature human being.
In this case, a fetus' moral status derives from its being one of a
kind of entity, every one of which has moral standing. However, as I
argued earlier, the human zygote's potentialities are mixed. It will
- develop into one or more human embryos and into one or more
amnions. I thought that human zygotes were rather paradoxical
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things - both human things and human beings or perhaps neither.
At any rate, one could not appeal to potentialities to support the
claim that they are human beings. In view of this, I concluded that
only individuated human embryos and human fetuses were human
beings in virtue of their potentialities.
Consideration of the fetus' "sameness of being" with a later
human being yields two conclusions. If one looks at it from the
point of view of personal identity, one is inclined to say that fetus
is the same being as a later human being when it becomes a
psychological being that is physically continuous with a later human
being. If one focusses on potentialities, it becomes reasonable to
conclude that there is a sameness in kind between individuated
embryos and fetuses and later human beings.
In both cases, fetuses turn out to command moral respect. They
will have it either because refusing to treat them as moral objects
constitutes an injustice to an entity that will at some time in its
life satisfy the criteria for having rights. Or, they have it because
they are immature human beings.
The two arguments are equally compelling. Since the latter,
however, leads to the conclusion that human embryos as well as
human fetuses proper are human beings, one must allow that
individuated human embryos and fetuses have a prima facie claim to
the same moral respect accorded to more developed members of
their kind.
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